FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

DECEMBER 15, 1924

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Published quarterly by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Subscription, $5.00 a year, post-free to any address in the world. Subscriptions, and inquiries regarding advertising, should be addressed to the Business Manager, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 25 West 43rd Street, New York, N. Y.

The Editors will be glad to consider manuscripts offered for publication, but no manuscript will be returned unless it is accompanied by a stamped and addressed envelope, and the Editors will take no responsibility for manuscripts that may be lost.

Entered as second-class matter September 12, 1922, at the post-office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879

VOL. III., NO. 2.

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 3 DECEMBER 15, 1924 No. 2

AFTER THE ELECTION

By E

VOX POPULI—the great American people—has spoken in no uncertain tones. It has declared that it wishes to have Mr. Calvin Coolidge for President and that it approves of his policies, which are those of the party he leads. But what are these policies? In spite of the flood of recent as well as of earlier literature on the subject and the pronouncements of those highest in authority, there is still room—indeed there will always be room—for the inquiry.

In the London *Times* for October 13th we find its American correspondent saying of the presidential campaign, "There is not a genuine issue before the country." This is not the place to enter into the question of whether such a sweeping assertion contains any truth in regard to our domestic affairs. Be that as it may, can we not at least maintain that the three great parties differ profoundly in their ideals of foreign policy? If so, the renewed triumph of the Republicans will mean something more than the victory of a particular set of men. It determines our attitude for the next four years towards the other nations of the world. What, then, is our attitude? Let us begin by summing up in the briefest space the tenets of the American parties in regard to foreign affairs.

Certain broad principles are generally accepted, for instance the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door. To come down to a more concrete and immediate example, all three parties believe —the Progressives the most of the three—in the payment of the Allied Debts. All recognize, too, that America must take some part in the settlement of world problems, including European ones, but their interpretation of that part varies greatly. The Republicans favor what might be called coöperation without commitment. The Democrats wish to join the League of Nations after they are sure the majority of the voters will support them. The Progressives prefer to keep out of the

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hornet's nest of European complications, while putting a stick in it by stirring up the most irritating question possible, a revision of the Peace Treaties; these they regard as the unclean thing, even worse than the war as the source of Europe's troubles. The Democrats, on the contrary, feeling a responsibility for the making of these treaties, approve of them, though some admit President Wilson had to make deplorable concessions to the greed of his allies. As for the Republicans, having refused to ratify the treaties but having got all the benefit for America there was to be found in them, they are indifferent on the subject of their theoretical excellence. Both the old parties have endorsed the idea of a World Court with more or less reservations —the Republicans more, the Democrats less. The Progressives do not much like courts of any kind if they interfere with the desires of the people—who knows, the one at the Hague might be worse than the one in Washington? They also demand immediate recognition of Bolshevik Russia. This is the more laudable as the advantage to the American farmer of putting Russia on her feet so that she may again become an exporter of grain is not obvious at first sight.

One may dispute as to how fundamental the above differences are and how free any party is to carry out its own program. At any rate it is the Republicans who have won the election and they have the President and, however nominally, both houses of Congress, so their foreign policy is the only one of practical importance at the present moment. There is nothing mysterious in their intentions or new in their plans. Through the speeches of the Secretary of State they have told us what they have done and what they mean to do. We are all fairly familiar with the story. Nevertheless, when we are looking forward to the beginning of a new administration, even with the same President, it is well for us to take stock.

We may assume that in its foreign policy the Republican administration will "carry on." The President has expressed his warm approbation of the achievements of Secretary Hughes, and the Secretary has stood forth as the most effective Republican speaker during the election campaign. We may, therefore, take it that for the present there is to be no change in the head of the State Department, and that he will be given a free hand. But that hand, like the President's own, is none too free at best. There are two sets of factors that will always have to be reckoned

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with, those due to internal conditions and those due to foreign conditions.

The most obvious difficulties arising from the internal situation are that though the Republicans control Congress they are far from having the two-thirds majority of the Senate necessary for the ratification of treaties, and that the President's control of his own party is not firmly established, indeed at the end of the last session it was not established at all. Since then the situation has improved. The President has behind him the prestige of an extraordinary personal triumph, he has had time to build up his own party machine and is in a much stronger position to secure attention to his wishes than he has ever been before. But there will always be limits to that attention. Congress is jealous of its own authority and the Senate in particular will not be disposed to abate the tiniest fraction of its prerogatives, real or imaginary. Senator Borah, the new chairman of the Foreign Relations committee, may not have the wide knowledge and experience of the late Senator Lodge, but he is equally set in his opinions. Though he sometimes seems to delight in being enigmatic, we know that some of these opinions are further removed from those of the administration than were those of Senator Lodge. Secretary Hughes, with the best of intentions, has never been particularly successful in conciliating Senators. He will have to tread warily. For instance, the idea of a cancellation of the Allied Debts, much as there is to be said for it, cannot for the present be entertained.

One pressing question has been settled by the Democratic Convention. There are few things most of the members of that august assembly understood less or cared less about than the treaty between Turkey and the United States, negotiated at the time of the Lausanne Treaty and on similar principles. None the less, as a concession to one group, a condemnation of the Turkish treaty was inserted in the Democratic Platform. Little as such planks often mean, it is hard to see how the Democrats in the Senate can now vote for the treaty which is to be submitted to them. Without their votes it cannot be carried. The State Department is thus left in an embarrassing quandary. Treaty or no treaty, the Turks do not intend to recognize the capitulations any longer. We are likely to find ourselves in a position where we shall have no legal means of protecting Americans in Turkey, or of obtaining redress of grievances, save by

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the use of force on a large scale, which we certainly do not wish to undertake. To be sure, our trouble with Turkey, though disagreeable, does not affect vitally many people in the United States. If every American is put out of Turkish territory, if the American schools and colleges which have done such wonderful work are closed and further American enterprise of all kinds is made impossible, this will be annoying, but it will not endanger our security or prosperity. We can forget about Turkey if we have to. The Far East is another matter.

When we compare the situation in the Far East from the point of view of American interests with what it was four years ago at the time of the accession of President Harding, we note three cardinal points. First, the internal situation of China has become worse, and the danger of actual political dissolution is more menacing. Second, the relations between the United States and Japan, after a temporary amelioration due to the Disarmament Conference, have not improved. On the contrary, the Japanese have a real and lasting grievance which they did not have before, and which they are going to make use of. It is true that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is defunct, but that presented no real danger to us. As to whether the United States is left relatively better or worse off by the military provisions of the disarmament treaties, we can leave this to the experts to quarrel over. What is more serious is that the good feeling which the reduction of armaments was intended to promote, though stimulated for the moment, has been more than neutralized by the immigration bill and by the particular way in which Congress, in spite of the President and to the humiliation of the Secretary of State, insisted on applying it to Japan. The intensity of Japanese sentiment on the subject was well shown by the incident of the patriot who committed *hari-kiri* in protest and who, as is illustrated in the recent honors accorded to him, will doubtless go down to posterity as one of the heroes of Japanese history. Third, Soviet Russia has reappeared in force on the Pacific. She has reoccupied the old Russian territories and reasserted Russian claims; she is in no way bound by the Washington agreement, to which she was not invited; she is fond of fishing in troubled waters, and as long as we maintain our present attitude towards her she may be counted on as being hostile to the United States. We need not be surprised, therefore, if we find her frequently making common cause with

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Japan now that the two countries are on speaking terms again.

Such are the disagreeable facts. They must be faced, but it is not clear what we can do about them. It is true we are too powerful for anyone to pick a quarrel with us needlessly. Even if Japanese public opinion may be hostile to us, the government of the Mikado is not likely to go beyond an attitude of cold and dignified reserve. It has not hurried to send back its ambassador to Washington, it may not send one back for years,—this is a legitimate form of showing resentment, and western rather than oriental. Meanwhile events in the Far East will take their course, and the possibilities are disquieting. We cannot hold China together if she insists on falling in pieces. What shall we do if she does disintegrate? The lending of money to put her on her feet does not today look attractive as a venture. To what extent are we ready to go in order to check Japanese domination or hegemony or spheres of influence in the Far East? Are we prepared not only to keep the Japanese out of our part of the world, but to interfere with them in theirs? Are Pan-Asianism or Pan-Mongolianism more unnatural than Pan-Americanism? Many questions of the sort might be asked, to which it would be difficult to make a satisfactory reply. It does not look as if there were much for us to do at present in the Far East except to mind our own business, look after and protect our commercial and other interests as best we can, be helpful when there is a chance and trust that the situation will improve of itself in the course of time. But our days as the "great and good friend" of everybody are over.

Towards Russia we have adopted an attitude which apparently commends itself to the majority of the American people and from which, with all due respect to Senator Borah, we shall not soon depart unless important changes occur there. This attitude has been firm, consistent and dignified, and its official harshness has been tempered by splendid unofficial charity. To be sure, this attitude presents grave inconveniences. The Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics covers too large a portion of the globe for us to be able to leave it comfortably out of account. We may have few points of contact, but there are some, even if we are willing to sacrifice for the time being our opportunities of mutually helpful trade. Now that the Soviet Federation has been recognized *de jure* by all the great powers but ourselves, as well as by many smaller powers, it will be in-

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creasingly difficult to avoid meeting, that is to say dealing with, its representatives at international gatherings of every sort. Are we to refuse to appear whenever the Russians are invited? And it will be hard to leave them out even when we issue the invitations ourselves. This is especially true of any disarmament conference. Our government cherishes the hope of convoking another disarmament conference at Washington that shall continue and surpass the achievements of its predecessor three years ago,—achievements of which the State Department is justly proud and concerning which it has never quite been able to understand the lack of livelier enthusiasm. But it is only too obvious that a Disarmament Congress in which Russia does not take part will be even more incomplete than the last. At that time her non-participation meant a gap in the Far Eastern settlement whereby whatever was concluded lacked the consent of one of the most interested and most powerful parties. Now it is Europe and western Asia that are concerned. If the Russians remain free to maintain armies of the size they think fit, how can the weak states along their borders, Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Rumania, and Turkey, which already live in some fear and trembling of them, be expected to cut down their own forces? How can France do so if she is to support these weak states, some of which are her allies and look to her for protection? But unless France reduces her forces we can hardly ask it of her neighbors such as Italy and England. The Bolsheviks may dislike the League of Nations as much as do some Americans, but there is a chance, however small, that they will accept the invitation extended to them to take part in a disarmament conference at Geneva. It is possible that they may abide by the decisions arrived at there and will consent to a fair proportional reduction of their armies. But they cannot even be invited to attend at Washington except perhaps as "unofficial observers."

The recent establishment of a Soviet legation in Mexico and the open expressions of sympathy for Communist ideas on the part of members of the Mexican Government are phenomena which we may view without alarm but not with pleasure. Russian influence in Mexico will be exercised in a sense unfavorable to the United States and it will not be agreeable if we are to have a base of communist propaganda established to the south of us. Still we should probably mind this less than one of Japanese influence. Not long ago it seemed that what we might

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have to fear was too close relations between Mexico and Japan, something like an alliance against the United States. There also appeared to be a possibility of an influx into Mexico of Japanese, some of whom would tend to cross the border in spite of our customs guards. This may still happen, but the Mexicans of today, like many other peoples, are more exuberantly nationalistic than of old. They no longer welcome Asiatic immigration, indeed it is conceivable that they may follow our example and forbid it. On the other hand, Mexicans are not excluded from the United States by our immigration laws and we may look forward to their flowing over in ever greater numbers. Before long, in southern California the place of the Asiatic may be taken by the peon. Whether he will be as efficient time will show, but perhaps it is better he should not be if he does not want to become equally unpopular. Any attempt to shut him out would add one more to the possible causes of ill-feeling between us and our difficult neighbors.

These causes are grave enough already. It is in the nature of things that the Mexicans, though in certain respects anxious for our assistance, should not like us and should distrust and fear us profoundly. We have got to accept this and make due allowances for it, and we shall often have to exercise infinite patience. The way that we handle Mexican affairs will be a test of our statesmanship. At present the State Department seems to be meeting this test with credit.

With the rest of Latin America we may be thankful that we have no such permanently delicate relations. We have been withdrawing or are going to withdraw American guards from Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua. In Cuba the situation is reasonably tranquil and things are progressing smoothly elsewhere. The Monroe Doctrine remains a shibboleth to which due homage is paid. Pan-American congresses bid fair to continue with much flow of the soul. All this is well enough as far as it goes. What one sometimes wonders is how far does it go? Is much really being accomplished? For instance the State Department has held that the Santiago Congress of a year and a half ago was a success, but that view does not appear to be widely entertained outside. The Government also holds that Latin America has never been better disposed towards the United States than at the present day, yet some people declare that there is a growing hostility towards us. If this last be true,

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a thing difficult to determine with certainty, it is unfortunate and discouraging, for there can be no doubt of the friendliness on our side, a friendliness perhaps tinged with a patronizing indifference but genuine enough in its essence. We have honestly tried to play the good big brother to Latin America. Still, even the rôle of the best big brother may be overdone.

Since the World War, as never before, except at the time of the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, the more important side of our relations with Europe has been the general one rather than the dealings with any particular country. We of course have our separate relations with each, but they are in the main simple and satisfactory. It may be noted here parenthetically that the return to power of a Conservative government in England will mean strong efforts to check the increasing disintegration of the British Empire. One form these efforts will assume will be an attempt to introduce imperial preference in tariffs, a measure which, however desirable from the British political point of view, cannot help being disadvantageous economically to the United States. Of course, as a highly protectionist country, a protest on our part would be ridiculous. Retaliation would have many dangers.

We may divide our relations with the European world into four main heads corresponding with four great questions which we are doing our best to keep asunder but which insist on remaining connected with one another. These are Rehabilitation, including especially the reparations question, Allied Debts, the League of Nations, and the World Court.

We—*i.e.* the triumphant Republican Party and the administration—have always been anxious to aid in the rehabilitation of Europe and the betterment of mankind. But we prefer to do it at our own time, in our own way, without running unpleasant risks or incurring awkward obligations. We have rejoiced at not being in the mess in which Europe has been floundering, at not sharing the passions and mistakes of her peoples and her statesmen. We have not been wanting in sympathy, as our private charity has shown, but we have believed it to be better for the world (and emphatically for ourselves) that we should keep out of the turmoil and merely proffer advice and indirect aid.

This policy has been justified by its results, at least in the eyes of the American people. After the somewhat sterile period of "unofficial observers" has come the more fertile one of approved,

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though still unofficial, coöperation. The success achieved by the commissions of experts gave the name of Mr. Dawes a popularity sufficient to make the Cleveland Convention feel that his nomination for the Vice-Presidency would add to the strength of the Republican ticket. There can be little doubt, too, that the presence of Secretary Hughes and his wise words at the opportune moment in London, Paris, and Berlin helped materially to secure agreement to accept the report. By our consent to the appointment of Messrs. Perkins and Gilbert we have given it a further blessing. If all goes well, we shall claim no small credit for our share in the transaction. If all goes badly, we shall maintain that it is not our fault. We have recommended and assisted the best solution yet proposed. If it is not carried out in practice, the blame must be attached to those who have not profited by the chance of salvation offered to them.

Our interest in rehabilitation and in reparations, though great, is indirect. The question of the payment of Allied Debts, though luckily not pressing, is direct. The outlook at the present moment is hopeless enough. Of course no government of continental Europe has even hinted at a flat repudiation of what it owes to us or to England, but at bottom no one of the peoples has any more belief they will be called upon to pay their debts than the American people has an intention of forgiving them. The English have made an arrangement which we regard as generous but which many of them resent as iniquitous, and which helps to make it difficult for them to remit what is due to them from the continental powers. Like ourselves, they assert that such debts are quite independent of what the Germans owe for reparations, a view which only prudence prevents the French Government from denying and which to the French people seems monstrously unjust. At any rate, we can see that if Germany does pay a substantial sum for reparations the situation will be easier. If no reparations are to be forthcoming, the prospect is gloomy. Our Government, to its credit, has appreciated the magnitude and delicacy of the task before it and has so far acted with real tact. Unfortunately its hand may be forced at any time by clamor in America or by ill-advised action in Europe.

The famous declaration of the Thirty One prevented the presidential election of 1920 from turning specifically on the question of whether the United States should join the League of Nations.

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The size of the Republican majority, however, and the attitude of the Republican press made it evident that the country as a whole was opposed to any such step. President Harding, who had given encouragement to the Thirty One, soon dropped all talk of an Association of Nations of any kind, and for long the League received little attention (its partisans said scant courtesy) from the State Department. Many Republicans spoke of it with open dislike and derision. Undeterred by this, or perhaps in ignorance of it, the public in Europe continued to hope that the United States might change its mind, and in spite of frequent rebuffs America was persistently invited to take part in one conference or another, and again and again refused.

In the last year or so the tone of the Republicans has become more generous. The League has ceased to be a bogey to them. They have been willing to recognize that it has excellent intentions and has done good in its way. They have approved of our joining in its conferences about such subjects as the white slave traffic and the evils of narcotics. Thus, though there have been few signs of conversion of Republicans, there has been a diminution of hostility on their part, indeed most of them have not regarded the connection between the League and the High Court as an insurmountable obstacle to our participation in that Court provided our own rights, as we choose to define them, are safeguarded. On the other hand, President Coolidge soon after he came into office declared the question of the accession of the United States to the League to be a "closed incident," and the Bok Peace Plan, which was a move in that direction, fell rather flat. The further publicity it might have hoped to enjoy, thanks to its being made the object of a senatorial investigation, was cut short by the more absorbing topic of the oil scandals.

When the Republican Convention came together in Cleveland the refusal to have the United States enter the League of Nations was, without opposition, made a plank of the Republican Platform. The Democrats were in rather a plight. Their party was committed to the League, but they feared that the majority of the American people might be opposed to it. Accordingly they tried to sidestep the issue by a Platonic declaration in its favor and a promise to submit the question to a referendum. One may doubt whether they gained any votes by this subterfuge, for they exposed themselves to the jibes of their adversaries for their cowardice and they made it easier for pro-League Republi-

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cans to remain faithful to their own party, on the ground that there was not much to be hoped for from the Democrats. In one way the attitude of the Democratic convention might be compared to that of the Thirty One four years earlier. Both prevented the question of our accession to the League of Nations from being a clear cut major issue between the parties at the presidential election. This is something for which American partisans of the League may be thankful.

For its part, the Assembly of the League met together in Geneva last September in a mood to take more resolute action than it had since the days of its formation. It had been stung by the charge that so far it had only settled small questions and proved itself incapable of solving large ones. It had also apparently come to the reluctant conclusion that there was no hope of an immediate change of mind in the United States nor advantage in longer waiting. The Dawes Report and its acceptance, the community of views expressed by Macdonald and Herriot, the new willingness of France to entrust the guaranty of her security to the League instead of relying merely on her own military strength, all paved the way for weighty decisions. The result was the Protocol.

This is not the place to go into the meaning or importance of the Protocol, which we were not invited to sign. Much has been said about it and we are only at the beginning of the discussion. For a good effect on America it came out at an unfortunate moment in an unfortunate way. Rightly or wrongly, the Protocol has increased distrust of the League here, reviving the somewhat forgotten alarms of those who had opposed the League on the ground that it was creating a superstate. To make matters worse, suspicion has been much intensified by the eleventh hour action of the Japanese. It is true that they did not obtain their demand in the form they had put it. It also may be true, though it is not clear, that they will be in no better position to urge their claims for a reopening of the immigration dispute than they were before. But the mere fact that the League seems to provide a way in which, without incurring its disapproval, the Japanese may go ahead and act as they please about what we believe to be a domestic question, is like a red rag to a bull to the average American. Supporters of the League will continually have to explain away a clause which seems to present in concrete form a danger whose existence they

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have denied in the abstract. All told, the chance of anything like the immediate accession of the United States to the League appears to have been reduced to a vanishing point. Even the more friendly attitude we have of late been maintaining towards it is menaced. Already there has been some little feeling in America at the proposal to call a disarmament conference in Geneva next June regardless of our expressed desire to have another one in Washington under our aegis. The charge, justified or not, that the Protocol facilitates anti-American designs on the part of Japan is almost enough to wreck all chance of our participating in any disarmament congress fathered by the League of Nations. If, as now seems probable (and even desirable to many friends of the League), the Protocol fails to receive the number of ratifications necessary to make it valid, we may witness the opposite effect. It is too early yet to make predictions.

But this is not all. The fact that the High Court has been brought into connection with possible Japanese claims about what we regard as domestic questions threatens to stimulate American dislike of any such Court. To be sure, President Coolidge as well as President Harding, the Republican Party as well as the Democratic, have pronounced themselves officially in favor of our participation. Still, a good many Americans have their doubts, and a large number, well represented in Congress, demand that it shall be entirely disassociated from the League. This demand has been strengthened, at least temporarily, by the incident of the Protocol and will be affected by its outcome. But the High Court is an indispensable part of the League. It can hardly be cut off to please us nor can it easily be made to serve in two capacities.

On this question of just what we intend to do about a World Court the administration must soon make up its mind. There is no such necessity in regard to the League, for there its mind is already made up. We intend to stay outside with Russia, Mexico, and Ecuador. We shall continue our policy of coöperation and we shall try to collect our debts. In our present mood we care less to have our course idealistic than to have it safe and sane, even if our definition of safe and sane looks to some people a short-sighted one.

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IRELAND, ONE AND DIVISIBLE

By Stephen Gwynn

IT WOULD be a great mistake to suppose that the Irish are not one people. In Ireland as everywhere there are sharply marked differences between northern and southern and between townsman and countryman; and these are somewhat accentuated by the fact that our north is more town-dwelling and industrial than the south. But a southern Irishman has much more affinity with a northern than either has with an Englishman. There is of course a special resemblance to the Scotch among Ulster folk, and naturally, for Scotland was colonized and conquered by Gaels from Ulster ten centuries before Ulster was conquered and "planted" with Scotch—many of them descended from the original Gaels. Sir James Craig, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, is no doubt descended from the planters; but he has a good Gaelic name, and one of the best known Gaelic speakers and writers in Ulster was a Craig and a Catholic. Two of the most prominent Ulstermen in the Imperial Parliament, Mr. Ronald McNeill and Sir Malcolm Nacnaghten, descend from clansmen of the Antrim Glens, who indeed came across from Scotland some centuries ago, but came as Catholic Gaels. It is not race that divides us.

Nor is it a lack of pride in country. Sir James Craig, and there could be no figure more typical of Ulster, considers himself just as good an Irishman as any Nationalist. I affirm this because he once invited a friend of mine, an old ex-Fenian in Redmond's party, to drink a glass with him in the House of Commons smoking-room and then solemnly opened their discourse by this asseveration. There is nothing to be surprised at. Every Irishman worth his salt prides himself on being as good an Irishman as any other, Unionist or Nationalist, Protestant or Catholic. What is more, every good Irishman, and for the matter of that every Irish person, good or bad, hates to see Ireland divided. But they differ profoundly as to how it should be united. Men like Sir James Craig would desire to see it, as Scotland is, integrally part of the United Kingdom. They would tell you, and with great justification, that Scottish nationality is as well marked as the Belgian, for example. And if union had been extended to Ireland, as was proposed by

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those who were then legally entitled to speak for Ireland, at the date of the Scottish Act of Union, and on similar terms—terms very considerate to the weaker contracting party—it is probable that Ireland's evolution might have been like that of the other nation in which the Gaelic strain was strong. But the policy would have needed to be carried out in the same spirit. In Scotland territorial power and social prestige were left very largely with the nobles of the old Gaelic clans. In Ireland all that could be taken from the Gaelic nobility was taken away. Where disaffection to the ruling powers lasted in Scotland it was skilfully conjured away. There was an appeal to Scottish pride when the kilt became a glory of the British Army; but when the Highland regiments were raised most Irishmen were legally debarred even from enlisting in the ranks.

But why? They were not debarred as Irishmen. They were debarred as Catholics. The Gael, if he became a Protestant as some did, was under no disabilities. What divides us is the state of mind inherited from times when citizenship was the privilege of one religion. Protestant ascendancy was adopted as a principle of British policy in the seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth it had unrestricted play in Ireland, where the mass of the people were Catholic. In the nineteenth century, and in the twentieth, the law was altered, after violent struggles, till the principle ceased to have any legal application, beyond that of the Protestant succession to the throne. But in practice Protestant ascendancy existed throughout the whole of Ireland fifty years ago; and the problems of Irish politics still present themselves in terms of ascendancy. There is a difference. Catholics have been content to ask for the application of ordinary democratic principles—naturally, for they are the majority; but also, the fact that many Nationalist leaders have been drawn from Protestant Ireland—including Parnell, the greatest of them all—has given a reality to their constantly affirmed desire that there shall be no prejudice against any creed. But it is not very cynical to suppose that if Catholics had been for two centuries and a half the privileged minority, holding most of the property and having a much higher average standard of education and consequently of efficiency, they, like the Protestants, would have regarded ascendancy as their natural inheritance.

Be this as it may, we in Ireland are confronted with the spirit of ascendancy surviving in the Irish Protestants. For political

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purposes, it is not so crudely expressed. They call, or called, themselves Unionists. Irish Protestants as a whole liked self-government for Ireland when government was placed exclusively in Protestant hands, as was the case under the Irish Parliament of the eighteenth century. But the increasing pressure of the partially enfranchised Catholic majority frightened their leaders into accepting the Act of Union, and in the nineteenth century Irish Protestants learnt to accept the Union as the one possible guarantee against Catholic ascendancy in Ireland. Parliament at Westminster was a Parliament representing an electorate in which Catholics were permanently and decisively outnumbered. In the twentieth century, when it became probable that Great Britain would consent to restore self-government to Ireland, on a modern democratic basis, Irish Protestants fought the proposal tooth and nail. Partition was first advocated as a tactical device to defeat Home Rule. Belfast politicians knew enough of Irish sentiment to know that Irish Nationalists would hold passionately to the unity of their country; they knew enough of British sentiment to perceive that the same democratic principles which justified the concession of self-government to the demand of a majority could be invoked to secure maintenance of the British connection when a majority of the inhabitants demanded it; they trusted, rightly, that Britain would impose partition of the island as the price of Home Rule; and they believed that no Irish leader could accept that bargain.

The consequences were different from the forecast. Home Rule was not defeated. But British statesmen came gradually to consider as a serious proposal what was put forward as a mere blocking amendment. Ulster, which began by saying simply, "We won't have it," to all Home Rule proposals, was told that this bald negative could not stand; there must be a constructive policy.

The history is curious. First the Ulstermen demanded that the whole province, containing nine counties, of which three were overwhelmingly Catholic and Nationalist, should be struck out of the operation of Home Rule and should remain as before governed from Westminster. This involved splitting the Irish Unionist forces. Protestants in the south were jettisoned when partition was proposed: for the opposition to Home Rule had come not from Ulster but from Irish Protestants as a whole, with exceptions of a few individuals. Ulster's answer to the

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protest of southern Unionists was in effect that their proposal would kill Home Rule, as it could not be accepted. But the British Government altered the situation by accepting Ulster's position in so far as it could be upheld on democratic grounds; and they pushed Redmond into consent to a counter-proposal that each Ulster county should be given the right to decide its fate by vote. Four counties out of the nine, containing a large majority of the Ulster population, and the cities of Derry and Belfast, would have been lost to Ireland on this plan; and Redmond never went further than to accept it as a temporary measure for a limited period of years. Sir Edward Carson retorted contemptuously that this was for Ulster sentence of death with a stay of execution. But the whole situation had taken on a new phase. On the one hand, the Nationalist party was shaken to the point of disruption. On the other, the Ulstermen saw that their demand for exclusion of the province went entirely beyond reason; under the electoral arrangements of the moment a majority of the representation of the province at Westminster was voting for Home Rule in 1914. But Ulstermen had pushed their attitude of defiance to actual preparation for armed resistance, and even if their leaders had agreed to accept the plan of county option, the rank and file would have resisted in regard to two border counties, Tyrone and Fermanagh, in which there were roughly speaking 55 Catholics to 45 Protestants though the bulk of the property was in Protestant hands. Civil war was threatened for the sake of these two counties. A conference at Buckingham Palace failed to reach any solution. And then the European War came. The Home Rule Bill became an Act for all Ireland subject to two conditions: first, that it should not be operative till a year after peace had been declared; secondly, that there was to be no coercion of Ulster.

In 1916, after the rebellion of Easter week, attempt was made to bring the Act into operation, with exclusion of part of Ulster; but the negotiation broke down, the Ulstermen insisting that six counties should be left out in permanence, the Nationalists only consenting to five, and that for a limited period unless Parliament should extend it. The excluded Ulster counties were still to be governed directly from Westminster. In 1917–18 an Irish Convention sat, and its proceedings were abortive. But it refused to consider at all seriously the idea of giving to Ulster a local subordinate assembly, like that of Quebec in Canada; and

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the Ulster representatives did not themselves put forward this, or indeed any constructive proposal.

Redmond died while the Convention was sitting, and his death was followed by England's attempt to enforce conscription, which flung Ireland into violent reaction; and at the General Election which followed the armistice Sinn Fein swept the board outside of Ulster and declared for a Republic. A year passed and it became necessary either to repeal the Home Rule Act or put it in force. But there remained also the necessity of fulfilling the pledges to Ulster. A Coalition Government was now in power, predominantly Tory; the Sinn Fein members having refused to take their seats, Nationalist Ireland was represented at Westminster only by half a dozen men. Recourse was had to the solution which even in a modified form the Convention had rejected. The Lloyd George Ministry decided to bring in a new bill, repealing the Home Rule Act and setting up instead two parliaments of Northern and Southern Ireland, having equal powers, including the right to unite if it so pleased them. A shadowy Council of Ireland, composed of twenty members from each Parliament, was vested with some vague attributes, as the germ of union. Ireland at large repudiated the proposal which never operated outside Ulster. Ulster decided to work the measure which assigned six counties as the area of Northern Ireland. A Unionist Council was held at which delegates from the three counties thrown in with Southern Ireland pleaded for the province to be the area. Had this proposal been pressed in Parliament on behalf of Ulster it would certainly have been carried; the Catholic minority would then have been strong enough to hold some forty percent of the seats and could have hoped by a treaty with Labor to check the party of pure ascendancy. But the Ulster leaders definitely turned it down. They wanted an area in which Protestant ascendancy would be absolutely unchallengeable; but they wanted it as large as possible and so they claimed and got in addition to the four really Protestant counties two others in which the party desiring union with the rest of Ireland was in a definite though not large majority. This arrangement was unjust and resentment against it has embittered the whole question ever since. As a protest against it, the Catholic members returned to the Northern Parliament refused to take their seats and have continued this abstention. In the interval, the system of Proportional Repre-

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sentation introduced by the Act of 1920 has been swept away and constituencies have been redistributed in such a manner that at the next election Catholics will have much smaller representation than their members should receive in fairness.

Of course, there is no mention in legislation of any religious qualification or disqualification; but in Ulster every man's creed is known and noted and ninety-nine men in a hundred vote according to their creed. No proposal is considered on its merits by the individual with reference to his own interests. Some Protestants take sides with the Catholics from Nationalist convictions; some Catholics with the Protestants from Unionist leaning or association. But, broadly speaking, the two strains in the Irish people are still locked in a struggle for ascendancy.

In a sense, Ireland has won, for there is self-government in Ireland. Every part of Ireland is self-governing. Further, England is out of the picture. The whole of Ireland if it chooses can become a self-governed unity at any moment. Yet in a sense also Ulster has won, for Ulster always refused to come under a Dublin Parliament, and it is today partly under the Imperial Parliament and partly under a Parliament of its own.

This principle of two parliaments in Ireland has in a limited sense secured general acceptance. Mr. de Valera while he was in America during the guerilla war against British forces announced the proposal that Ulster should have the status of Quebec. His successors in the leadership have always maintained this offer; and though many people in Ireland regard the duality as wasteful it has full justification. Northern Ireland differs from the rest in that it is industrial and city making. Belfast and to a less degree Derry have been created by the enterprise of industrialists—all of them Protestant. The northern cities are entrepôts for trade no less than the southern, but the southern are nothing else, except centers of education and places of residence. The population which created Derry and Belfast is naturally unwilling to allow control of its life to pass to the representatives of a population which has no instinct for the industrial type of society. Again, a Protestant population does not willingly allow education to be controlled for it by Catholics; though on this matter opinion seems rather to be divided into lay and clerical, Church of Ireland and Presbyterian clergy insisting almost as strongly as Catholics on the need for some clerical control.

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But the root of the trouble is that Protestants believe themselves to be more efficient, and more efficient because they are Protestants. They are in point of fact more efficient. Belfast merchants beat Dublin merchants in the distributing trade throughout Ireland; they give more satisfaction to Catholic customers and clients; yet for a century and a half at least the distributing trade has been fully open without let or hindrance to Catholics. In the main, Ireland agrees that Northern Ireland being mainly Protestant shall have a legislature to manage its local affairs according to Protestant ideas. They accept this unreservedly for local matters such as Quebec controls.

If Ulster would agree to transfer to an Irish Parliament the powers of central taxation and military control now exercised over Ulster from Westminster, then no question of area would arise. But Ulster refuses. The Free State agrees then, unwillingly, that Ulster shall exercise the option allowed it by the Treaty, but insists on determining according to the Treaty what area Ulster shall be entitled to control. The matter is full of difficulty.

When the Treaty was signed between representatives of the unrecognized Irish Republic and of the British Cabinet, Article XII laid down that, if the Ulster Parliament so chose, the Act giving dominion status to all Ireland should not be applicable to Northern Ireland, provided that a Commission of three should be set up to "determine in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions, the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland."

It was generally anticipated that Ulster would exercise the right of voting out, and it so happened. But I have been assured by many Unionists in Ulster that within the first weeks after publication of the Treaty opinion in the north was trending to the choice which meant giving up representation at Westminster and receiving instead full representation in a Central Irish Parliament. The general approbation with which the Treaty was hailed at first in the south helped this trend. But when opposition led by Mr. de Valera developed in the Dail, Ulster heard one speaker after another justify acceptance of the Treaty merely as a stepping stone to complete separation; and on that path Ulster had no disposition to enter. Then followed a campaign in which the Republican party deliberately tried to

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provoke England to attempt reconquest of Ireland, and proceeded in the first instance by provocative outrages in the six counties, over which the Irish Provisional Government could exercise no control. In Belfast especially a state of horrible savagery prevailed during the first half of 1922. Murder replied to murder, bombing to bombing. Then civil war broke out in the south and the best proof that the disturbing agents came from the south is that henceforward peace began to settle down on the north. But the early days of the Free State did not furnish much encouragement for any one exempt from its jurisdiction to put himself under it. Mr. Cosgrave and his colleagues by their resolute countering of insurrection earned respect; but the task of restoring order and reestablishing finance has involved drastic measures and heavy taxation which made the Free State Government unpopular; it was open, it still is open, to everyone in Ulster to assert that the Free State totters and that the only alternative government would declare for a republic. Even suppose the Government stable, its annual expenditure still far exceeds its revenue, yet the citizens pay every tax imposed in the British area and an extra sixpence on income tax; they pay twopence for a stamp which north of the border would be only three halfpence; and old age pensions, the benefit most widely appreciated, have been reduced by a shilling a week.

In the face of all this Mr. Cosgrave and his ministers knew that the proposal to transfer unwilling persons from Northern Ireland to the Free State must be open to grave objection. Yet the Free State construction of the Treaty was publicly declared to imply a claim to the whole counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh and also to Derry city; and, stated in its extreme form, it asked also for the southern part of counties Armagh and Down as well. The official demand was simply for a transfer under the terms of the Treaty of territory whose inhabitants might declare a wish to come over; but speakers publicly assumed that a fair construction of the clause would leave Ulster so restricted in area and population that it could not continue to exist as a self-governing state. These declarations very naturally produced in Northern Ireland a disposition which expressed itself in Sir James Craig's refusal to nominate a Commissioner for the task of fixing the boundary. He was, however, willing to coöperate with the Free State in rectifying the frontier by mutual consent without the intervention of a third party, and certain negotia-

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tions took place. But the gap was too wide to be bridged.

For more than two years no effective action was taken. The Free State had its hands full of other business, and the Conservative Government in England had every reason to avoid the subject. But when a Labor ministry came in, by tradition hostile to Ulster's pretensions, Mr. Cosgrave was naturally urged to press for a settlement. It was hoped in Ireland either that Labor would force Ulster out of its attitude of defiance; or, if Labor shirked the task, that it would be open to Ireland to say that the Treaty was disregarded and that they were no longer bound by such clauses as have been specially unpopular —for instance, that imposing the oath of allegiance on members of Parliament. Even if a republic were declared, no one thought the British Labor Party would actively oppose the step.

Whatever Mr. Cosgrave's personal view of the expediencies, his position was not strong enough to disregard popular opinion. Ireland held that it would be cowardice and folly to refrain from pressing the legal advantage. Consequently, Great Britain last summer named a commissioner, and, when Ulster renewed its refusal, referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council the question whether the Crown might appoint in default. The Judicial Committee reported that only a fresh Act of Parliament could get over the difficulty; and after vehement opposition from the Conservatives an Act was passed this autumn authorizing the Crown to complete the Commission. The Irish Parliament has also passed this measure and by the time this is printed a third commissioner will have been appointed. The question is, what next?

In the first instance, delay. That in itself is not bad, but delay may breed incidents. How is the Commission to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants? By plebiscite? In Northern Ireland one may doubt whether the Government will facilitate such a proceeding. In Southern Ireland there would be a different difficulty. Southern Ireland contends that the status of a free dominion was accorded to Ireland as a whole; that the area known as Northern Ireland was granted the power to exclude itself, provided that the people along its border who wished to be in the Free State could transfer themselves. In other words, there were to be no transfers of territory for the Free State, but only transfers to it. They might therefore on principle refuse to allow any plebiscite in their territory, and

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break with the Commission on this point. But probably while Mr. Cosgrave remains in power they will adhere to his pledge to accept the findings of the Commission and may extend this to mean that the Commission must have power to interpret the Clause under which it acts.

Assuming that it carries through its work, various possibilities present themselves. One is that the transfers proposed may be so slight that Ulster will say, "This is what we always meant." It is possible then that Mr. Cosgrave may say, "We are disappointed but we abide by the decision." If so, there will be a violent clamor headed by the Republicans and backed by all those whom Mr. Cosgrave's ministry has alienated (some by its good qualities, some by its bad) and Mr. Cosgrave may be defeated. If a British Labor Ministry were in power, this result and the return of a Republican Party would be probable. But with Tories in the saddle at Westminster, putting Republicans into power will seem more serious. Nobody in Ireland wants a renewal of fighting, and fighting might come of that.

Finally, there is the chance that the Commission might propose transfers which Ulster would not accept. In that case Sir James Craig has declared in Parliament that he will resign office and take his part in leading the resistance. This speech was not generally approved, because Ulster also is for peace. Yet it would be acted on.

One factor, moreover, exists that was not there ten years ago. Ulster has got self-government; it did not want it; but after trial of it, it has no intention of giving it up. Talk to one of their ministry, and you will find him complaining that the British Treasury is constantly butting in. I said to one that within five years it would have butted them into the Free State if the Free State gave natural forces a chance. He answered, regretfully, that as things were there was no hope of that happening. Again, it is certain that in this year the Free State has won a case against Ulster with the British Parliament as judge. Ulster did its utmost either to prevent the Commission from being set up, or to have it set up with limiting terms of reference. Great Britain as a whole insisted on construing its obligations under the Treaty according to the interpretation put on them by those Irishmen with whom the bargain was made. In a word, Ulster failed to get Parliament to do what Ireland thought unfair. That will have been a disappointment

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to Ulster—and salutary. Others may follow, if Ulster tries to prevent the Commission from doing its work. If they are merely minor rebuffs, the likelihood is that Ulster in anger against those on whom it counted, may be disposed in mere spleen to draw closer to the Free State. Tactful handling south of the border could do much, and tactful really means generous. For, if the finding is such that Ulster would only submit to it under compulsion, grave harm must follow.

Here is the position. If the British army were withdrawn altogether, it is improbable that the Free State could take one inch of territory by force from the six counties. The effect of the period from 1920 onward, when Ireland was a pandemonium, was to prompt Ulstermen to organize their Protestant population as a military police. The scheme was thought out and directed by a very able soldier, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. There is, first, a regular constabulary of the old type—men who are professional police, carefully trained to police work, but trained also to the use of arms. These are not a sectarian body and in Ulster they are carrying out the law without fear or favor. Secondly, there are the so-called "B" police, who have a uniform, and a small pay for the period of duty. These enforce the curfew regulation which throughout the whole six counties forbids any movement after midnight. Probably the regulation, now unnecessary, is maintained so as to keep this body active and justify its existence. The "B's" give protection, they maintain order, but they are in practice exclusively recruited from Protestants, and they are really a defense force. Behind them are the "C" police, to which belong nearly all "loyalists" (meaning in practice Protestants of military age). Each man is furnished with a rifle, and is bound to attend a brief period of training yearly. This training given in mass makes the men virtually a militia ready to be called out.

In the event of a collision with the Free State all these forces would be led by men having experience of the European War. A large proportion of the rank and file have been soldiers. That element is present also in the Free State army. But the Free State troops have no single officer accustomed to handling troops on a large scale in actual war, because for political reasons they refused to employ those who offered, or were willing. Also they have no experience of artillery work. The most hopeful fact is that the Free State army since it has had time to organize

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and discipline itself realizes these aspects of the situation. Recourse to arms is improbable and nobody talks of it except some Ulster politicians who did not see fighting abroad.

Financiers expect a peaceful solution of the immediate problem. But nobody looks for an early readjustment of Ulster's relation to the rest of Ireland. Yet everybody is agreed that unless and until unity of some kind is achieved, Ireland as a whole must labor under a heavy handicap.

For one thing, a customs frontier and two separate fiscal systems are grave inconveniences in so small an island. For another, the present military establishments are a crushing burden. The Free State maintains an army at a yearly cost of nearly four million pounds—more than £1 a head on the population. Its existence is justified at present by the need to preserve internal order: the Republican Party has never renounced the project of upsetting the Free State by physical force. While that army exists, Ulster will remain mobilizable: it may or may not succeed in getting the British taxpayer at large to foot the bill. Taxation pressure is so sharply felt in the Free State that possibly after a period Ireland may disband an army which is not really of service except to reinforce the police; for Ireland is protected against any possibility of British aggression by European and American opinion, best expressed in the registering of the Treaty at Geneva. If the Free State army disappeared, so would the "B" and "C" specials. But the customs barrier is a different affair. Ulster is convinced at present that her interests require a fiscal system identical to that of the United Kingdom. Ireland at large is at present obsessed by a desire to grasp at every symbol of independence: and behind that is the same instinct which today makes all the British dominions maintain a rigid tariff against British imports. Ireland has the same desire to develop a manufacturing industry which outside of Ulster has no considerable being. She is likely to become more protectionist than less, and to desire protection chiefly against British imports. If Ulster ever contemplates coming under a central Parliament of Ireland, she would certainly insist on keeping control of her own tax system and of her fiscal relations with Great Britain.

That contingency is at present remote and will continue remote so long as the rest of Ireland expresses the aspiration to become a separate republic. Ulster (the statutory "Northern

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Ireland") is linked to the British system by a sense of interest, but more strongly still by a solidarity of sentiment. It is easy to laugh at Ulster "loyalists" who have repeatedly expressed the intention to rebel as an expression of their loyalty; but the sentiment of solidarity is real. According to the best of my observation, it is incomparably more real than the supposed attachment of Nationalist Ireland to the idea of a separate republic. That cry was taken up generally no longer ago than 1918; and it was in the main an expression of violent and angry reaction against British attempts to rule Ireland by force in a period when Britain was everywhere professedly championing the rights of small nationalities. It has infinitely less substance than the desire to see Ireland united.

The matter is complicated, at present, by the question of Gaelic. Our Constitution has affirmed that Gaelic is the national language. Yet there is scarcely one person in a thousand throughout Ireland who cannot speak English and scarcely one in ten who can speak Irish easily. The theorists are at present attempting to spread the use of Irish by all means at the command of Government, and Ulstermen, who in the main are not descended from Gaelic speakers even in a remote past, resent this: they think it an attempt to secure jobs for Catholics by setting up a test which will disqualify most Protestants. But already in the Free State itself there is a reaction against what somebody called 'Gaelic on forced draught." And here also time may remove a good deal that today makes against union. The problem of actual symbols may be more difficult: it will not be easy to combine the Union Jack and the tricolor, and I cannot conceive that either party would surrender its flag.

Thus the obstacles to union in the main are ideals, symbols, pretenses or pretensions, and prejudices: and no one who knows Irish human nature will underrate their stubbornness. Yet the Ulster people who were so ready to fight for the cry "No Home Rule," would fight too, much more stiffly, to retain self-government. Self-government has altered them already; it will alter them much more. And the same is true of the rest of Ireland. Politics in Ireland were passionate for an idea, "Home Rule," or "No Home Rule." But once you begin self-government, issues less abstract set up new cleavages and affinities. In short, political education has now begun seriously in Ireland, both North and South; and only education can get the better of prejudices.

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These are stronger among the country folk than the townsmen; the Ulster farmer is even nearer to the seventeenth century mentality than the Belfast shipyard hand. But read Shan Bullock's recent book, "The Loughsiders," one of the best Irish novels ever written: it describes with humor and affection and perfect fidelity a community of Ulster farmer folk among whom there is not one Catholic. Yet their attitude towards the great affairs of life,—the land, marriage, and the law,—is precisely that of Catholic farmers of the class in any adjacent county. They are as Irish as Synge's people, though in a different way. The man of a house dies and he is buried with his Orange sash on him: it is part of his religion, exactly as the Catholic equivalent to him would have the insignia of a Land Leaguer or a Hibernian. Even for Ulster agriculture is the main industry and there is no distinction by provinces in that. In Ulster as elsewhere land tenure is unlike that of England: it is a system of peasant proprietary, imperfectly worked out. At the present moment the Free State offers farmers better terms of state-aided purchase than they get in Northern Ireland. This fact may ease something in the transfer of an agricultural district,—though not much, for at present the burdensome Free State taxation offsets this advantage. Yet, to any unpurchased Ulster tenant, citizenship of the Free State offers one material attraction. Similar inducements may be more widely extended. Ireland's financial embarrassments are temporary. She is really trying to pay off her national debt out of revenue. When income tax is lower—as it is likely to be within five years—in the Free State than in the six counties, union will begin to be seriously considered on all hands.

But not under a republic. Ireland of the Free State claims justly that it shall be free to maintain its own historic national pride and identify itself triumphantly with the close of a long drawn-out struggle in which the weaker nation has won. It must, however, leave to that part which is Irish in a different sense—with three centuries instead of thirty behind it—its own pride both of race and of achievement. The Ulster people will never come in as beaten men. The Ireland which is not Ulster has its very real glories in the past and in the present: Dublin has much to boast of in culture. Yet even in this sense it would be wrong to underrate Belfast. The Ulster theatre has nothing to set against the work of Synge: but its comedies and its actors

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may fairly stand comparison with most that is to be seen at the National Theatre. Belfast's poet, Richard Rowley, does not approach the class of Yeats, and he is no better than half a dozen of his contemporaries in the South: but he is a poet and he is fully typical of Belfast. On canvas nobody has done for Dublin what William Connor is doing for the northern streets and their inhabitants. Paul Henry, the best landscape painter in Ireland, with not many superiors out of it, paints Connaught by choice; but he is Belfast, born and bred.

Yet the essential is elsewhere. The great linen mills are ugly things, but they represent a perfect application of modern mechanical invention to the trade from which Belfast has grown within a hundred and fifty years from a small town to a great city. There is no ugliness in Belfast's supreme achievement which only began to develop within living memory. I left the harbor on a moonlight night last week and steamed down the Lough past the gigantic frames which cradle the largest and most beautiful works of the shipbuilder: and no man seeing that could fail to understand why this breed of our people in this corner of our island, having such works of skill and energy to show, so little matched elsewhere, should be attached to the system, both commercial and political, under which they have grown to such stature: none need ask why they should be slow to trust control of their destinies to an assembly in which their voice may be overborne by numbers, who have neither competence nor experience in this whole way of life and work. Ulster is too strong, not only in her close and guarded alliance with Great Britain, but in her own self, to be forced into any compact except on her own terms. Yet if there is a sentiment holding Ulstermen back from even a nominal union with their countrymen, there is also a sentiment, obscure but vital, pushing them towards it. The true wisdom for the rest of Ireland is, first, to direct effort to reinforcing this sentiment for unity by a clear perception of material interest, and, next, to seek to reconcile Ulster's pride with their own.

There is no use in looking for that wisdom on the day after a country emerges from such experiences as Nationalist Ireland has known, if only since 1918. We shall have to grow into it. But for my own part I think it will come: because I believe that the aspirations of the ordinary Ulsterman for his country are very much liker those of the ordinary Irishman in Dublin and

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Cork than would appear from a study of what is uttered by the zealots, whether Orange or Republican, North or South.

P. S. The British elections have probably improved the chances of peace in Ireland. No doubt a section of the swollen Tory representation will demand that this parliament go back on its forerunner's decision and by some means lay it down that detailed rectification of the boundary by small alterations is the scope of the Commission's task. Ulster, by raising technical or legal difficulties in the way of the Commission's work, may contrive to bring the issue before Parliament. But the British electorate has voted for a quiet life. Everybody knows that any rescinding or modification of the Act which enabled the late ministry to fill up the Commission and bring it into operation would make President Cosgrave's position impossible. This would be taken in Ireland—and perhaps outside Ireland—as a deliberate tampering with the Treaty. I do not believe that Mr. Baldwin or his colleagues will risk incurring that reproach.

Setting aside this possiblity, it is certain that no finding of the Commission will meet with resistance from Ulster. Ulster Loyalists construe loyalty as the duty of rendering obedience to a British government—unless it consists of Labor and Liberal members, because these, being Home Rulers, are "disloyal." There is no chance of a situation arising in which the British Government will need to force the Ulster Government into evacuating territory by even a show of British troops.

On the other hand, even if the Commission's findings prove unacceptable to southern Ireland there is little likelihood that a wave of resentment, real or fictitious, will throw out Mr. Cosgrave (who has declared in advance his determination to abide by the finding) and put in some other ministry pledged to declare the Treaty broken. There would have been a temptation to this with either a Labor or a Liberal Ministry in power, because Irish opinion generally believed that such a ministry would take no drastic action in reply. Ireland is quite aware that a strong Tory ministry will take whatever action is necessary to enforce observance of the Treaty. Such action need not be military. To close the British ports against all imports from the Free State would probably suffice—Britain being virtually Ireland's sole market.

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FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIERS

By Charles H. Haskins

THE frontier between France and Germany is one of the oldest, as well as one of the newest, problems of European politics. It is, from one point of view, as old as Caesar's Gallic wars and the Germanic invasions of the Roman Empire, as new as the treaty of Versailles, and even newer. Some elements in it are almost secular in their persistence, some are only of recent origin. Moreover, the problem is much more complicated than is usually supposed, for we have here a frontier zone rather than a single line, a compound not a simple fracture; while the line which would be drawn in one place by one set of considerations would be drawn elsewhere by other forces.

The oldest historic frontier in this region is the Rhine, for nearly five centuries the boundary between Gaul and Germany, in speech and culture as well as in government. The Germanic invasions of the fifth century pushed the German element well to the westward, establishing the western limit of Germanic speech much where it lies today, and creating a mixed Gallo-German population in what is now western Germany as well as in northern and eastern France. At the same time the political frontier disappeared with the formation of a Frankish kingdom, and later a Frankish empire, ruling over both Gaul and the lands to the east of the Rhine, only to reappear in the partitions of the ninth century. The treaty of Verdun in 843 set apart the France and Germany of the future, separating them by a middle region of Lotharingia which was to be the bone of contention between them for more than a thousand years. With the partitions of Lotharingia the Franco-German problem begins to take on a more modern form. The best-known of these, the treaty of Meerssen in 870, gave to the German kingdom the whole left bank of the Rhine, including Strasbourg, Trier, Metz, and the upper valleys of the Meuse and Moselle, whence this treaty has been a favorite with German writers, who overlook the fact that it left Maestricht and the mouths of the Rhine to France.

In the tenth century the region between the Meuse and the Rhine breaks up into the duchies of Upper and Lower Lorraine, and these again dissolve into those feudal and ecclesiastical

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principalities whose vicissitudes constitute the political history of the region until the French Revolution. At first a duchy of the German kingdom, Lorraine's dependence loosened with the disintegration of the empire and the growth of territorial sovereignty, while at the same time French influence began to assert itself. In 1648 the Three Bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun were formally ceded to France, and the foundations of French domination was laid in Alsace; France had reached the Rhine. In 1766 the duchy of Lorraine, whose independence had been recognized by the Emperor Charles V, passed definitively to France. All modern German historians represent such changes as so many robberies of German territory by France. Robberies they may often have been, as in the case of the seizure of Strasbourg in 1681, but at the expense of local liberty rather than of Germany. There was in this period no real German entity, at least in the political sense, as the establishment of Dutch and Swiss independence illustrates. The identification of the Holy Roman Empire with the modern German Empire has been one of the most subtle and pervasive, as well as one of the most misleading, forms of Pan-Germanism.

The French Revolution carried the limits of France to the middle and lower Rhine, where they remained till 1814. The intermediate territory underwent the dissolving and transforming influence of the Revolution, received in many places with enthusiasm, and the less benign effects of the Empire. When the flood subsided in 1815, these lands with the exception of the Palatinate were not restored to their former princes, lay or ecclesiastical, but, save for the valley of the Nahe, were handed over to Prussia, which for the first time became a neighbor of France and the chief power on the Rhine. One of the accompanying adjustments of boundaries remained a sore point to France, namely, the northern line of Alsace and Lorraine. Here the frontier of 1789, with its irregular outlines, disputed sovereignties, and enclaves on either side, had nothing to recommend it, and the negotiations of 1814 had drawn a simpler line by which France abandoned her outlying possessions to the north and received in exchange certain connecting territory including most notably the region of Saarbrücken. In 1815 the treaty cut back this line, giving to Prussia not only Saarbrücken but Saarlouis and Landau, both of which had been French since the seventeenth century. The loss of the frontier of

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1814 continued to be felt in France till it was swallowed up in the greater loss of 1870, and the restoration of Alsace and Lorraine by the armistice of November, 1918, reopened the problem of their historic boundaries. Meanwhile from 1870 to 1918 Alsace and Lorraine had been a German Reichsland, and this part of the Franco-German frontier had followed the Vosges and not the Rhine.

This outline of the varying fortunes of this debated region would seem at first sight to indicate that the frontier had been fixed entirely by political forces pushing the line in one direction or another according to the predominant strength of either party—a Franco-German tug of war. As a matter of fact, the problem is complicated by other elements of land and people which have determined the form and character, as well as the watchwords, of the varying phases of the struggle.

First of all, there is geography. Is there a natural frontier? It is plain, on the one hand, that France has no such clearly marked natural boundaries on the northeast as on its other borders, while it is also evident that the broken relief of western Germany creates possible physical lines of delimitation such as are conspicuously lacking on the side of Poland and Russia. At least the territory is open to debate. A certain school of French geographers and historians, ever since the days of Louis XIV, has maintained that the Rhine is the natural frontier of Gaul—"Rhenus finis Germaniae"—and the League of the Left Bank revived the cry during the World War. The German view that the Rhine is a German river, summarized in Arndt's lines on the Rhine as "Deutschlands Strom, nicht Deutschlands Grenze," has been emphasized by geographers, who maintain that mountains, not rivers, are the real frontiers. Their conclusion that the Vosges are a natural boundary has something to be said for it in the region of Alsace, but it breaks down as we go northward, and fails to meet the questions raised by the valleys of the Meuse and the Moselle.

Strategic considerations are an application of physiography. Not to go back to Cæsar's *pons asinorum*, we may recall the importance of the upper Rhine bridges in the seventeenth century and of the bridgeheads of the Saar under Louis XIV and again in 1815, as well as Moltke's insistence on Metz in 1871. Alsace was declared by Bismarck to be the glacis of a fortress; its acquisition, said Wilhelm I, had "no other purpose

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

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than to set back the point of departure of the French armies which will come to attack us in the future." An important school of French strategists has maintained that German occupation of the Left Bank was a permanent menace to France, which could only be protected by an army on the Rhine, or at least by French control of the great Rhine bridges; while German writers[1] insist that possession of the whole valley is necessary to their national security.

Mineral resources are a phase of geography which has peculiar significance in this region. The debated territory of the Left Bank contains the coal fields of Aachen and the Saar, the great potash mines of Upper Alsace, and the *minette* district of Lorraine, the largest body of iron ore in Continental Europe, while on the Right Bank lies the valley of the Ruhr.[2] With the growth of modern industrialism these have had a large share in territorial changes and ambitions. In 1815 the coal of the Saar was one reason for the adjustment of the frontier at the expense of France, the first step in the economic conquest of Alsace-Lorraine. The iron of the Lorraine border explains the meanderings of the frontier of 1871, carefully drawn by German geologists with the aim of including all that was then considered valuable in the field; but new processes gave new value to the deposits on the French side of the line in the region of Briey and Longwy. In 1914 German engineers hastened to occupy this territory, and its annexation was a declared objective of the great German iron interests throughout the war. With the restoration of Lorraine by the treaty, the whole iron district became French property with the exception of a narrow strip on the north which lies in Luxembourg. The coal of the Saar valley was an important occasion for the French demand of the frontier of 1814, and its proximity to the French frontier made easy its transfer to France as a means of reparation for German ravages elsewhere. The industrial reasons for the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 are still fresh in men's minds.[3]

It is necessary also to remember that the most important mineral resources of the Rhine valley, coal and iron, form a unit, one of the three great actual world-areas of iron and steel production. From a purely economic point of view there is

[1] E.g., H. Stegemann, "Der Kampf um den Rhein" (Stuttgart, 1924).

[2] See the accompanying map.

[3] On the Ruhr cf. C. K. Leith, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol. I, No. 4; and on the Left Bank, A. H. Brooks and M. F. Lacroix in Bulletin 703 of the U. S. Geological Survey (1920).

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here no frontier, and any political line which separates the coal of the Ruhr from the iron of Lorraine runs against overpowering economic forces. Hence, above all, the efforts of Germany to annex Lorraine and of France to control the Ruhr; hence the necessity of some form of economic working agreement across the present political frontier. From the point of view of world peace, there is, however, much to be said for the division of this great area, as at present, rather than its union under a single state which would have, in war and peace, a practical monopoly of iron and steel on the Continent. Even an economic agreement of these Franco-German interests is considered a serious danger by their British competitors, whose fears have recently been voiced by the Labor Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Of the more specifically human elements which have affected the frontier, we may begin by eliminating that of race, which has played a large part in Pan-German and "Nordic" writings. Neither the Teutonic nor the Alpine race dominates this region, nor can their occurrence be divided by any line. The original Gallo-Roman type and that of the Teutonic invaders are thoroughly intermixed on the Left Bank, the first surviving most largely in the hills and the second being most numerous in the lowlands, with no demonstrable political affinities as such on the part of either. The loose claims that this whole region is German *Stammland* are dissolved by the more discriminating analysis of the ethnologists.[4]

A surer and clearer test than race, the matter of language is of much greater interest. In the country it is remarkably permanent, as is shown by the very slight fluctuations of the linguistic frontier where its history has been established in detail by the researches of Kurth in Belgium and of Witte in Alsace-Lorraine. In the towns it is more subject to change, as is illustrated by the French-speaking element in Strasbourg, Colmar, and Mulhouse, the German-speaking influx into Metz before the war, and the spread of French among the educated classes in Luxembourg and Flanders. Yet even in the country, as Dietrich Schäfer has pointed out, and as the accompanying map illustrates, the linguistic frontier has rarely coincided with the political. German-speaking Alsace was held by France, and later French-speaking Lorraine by Germany, though we now know that in the last year of the war it was planned to change

[4] Cf. L. Neumann, in Scobel's "Geographisches Handbuch" (1909), i, p. 539.

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all this by the forcible colonization of French-speaking Lorraine by Germans.[5] Nor does the present political frontier follow linguistic lines in Alsace-Lorraine or, with entire exactness, on the Belgian border.

It is of course true that community of language is an important influence in producing that "consciousness of kind" upon which nationality rests and in facilitating the life of the modern state, yet the examples of Switzerland and Belgium show that a single speech is not indispensable for a sound national life. The solidarity of France is not disturbed by the persistence of popular languages, quite different from French, in Brittany, Provence, the Basque region, and the bit of Flemish-speaking territory about Dunkirk; and Frenchmen argue that they have room also for the local German patois of Alsace-Lorraine, in contradistinction to the official high German. In the German view, on the other hand, the German language is an essential part of German culture and nationality, and it is tacitly assumed that German-speaking populations ought always to be part of the German Reich[6]. Such a principle, however, obviously breaks down in the Swiss portion of the Rhine valley, not to go into its Pan-German applications in Flanders and the Netherlands, so that, with all its importance, language must be considered only as a part of the larger question of the affinities and desires of the population concerned.

When we turn from an objective fact like language to such matters as the historical traditions and cultural affinities of the population, we are dealing with more subjective considerations which have been the field of endless controversy. To an outsider the disputants seem to move for the most part in different realms of thought and feeling, dealing with incommensurable elements and with arguments which do not meet short of infinity. To German writers the Germanic character of this whole region seems self-evident, resting on its age-long member-

[5] See Hindenburg's memoir of 27 December, 1917, in Charles Schmidt, "Les plans secrets de la politique allemande en Alsace-Lorraine," p. 183. (Paris, 1922; and in a very poor English version, 1924.)

[6] A recent example is the reported declaration of Chancellor Marx, 27 October, 1924, that all German peoples should be united in a greater Germany—a policy which would mean war with Switzerland and Czechoslovakia as well as with France, and would entail the re-subjection at the same time of certain non-German peoples with whom Germans are intermixed. It is well to remember that the number of German-speaking people detached from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles is much less than the number of non-Germans then set free from German masters; and that an absolute linguistic frontier is an impossibility.

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ship in the mediaeval empire and its continuous participation in German literature and culture, so that any connection with France seems unnatural and contrary to all national life. The French stress the political and social transformation brought about by the Revolution, and the more democratic and liberal character of the Rhine valley as compared with the Junkerism of northern and eastern Germany. Thus Reuss, the principal French historian of Alsace, admits that when "it passed under French rule, it belonged to Germany in language, habits, institutions, and ideas;" but since the Revolution, says Fustel de Coulanges, "it has followed all our destinies, it has lived our life."[7]

The absence of a single clean line of fracture between France and Germany has helped create various forms of political organization in the intermediate zone of conflict. Of an actual middle kingdom the first important instance was at the partition of Charlemagne's empire at Verdun, when Lothaire received that short-lived kingdom of Lotharingia which has left its name on the map in the forms Lothringen and Lorraine. More significant was the Burgundian state which grew up in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries by successive additions until it brought under a single ruler the larger part of modern Holland and Belgium, Luxembourg, and portions of eastern France. As a middle kingdom this went to pieces in 1477 in the efforts of Charles the Bold to subjugate the Swiss, and the greater part of its lands passed into the possession of the Hapsburgs, hardening ultimately into the modern states of Holland and Belgium, while Switzerland took more definite form to the southeast. These small, so-called neutral, states came into being precisely in this middle zone of fracture, as did a smaller state of less assured independence, the grand duchy of Luxembourg. If the middle kingdom disappeared, certain of its fragments persisted as middle states, over which France and Germany has each sought to establish its influence. After 1815, France asserted itself in aiding the Belgian revolution of 1831, and while Napoleon III pursued an unsuccessful policy of annexation in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the German territories of the Left Bank, Germany until 1918 was more successful. Luxembourg became a member of the German Zollverein in 1842, and her railroads passed under German control in 1871. The German invasion

[7] For a fuller discussion of these problems, see Haskins and Lord, "Some Problems of the Peace Conference" (Cambridge, 1920), chs. 3 and 4.

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of Belgium and Luxembourg in 1914 was part of a plan, the Schlieffen plan, which is said originally to have comprised the invasion of Holland as well, and the occupation called into print a great variety of plans for the permanent control of Belgium, ranging all the way from a customs union with military safeguards to complete annexation. Since the war, on the other hand, the French have established closer relations by agreement with Belgium and Luxembourg.

With the close of the Great War the question of the Franco-German frontier entered upon its present phase. By the Treaty of Versailles Belgium was restored to its people in unrestricted sovereignty, while Alsace-Lorraine with its boundaries of 1871 went back to France. These changes may be regarded as reasonably permanent, for no party wants the Germans back in Belgium, while whatever local discontent has existed in Alsace-Lorraine has made its watchword, not reannexation to Germany, but autonomy. A new situation was created in the Saar, where the French asked for the frontier of 1814. Instead of this the mines were ceded to the French state as an item on the reparation account, while the administration of the territory of seven hundred square miles and six hundred and fifty thousand people was handed over to a Governing Commission of the League of Nations, pending a plebiscite to be held in 1935.[8] The commission controlling the navigation of the Rhine, previously confined to representatives of the adjoining German states and Holland, was now enlarged by the addition of France, Belgium, Switzerland, Great Britain, and Italy, under a French chairman. Germany's monopoly of the water power was also restricted.

The main difficulty in the Paris negotiations was that of the Left Bank between the Alsatian and Belgian frontiers, comprising the Bavarian Palatinate, Birkenfeld, a portion of Hesse, and so much of the great Prussian Rheinprovinz as lay west of the Rhine, in all a population of five and one-half millions. It was hard for many Frenchmen to forget that this rich region had once been French, though not for long, and many hoped it might become French again, perhaps after an intermediate period of autonomy under a French protectorate and within the French customs zone. Others who did not desire annexation urged strong military guarantees against another invasion

[8] On the Saar see the writer's article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol. I, No. 2.

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from this quarter, so that Germany might lose her "spring-board" for attack. The official French proposals (March 12, 1919) included the severance of the territory west of the Rhine from Germany, and its organization into "one or more independent states under the protection of the League of Nations," the demilitarization of a zone of fifty kilometers on the Right Bank, and the permanent inter-allied occupation of the Rhine and its chief bridge-heads.[9] The final compromise of the treaty rejected any separation of the Left Bank from Germany but called for its demilitarization, along with that of the fifty-kilometer zone beyond, and an Allied military occupation for fifteen years with evacuation of successive regions after five-year periods—measures opposed by Marshal Foch as entirely inadequate. The Anglo-American agreement to aid France in case of unwarranted aggression by Germany, though not a part of the instrument of Versailles, was to the French an essential part of the compact, as the consideration for their abandonment of the military frontier of the Rhine; and its failure in the United States has been largely responsible for the French feeling of insecurity. The subject was again taken up by Mr. Lloyd George at Cannes in January, 1922, but soon became complicated with questions of reparations and alliances, and Mr. MacDonald later expressed his definite opposition to any military guarantee by England. Meanwhile the occupation of the Left Bank has also become entangled with reparations, both in relation to the advance from this base into the Ruhr and in connection with the evacuation of the northernmost zone in the five years contemplated by the treaty.

Under the Inter-Allied occupation the German civil authorities of the Left Bank have remained in action, subject to the supervision of an Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission. Certain movements for autonomy have at times appeared, chiefly in the Palatinate, but they have shown little vitality. The political frontier remains where it was, as does now the economic frontier, and if the military frontier is on the Rhine, or just beyond, the treaty gives this no status of permanence.

Another phase of intermediate status in the middle region is the question of local autonomy. Since 1815 the Palatinate has

[9] See Tardieu, "The Truth About the Treaty," chs. 5 and 6. These documents will also be found in the French "Livre jaune," which carries the subject through 1923: "Documents relatifs aux négociations concernant les garanties de sécurité contre une agression d'Allemagne" (1924).

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been ruled from Munich, while the Rhine province and Westphalia have been governed from Berlin. There was some talk late in 1918 of separating the Rhine province and Westphalia from Prussia as coördinate states in the German Confederation, but nothing came of it. Prussia still retains her conquests of 1815, which continue to pay for her mistakes, while the new Reich is more highly centralized than the old. So Alsace-Lorraine never received the autonomy she sought in the German Confederation, but was governed until 1918 as a conquered Reichsland, preliminary to a partition among the neighboring monarchs when they could agree on their respective shares.[10] Restored to France, these three departments still retain many of their distinctive arrangements, like the Concordat, but there is no guarantee how long this special régime may last, since uniformity is part of the programme of the Radical party in France. On the whole, the result of the war has been to draw lines tighter within the respective frontiers.

The Great War likewise weakened faith in buffer states and guaranteed neutrality. The examples of Belgium and Luxembourg were too glaring for those who urged a continuous neutral zone in which Alsace-Lorraine should form the connecting link between Switzerland and Luxembourg. No such line could stand the shock of another 1914 or the newer methods of warfare. At the same time the war gave a new urgency to the whole problem of the Rhine valley by demonstrating impressively that the Franco-German frontier is a matter of European and even of world interest, and the Treaty of Versailles did something to assert international control in this area of high tension. The demilitarization of the Left Bank, the new régime for the navigation of the Rhine, the administration of the Saar Territory by the League of Nations, all look in this direction, while the failure of the Anglo-American guarantee has increased the need for some wider form of international guarantee and supervision such as was ultimately contemplated by the Treaty of Versailles. Recent events have suggested still further participation of the League of Nations in these matters, at least as regards disarmament. The rôle of shock-absorber along the Rhine is not an easy one, and it will try the highest statesmanship of the League, but it is a rôle which cannot be avoided if

[10] See the official documents of 1917 in Charles Schmidt, "Les plans secrets de la politique allemande en Alsace-Lorraine."

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the League is to reduce the danger of war in this age-long area of conflict.

The Treaty of Versailles and the associated instruments contain two kinds of provisions, on the one hand those liquidating the war with the Central Powers, on the other the Covenant and the clauses concerning the international organization of labor, and each of the two represents a corresponding tendency in the subsequent politics of Europe. One group has been more interested in the execution, or non-execution, of the treaty, while the other tends to look away from this toward a new international order. Each has a basis in the realities of European politics. The danger has been that one would forget the other, or at least the justification for the other. It was the great merit of the Treaty of Versailles that it faced the facts sufficiently to recognize both these sets of issues, instead of conveniently ignoring the one or the other, after the fashion of its critics at either extreme. Those who regard the anti-German clauses of the treaty as a mere reflection of war psychology need to adjust their perspective by examining the nature and history of the Franco-German frontier, while those who, on either side of the Rhine, regard this as purely a national question need to enlarge their international outlook. The problem of the Franco-German frontier is not only an old problem and a real problem, it is a problem which concerns the peace of the world. It will not be solved by ignoring it; the best hope for its solution lies in the triumph of international interests and the growing strength and wisdom of international agencies. The League of Nations is the newest and seems the most hopeful element in the situation.

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AT SEA WITH A BOARD

By S. G. Riggs

THE most serious error made in discussing our shipping problem lies in the assumption that it is entirely economic. The truth of the matter is that for the present it is largely political. The economist has neatly proven on many occasions that it is better for our country to let the carriage of its goods by sea be done by countries which can do it cheaper than our own nationals. In their opinion all is over so far as a large American merchant marine is concerned except the choice of a suitable epitaph. Yet we have a large fleet of merchant ships under the American flag and the trend of events points to a continuance of this situation. The manner in which this recrudescence of our merchant marine came about and is being carried on has a number of implications worth consideration.

The United States is today one of the leading maritime countries of the world—on paper. In 1914 only three-quarters of a million gross tons of steam shipping were registered for foreign trade under the American flag and only a dozen or two vessels were actually engaged in deep-sea traffic. The American flag on a merchant vessel was a rare sight in most ports of the world. Today three million gross tons of our shipping are actively employed in oversea trade with distant foreign countries, three-quarters of a million more in near-by foreign trade and 8,600,000 tons are registered for such service. American ships literally are "sailing the seven seas." The United States is second only to Great Britain in the amount of sea-going tonnage owned, and has nearly four times as much shipping as France and Japan, which stand third and fourth on the list.

The story of this change is fairly familiar; the increase in tonnage was caused by transfer from other flags and by construction. Just after the outbreak of the war in Europe, Congress passed the Ship Registry Act of August 14, 1914, under the provisions of which two-thirds of a million gross tons of fine ships were admitted to American registry. These ships were almost entirely owned by American capital; they had been built abroad and had been operated under foreign flags as a matter of economy.

The greatest gains, however, were from new construction. After the uncertainties of the latter part of 1914 and the early

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part of 1915, shipbuilding responded quickly to the increased demand for ships. The established American yards were booked to capacity with orders, and new yards were rapidly laid out. The output of steel ships in this country in 1915 was only 155,000 gross tons. In 1917 it was 513,000 tons, in 1918 over 1,000,000 tons and in 1920 a peak of 3,660,000 tons. Our steam tonnage registered for foreign trade jumped from 725,000 gross tons in 1914 to 10,466,000 in 1921, an increase so large that it looks awkward when expressed as a percentage.

The essential fact in this enormous expansion of our potential merchant fleet is that it was accomplished through government, and not private, action. Our so-called shipping problem today hinges on the fact that the Government owns and operates a large part of our merchant marine, and dominates the whole.

It was by chance that our Government became heavily enmeshed in shipping. It is by design that it does not extricate itself. Ten years ago the Government had only slight contact with ocean shipping through registry laws, steamboat and radio inspection, etc. In 1912 a larger control over ocean transportation had been forecast in the investigation of the House Committee on The Merchant Marine and Fisheries into the activities of steamship conferences. This Committee recommended that some form of Government supervision over steamship agreements and rates be set up. In succeeding sessions of Congress bills were introduced to establish a shipping board, which was to have regulatory and quasi-judicial authority over shipping activities and rates somewhat similar to that exercised over our railroads by the Interstate Commerce Commission. In the meantime our export trade was suffering severely because the Allies, and particularly the British, had found it necessary to withdraw shipping from trading routes for war purposes. Cotton sold on the farms in the South for as low as five cents a pound. Stocks of all kinds of goods piled up at our ports. Ships to carry our commodities abroad seemed to be the solution. The Democratic Party, which for the last few decades has had a decided leaning toward government ownership, was in power. After a prolonged debate in 1916, provisions were inserted in the pending shipping bill whereby $50,000,000 was provided for the building, purchase, charter, and operation of vessels by a subsidiary corporation which the Shipping Board was authorized to establish.

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The Shipping Act, 1916, has a double significance; it authorized the government to attempt to regulate ocean shipping, and at the same time allowed it to take part in the business to be regulated. It should be stated in fairness that the intentions of Congress were good and that originally they limited the life of the subsidiary corporation (the Emergency Fleet Corporation) to five years after the cessation of hostilities. The emotions of the time and concentration on the unusual happenings in the world obscured the incompatibility of the two basic activities provided for in the Shipping Act of 1916. Many of the incongruous actions of the Shipping Board in recent months are explainable only in terms of the conflicting functions Congress has asked it to perform.

To understand adequately the present tendencies in our shipping, it is necessary to discuss briefly the chaotic happenings of the last seven years. For logical convenience the events of these years may be divided arbitrarily into five periods: (1) construction, (2) vainglory, (3) bewilderment, (4) receivership in bankruptcy, and (5) cross purposes.

The period of construction began with our entry into the war and continued until the early part of 1919, although the effects of the war policies did not result in a maximum output of ships until about a year later. Our successful participation in the war depended upon ships. The German submarine campaign had resulted in a monthly loss as high as three-quarters of a million gross tons. The quickness with which this country mobilized its resources to build ships astonished the world. Congress appropriated over $3,500,000,000 for this and closely allied purposes. From the middle of 1917 to the armistice, the major concern of the Shipping Board, working through the Emergency Fleet Corporation, was to send ships down the ways in increasing numbers. The original program of the Board just before the end of the war called for the construction of 3,249 ships aggregating 18,092,921 deadweight tons.

It would naturally be supposed that construction on new ships was largely stopped with the signing of the armistice. It is even on record that President Wilson cabled instructions from Paris to that effect. But the thing was not done; indeed, it could not have been done. Several thousand men were employed in shipyards on every coast of the country and even on the shores of the Great Lakes, and thousands more were busy

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fabricating materials and manufacturing supplies in the remotest corners of the country. A sudden cessation of shipbuilding activities would have had a severe and depressing effect on domestic prosperity. Furthermore, the Government had made contracts with shipbuilding companies for the construction of vessels and it is expensive even for the government to cancel contracts. But the main reason why work on so few ships was stopped was political. It would not have been easy to justify to a Congress composed of representatives elected on a regional basis why contracts in specific regions were cancelled. The ship construction program viewed from the political angle was the biggest pork barrel ever provided by a Congress.

So the Board in its annual report for 1919 said: "The general basis on which cancellations were undertaken depended upon the type of vessel involved. . . . In the case of steel vessels, before action was taken toward curtailment the construction program was reviewed by officials of the corporation and by constituted boards of ship owners and operators. It was determined that more of certain types of vessels were under construction than could be utilized profitably, and suspensions or cancellations were instituted where construction had not advanced to such a degree as to make this action unwise. To round out the shipbuilding program, the design of several additional types of vessels running from 10,000 to 15,000 tons deadweight was undertaken, many of them being of relatively higher speed than the average vessels under construction, the motive power in certain instances being Diesel engines and in others quadruple expansion reciprocating engines on geared turbines, depending upon the service desired."

It will be immediately noticed that the mind of the Board as late as the middle of 1919 was still centered on building more ships rather than on stopping work on the enormous number called for by their program. What were the results of the feeble efforts at cancellation? Work was stopped on 467 wooden and concrete ships totaling 1,479,000 deadweight tons; few reliable voices had ever been raised in favor of these types. Contracts were cancelled for 379 steel ships aggregating 2,690,000 tons, or only twenty-three percent of the total. Looking at the problem from another angle, 5,658,000 deadweight tons had been delivered by June 30, 1919, seven months after the close of the war, and 7,759,000 tons, or 57 percent were still to be delivered.

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It was while ships were being completed and delivered every day that the Board dreamed a great dream. The exceedingly high rates of the time made it profitable to operate almost any kind of ship over almost any ocean route. Dozens of new services were inaugurated out of insignificant ports in this country to equally insignificant ports abroad. The Shipping Board boasted that it had "209 general cargo berths, of which 202 were between United States and foreign ports and between United States ports, and seven between foreign ports. These various berths afforded shippers 229 services." To man and maintain this great expansion in our shipping, it was necessary to train hundreds of men for various posts. The idea was even conceived of training executives overnight and the scheme of "super cargoes" was initiated. A super cargo was "a young man assigned to a vessel to assist the master in all clerical work, as well as to report on conditions in favor of or against the vessel, its management, crew, etc., and also to make a detailed study of shipping facilities in foreign ports." The anomoly of having a young inexperienced man reporting on the technical activities of captain, engineer, and master stevedore is obvious. Coincident with the inauguration of this scheme, Mr. Hurley, who was Chairman of the Board at that time, confessed that he had encouraged "American toymakers to produce some playthings that would bring the American Merchant Marine to the attention of American citizens in early childhood. They brought out a self-propelled sheet-iron cargo vessel and a game by playing which young Americans will learn the products and needs of the different nations and the rules and customs of ocean traffic. The need for such educational measures is a real one, for the popular character of the merchant marine is its very life-blood in every maritime nation on earth."

These bizarre examples of the plans made in this period of vainglory are given by way of illustration. They show the illogical conception of fundamental conditions which was the great characteristic of this period. The first assumption was that the mere possession of ships makes a maritime country. Since we were second in tonnage only to the British, we were going to drive British ships from many of the trade routes of the world. Secondly, it was assumed that high ocean freight rates would continue forever, and that our 229 services would always be profitable. If high ocean freight rates were to con-

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tinue indefinitely, why not ask $225 a ton for ships which were selling in Great Britain at from £20 to £25 a ton? The result was inevitable; the government ships were not sold and the government became more firmly established in the shipping business.

As so frequently happens, this period of vainglory was followed by one of bewilderment. The membership of the Board dwindled, through resignations, to two commissioners. Ocean rates dropped precipitantly. The vast network of world services became an enormous liability. Losses piled up on every hand—at a rate in excess of $100,000,000 a year—although the account-methods of the Board were so poor that it was impossible to get an accurate statement. There was no courage to remedy the situation. A weak attempt was made to sell ships. Within less than a year the terms of sale and the basic prices were changed five times; every reduction in price was made after the market had changed and no reduction ever met the open market rate. Only a few hundred thousand of its 8,000,000 tons were disposed of by the Board.

With the advent of the Harding Administration the Shipping Board, figuratively speaking, passed into the hands of a receiver. When Mr. Lasker assumed office as Chairman of the Shipping Board he frankly admitted that he was in charge of a bankrupt enterprise. Over 600 vessels, totaling nearly 5,000,000 deadweight tons, were being run in helter-skelter services with an accounting system in Washington so poor that no one knew how large losses were; intelligent guesses placed them at around $15,000,000 a month. Even the supervision of the laid-up vessels was costing nearly $1,000,000 a month. The new broom swept clean. The management of the Emergency Fleet Corporation was in a measure divorced from the Board itself; high-priced practical steamship men were brought in from industry to handle operations. The number of ships actually employed was reduced one-third, and while the laid-up fleet was greatly increased, the expenses of caring for it were reduced two-thirds. A corps of trained accountants was secured and after months of work it was possible for the first time to draw up a balance sheet and to know each month how large losses were. The experienced steamship men, given large powers in actual operations, were soon able to have ships sail on advertised schedules. A system of publicity and soliciting was inaugurated which bore results in the way of increased confidence on the part of shippers and

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good cargoes for the ships. It is not intimated that conditions in the Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation during this period were ideal, or that they ever can be, but anyone acquainted with the intimate details is forced to admit that Mr. Lasker accomplished immense reforms that saved the taxpayers of the country millions of dollars.

Coincident with this reorganization of the Board came the drive for a direct subsidy. The bill introduced in Congress proposed to grant a bounty to ships engaged in foreign trade on the basis of the tonnage of the ship and the mileage traveled in a year. After lengthy hearings the House passed the measure by a considerable majority. A filibuster, however, developed in the Senate in the closing days of the session of Congress and the bill was killed. Soon after the failure of the subsidy program, Mr. Lasker retired. It should be said in his favor, as the facts mentioned above indicate, that he came very near doing the impossible and his administration stands out in contrast to those that went before as conspicuously able.

And so began the period of cross-purposes. The Lasker mantle descended upon the shoulders of Mr. Farley. His chairmanship was brief. He was the advocate of a scheme whereby corporations subsidiary to the Emergency Fleet Corporation were to be formed and to which the active government vessels were to be delivered for operation. Heated discussions, both verbal and physical, were held on this subject by the Shipping Board, with the Chairman unable to control the opinion of the other members. Exit Mr. Farley. There followed a brief interregnum and then Mr. O'Connor was promoted by the President to the chairmanship of the Board and Admiral Palmer was chosen as President of the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

At this time the Shipping Board was somewhat frightened. Unsympathetic meddlers were suggesting that the operation of Government ships be divorced entirely from the Shipping Board. Proponents of this idea pointed out that in a highly competitive business, such as ocean shipping, important decisions could not effectively be delayed until a meeting on next Tuesday of seven men with a strong local bias and unlearned in the details of ship operation. It is true that the seven commissioners would still have had a life-time job, barring political accidents, but these unwelcome interferers were even suggesting that the salary of

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each member of the Board be reduced from $12,500 to $7,500 a year. The whole matter was of such serious importance that it was discussed on several occasions with President Coolidge.

The Shipping Board won. A compromise was agreed to, according to which the President of the Emergency Fleet Corporation was to have wide freedom of action, merely referring his decisions to the Board for formal approval. The Commissioners of the Board breathed more easily, as men do after escaping from a tight corner. They apparently had conceded a great deal to the Emergency Fleet Corporation. Actually they still held the strings—as, indeed, the Merchant Marine Act, 1920 made it obligatory for them to do.

An example of how this agreement was to work soon appeared. Congress reduced the appropriation of the Shipping Board from $50,000,000 in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1924, to $36,000,000 for the year ending June 30, 1925. This reduction in appropriation made it essential that the operation of ships be curtailed. Admiral Palmer, with good business judgment, decided to consolidate the numerous existing services in order to reduce overlapping and competiting activities among the operators of Shipping Board ships. His plans were designed to keep operating losses within the limit set by Congress. He could not institute these reforms without the approval of the Board. Only after long delays were any of the plans of the Emergency Fleet Corporation accepted, and many were disapproved by the Board entirely. One side is not living up to the promise made to President Coolidge that the operation of ships should be in practice largely divorced from the Shipping Board.

In this manner we have arrived at the present situation. Over $3,500,000,000 of the taxpayers' money was spent during and after the war to construct and acquire around 8,000,000 gross tons of ships for the Government. Of this total three-quarters of a million tons were wooden vessels, which were never worth the bolts that were intended to hold them together and which, after five years of indecision, have at last been almost completely scrapped. Of the seven and a quarter million tons of steel vessels belonging to the Board, it still has six and a quarter million tons. Of the ships it still possesses, only 2,4000,-000 tons are in operation, while nearly 4,000,000 tons are laid up in various rivers and harbors over the country. It is generally recognized both here and abroad that over 2,500,000 gross

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tons of the laid-up fleet are not fit for commercial operation at the rate levels which are likely to exist within the rapidly diminishing life of the idle fleet. But it takes courage for a politically appointed Board to decide to sell or to scrap ships. It is even known that while Mr. Hurley was Chairman of the Board he was urged to set a sales price of $100 a deadweight ton of the Government ships instead of $225 a ton. To this proposal Mr. Hurley objected, saying that a certain group of papers would be on his neck the next morning. "Yes," his adviser replied, "and the next day the taxpayers of the country will call you a statesman." Statesmen, of course, are scarce today and it is probable that none have desk space with the Shipping Board.

In the meantime, four and one-half million gross tons of privately-owned ships are in operation, and a half million tons are out of employment. Only a million and a quarter tons of privately-owned ships are employed in foreign trade, the balance being in the protected coastwise and inter-coastal trades. In the oversea trades where privately-owned ships are employed they must meet the competition not only of foreign lines but of our own government lines, toward the support of which they contribute in taxes. The President of the Emergency Fleet Corporation recently confessed that every voyage of a government ship was costing on an average $25,000 above receipts. Some business men are so blunt as to say that the foreign trade of the country is being subsidized through the operation of government ships to the extent to which these ships make voyage losses. They overstate the case slightly, for Government operation can never be as efficient as private operation and ocean rates everywhere are abnormally low today. At any rate, the private ship owner can extract little consolation from the situation.

Obscured though they are by the diverting details of the situation, two tendencies of considerable importance may nevertheless be discerned by the careful observer. These tendencies are more vital than the loss of a few million dollars a year by the taxpayers, because in the long run they will cost them infinitely more. The first is the strengthening of the sentiment for a continuation of government ownership and operation of ships, and the second the increasing danger that serious international friction will arise over shipping questions.

Many business men become facetious when the idea is ad-

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vanced that we seem to have embarked on a new policy of government ownership and operation. They are apparently firm believers in the efficiency of legislation and put their trust in the preamble of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, which says, "That it is necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United States." They stress the declared purpose of the will of the people as expressed in Congress assembled that our merchant marine shall be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United States. They overlook the fact that such is not the case today and that the adverb "ultimately" leads the declaration.

Those who hold to the idea that the Government is going to get out of shipping as soon as it can are doubtless unaware of a serious debate which occurred between two of the learned counsel of the Shipping Board before that body on the question of whether Congress intended that the Shipping Board get out of the shipping business or stay in it. One counsel argued from the preamble just quoted, passing lightly, of course, over the "ultimately," and supported his view by reference to section 5, in which the Board is "authorized and directed to sell, as soon as practicable" all its ships. His opponent in the debate was an easy victor. He merely pointed out that "ultimately" is a long time, that section 5 hedges the sale of ships about with impossible provisions which seem reasonable at first glance, but several of which, if stressed, make necessary an impossible knock-down price, and that other sections provide similar limitations. Section 5 says that the Shipping Board in "fixing or accepting the sale price of its vessels shall take into consideration the prevailing domestic and foreign market price of, the available supply of, and the demand for vessels, existing freight rates and prospects of maintenance, the cost of constructing vessels of similar types under prevailing conditions, as well as the cost of the construction or purchase price to be sold, and any other facts or conditions that would influence a prudent, solvent business man in the sale of similar vessels or property, which he may be forced to sell."

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to "legal disputes." In general, such disputes would relate to (a) the interpretation of a treaty, (b) any question of international law, (c) any breach of an international obligation, or (d) reparation for such a breach. But the Protocol (Art. 3) does not prejudice "the right of any state" to make compatible reservations when it accedes to the Court Protocol of December 16, 1920, and the wording of Article 36 of the Court Statute leaves a wide range for such compatibility.

Compulsory jurisdiction of the Court had been proposed in the draft of its Statute which was framed by a committee of jurists in 1920. At that time, it was felt by some states to go too far. But between 1920 and 1924 the optional provision for such jurisdiction had been signed by twenty-two states, including Brazil and China but none of the so-called Great Powers. As a result of the Protocol of Geneva, it has now been signed by France, on condition that a denunciation may be made if the Protocol does not become operative. And Mr. Arthur Henderson announced at Geneva that Great Britain had in mind acceptance of the optional provision with a reservation as to legal disputes concerning the use of the British navy in operations sanctioned by the League and in support of the Covenant.

(2) Secondly, the signatories of the Protocol of Geneva agree to arbitrate all non-legal disputes. The Covenant had already provided that any dispute "likely to lead to a rupture" should be submitted either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council. The arbitration envisaged by the Covenant (Art. 13) may be entirely outside the League. The signatories of the Protocol remain free to resort to any arbitration they choose. It is only when other arbitration is not resorted to that members of the League are bound by the Covenant (Art. 15) to submit a dispute to the Council, and the Protocol now "renders more complete" the provisions of the Covenant for the Council's proceeding.

The Council will first endeavor to effect a settlement. Failing that, the Council will endeavor to persuade the parties to agree to arbitrate. Failing that, and if one party so requests, a committee of arbitrators will be set up with the Council's assistance. Failing that, the Council shall endeavor to recommend a settlement by unanimous vote (not counting the votes of the disputants) and such a recommendation will become obligatory. Failing such unanimity, however, the Council must submit the dispute to arbitration, itself determining the conditions thereof.

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

Compiled by Col. Lawrence Martin

ADHERENTS TO LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND TO PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

All the states shown above as belonging to the League are also members of the International Labor Organization. In addition, Germany, Ecuador and Hedjaz, though not members of the League, are members of the International Labor Organization. New Zealand, which does not fall within the limits of the above map, adheres to both League and Court.

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A judicial sentence, an arbitral award, or a unanimous Council recommendation at any of these stages becomes binding on the signatory states. The scheme thus seems to be war-tight in its provision of a peaceful procedure for settling disputes.

But one possible qualification must be noted. Some questions still remain outside the category of adjudicable and arbitrable questions. Two decades ago, arbitration treaties were not permitted to apply to questions of "national honor and vital interest." That phrase is now obsolescent. In its place, the Covenant of the League of Nations provides that in a dispute concerning "a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction" of a state, the Council shall make no recommendation as to settlement. This provision was put into the Covenant as a result of American insistence at Paris. The Protocol expressly provides that it shall remain intact, and the Council is as incompetent now as before to make any binding recommendation for settling a dispute which it finds to relate to a domestic matter. Or if a dispute is being arbitrated, the arbitrators are precluded from proceeding further once the court has given an advisory opinion that it relates to a domestic matter.

But the Protocol of Geneva includes an additional provision, inserted at the instance of the Japanese, that a decision that a matter in dispute is domestic need not prevent "consideration of the situation" by the Council or Assembly of the League under Article 11 of the Covenant—that is, under the power there given in the event of war or threatened war, to "take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." A state is to be presumed an aggressor if it goes to war in disregard of a proper finding that a matter in dispute is domestic, and if after such a finding it fails to submit the dispute to the Council for "consideration of the situation." If, on the other hand, a state does make such submission and does await the Council's consideration, is it an aggressor within the meaning of that term as used in the Protocol if it thereafter goes to war? The presumption of aggression (Art. 10) does not then apply, but the state may still be violating its undertaking (Art. 2) not to resort to war except in case of resistance to acts of aggression or when assisting in international police work against an aggressor. M. Politis (Greece), who acted as a *rapporteur* for the first committee of the Assembly, was explicit

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in his report in saying that "no breach in the barrier set up by the Protocol against aggressive war" has been opened up; and he declared that "a war undertaken against a state whose exclusive jurisdiction has been formally recognized is an international crime to be avenged collectively by the signatories of the Protocol." It would seem, therefore, that a state which, after awaiting the Council's consideration of the situation, goes to war over a dispute held to concern "a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction" of another state, may be found to be an aggressor, though the presumption of aggression does not automatically apply to it.

What is the action which the Council may take in its "consideration of the situation?" Obviously, it is in the nature of good offices and mediation. The Council is prohibited from making any binding recommendation, but it may still attempt to persuade the parties to continue discussion and to refrain from hostilities. In this respect the Protocol's provision for the Council's "considering the situation" is not new or startling. "It does not confer new powers or functions on either the Council or the Assembly," as M. Politis explained. Indeed, it merely recognizes what the Hague Conferences recognized in 1899 and in 1907, that it is "expedient and desirable that one or more Powers, strangers to the dispute, should, on their own initiative and as far as circumstances may allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the states at variance."

(3) In a third field, also, the Protocol would lend precision to the provisions of the Covenant. The latter instrument makes provision (Art. 16) for police measures to be taken against a state which resorts to war in disregard of its obligation to submit to arbitration or inquiry by the Council. Such measures would include "the severance of all trade or financial relations," and the prohibition of intercourse with nationals of the offending state. The Council is empowered to recommend what effective military, naval or air force each state should contribute for putting down the aggression, though no state is bound to accept that recommendation. Moreover, according to the decision of the Second Assembly, each state is left to decide for itself whether the Covenant has been violated.

The Protocol would give the Council power to determine the fact of aggression, and to call on the signatories to apply the sanctions. Thereafter, each signatory would be entitled to be-

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come a belligerent against the aggressor, though not bound to do so. Each signatory would be bound, however, to "coöperate loyally and effectively" in resistance to the aggressor, "in the degree which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow." And each would be bound to "come to the assistance" of the victim of aggression, though free to say for itself what the nature of this assistance should be.

In anticipation of such a situation, the Protocol envisages the possibility of an undertaking which a state may give to the Council that in certain events it would be willing to make a particular use of its forces. Thus Great Britain might give an undertaking to the Council that in the event of Germany's being found by the Council to be an aggressor against France, the British fleet would be used to protect the French channel ports. And the possibility is also foreseen that two states might enter into a treaty to come each to the other's assistance in a particular manner; but the Protocol would recognize such agreements only if they were registered with the League of Nations and if they were held open to adhesion by any other state which is a member of the League. This is a novel effort to avoid the evil effect of special military alliances.

M. Benes (Czechoslovakia), as *rapporteur* of the third committee before the Assembly, stated that "no burden has been imposed on states beyond the sanctions already provided for in the Covenant." If a state should fail to "coöperate loyally and effectively," no sanctions are to be operative against it. M. Benes states the gist of this part of the Protocol to be: "Each state is the judge of the manner in which it shall carry out its obligations but not of the existence of those obligations."

The possible application of the sanctions to states which are not signatories of the Protocol has been envisaged. The Covenant provides (Art. 17) that in the event of a dispute between a member of the League and a state which is not a member, the latter shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership for the purposes of such dispute, on conditions which the Council may deem just; and that if the invitation is declined, the sanctions provided for (Art. 16) may be enforced against it. The Protocol provides for a similar invitation to be sent to such a non-member state, inviting acceptance of the obligations of the Protocol for the purposes of the single dispute. It does not go beyond what was already in the Covenant in this respect.

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If the application of police sanctions should involve military operations, the Protocol would fix upon the aggressor "up to the extreme limit of its capacity" the cost of such operations, as well as the duty to make reparation for all losses suffered by combatant as well as by civilian individuals. If this should not have the effect of deterring a would-be aggressor, it might furnish the gauge for reparations which was so sadly lacking in 1919.

(4) It is only the fourth aspect of the Protocol which deals with the third link in the chain of arbitration, security and disarmament. The Assembly found the framing of the Protocol such a large undertaking that it could not attempt at the same time to work out plans for disarmament. Moreover, various preliminary studies were necessary, and had not yet been made. The Protocol therefore provides (Art. 17) that an International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments shall be convened in Geneva on June 15, 1925, to which all states are to be invited. A program for reduction and limitation is to be drawn up by the Council for consideration at this Conference, and must be communicated to the Governments by March 15, 1925. To this end, the Temporary Mixed Commission on Reduction of Armaments has already been reconstituted, and various suggestions as to the work of the Conference were made by the Assembly itself.

The success of the Conference conditions the coming into force of the Protocol. If by May 1, 1925, ratifications have not been deposited by three of the four Powers—France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan—as well as by ten other members of the League, the adjournment of the Conference to some later date is provided for. In no event is the Protocol to become binding until such ratifications are deposited and until the Conference has adopted a plan for the reduction of armaments. Thereafter, the Protocol shall cease to have effect when the Council declares (on grounds to be determined by the Conference) that the plan has not been carried out.

The Protocol received the blessing of forty-eight states represented in the Fifth Assembly on October 2, 1924, when their delegates voted unanimously to "welcome" it "warmly" and to recommend its acceptance to "the earnest attention of all members of the League." On the same date, it was opened for signature to all states of the world, and signatures were promptly affixed on behalf of Albania, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile,

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Czechoslovakia, Esthonia, France, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Portugal and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. (The American press has also reported signature by Paraguay.) Before the end of October, Czechoslovakia had effected her ratification.

It remains now to be seen whether other states are prepared to put the Protocol into effect. Without Great Britain's coöperation it seems doubtful whether anything can be done; and the British action seems to be conditioned on the participation of the various Dominions and the Irish Free State quite as much as on the views of the new Conservative Government. At the time of writing there has been no clear indication either of the attitude of the Dominions or of the attitude of the new Government.

MM. Benes and Politis reported to the Assembly: "Our purpose was to make war impossible, to kill it, to annihilate it. . . . The plan drawn up leaves no loophole; it prohibits war of every description and lays down that all disputes shall be settled by pacific means. . . . If we succeed, the League of Nations will have rendered an inestimable service to the whole modern world." Perhaps the Protocol will have influence, however, even if it fails to realize such large ambitions. For whatever its fate during the next twelvemonth, its provisions are bound to affect the place which war will have in international law as it is to be developed in the future. Even if no further progress were made immediately, the drafting of the Protocol is in itself a fitting celebration of the third centenary of the publication of Grotius' classic "De Jure Belli ac Pacis."

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ECONOMIC RIVALRIES IN LATIN AMERICA

By Julius Klein

AS THE situation clears in Europe it is rapidly becoming more evident that the recovery of the old world involves, and is in fact largely dependent upon, the intimacy of its economic contacts overseas. With the gathering momentum of the Dawes Plan, the restoration of a "business government" in Great Britain, the surprising economic rehabilitation of Italy, and the industrial and commercial recovery elsewhere on the continent, it is quite clear that the economically "new" lands of Latin America are to play a prominent part in this new era.

In certain cases, in fact, notably those of England and Belgium, a definite part of the recent industrial recovery has been directly traceable to long established financial and commercial reserves in the American Republics, which have stood the older countries in good stead during their recent years of need. Somewhat similarly, Italy's transatlantic assets, namely her emigrant colonies which in recent decades have had such a notable growth to the south of the Equator, have provided an invaluable source of necessary capital for the new Italian régime. On the other hand, the recovery of French trade and industry from 1919 to 1923, striking though it was, would undoubtedly have been even faster and more complete had it not been for the concentration of French pre-war investments almost entirely in Europe, particularly in Russia.

The old ties between Europe and the southern republics are taking on new forms. For instance, South America's most promising area, the southeast coast, which in pre-war years was almost entirely served by European shipping lines, is likely to have a conspicuous share in the new age of transatlantic air traffic. French exploitation of Dakar on the western tip of Africa as a terminal for such traffic is showing signs of something more than academic interest. The recent announcement of the contemplated transfer of the Zeppelin works to Seville is another instance of the same tendency, and is further of international concern as a part of the post-war revival of Germany's well-known interest in the Pan-Hispanic as a counter-balance to the Pan-American movement.

Even more significant, of course, is the marked intensification

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since the war of blood relationship between Europe and Latin America. Latin America has long been a favored destination for those flying fragments of population which are constantly thrown off by the whirling economic and political turmoil of the Old World. The recent restrictive immigration policy adopted by the United States has accentuated this link between the two areas. Incidentally, the recent triumphal tour of the Italian Crown Prince through Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile is worth bearing in mind in connection with Mussolini's pronouncement on the immigration policy of the United States.

One phase of this social relationship which is not sufficiently appreciated is the constant ebb and flow of the harvest hand "golondrinas" or "swallow" migrants, whose annual visits back and forth across the Equator provide an intimacy and continuity of contact which is much less evident in the North Atlantic migrations. In many important instances of agricultural and industrial (particularly mining) advancement in Spain, Italy, and Portugal the inspiration can be directly traced to these annual visitations of thousands of aggressive and ambitious workers from those countries to the New World and their observation there of the latest American machinery and methods.

It is well, too, to bear in mind that this factor of two-way immigrant traffic in considerable numbers each year will be a lasting advantage in favor of European shipping in Latin American traffic as against that of the United States. The well-known axiom of the merchant marine, namely, that the steerage supports the line, while not always valid, still carries a good deal of weight, and there is no prospect of heavy steerage traffic between North and South America for decades to come. The policy of the American shipping lines, therefore, has been rightly, and it should be noted quite successfully, concentrated on the high-grade passenger business in which it has now established a clear leadership. In fact, its tonnage to both coasts of South America has increased about 40 percent since April, 1923.

In this connection it will be well to note the repercussions of our restriction of Japanese immigration upon the relations between the Island Empire and the Latin Republics on the Pacific seaboard, where post-war shipping and commercial contacts are being extended by Japan with characteristically close collaboration between governmental and private agencies. Whenever the development of this situation requires recognition through

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the negotiation of new commercial treaties between Japan and the various republics, we may expect to find that the question of immigration, which is so vital a part of any shipping program, will undoubtedly be given careful attention. As yet Japanese commercial and maritime enterprises have given no indication of competing seriously in Latin America. It would require unusually heavy governmental subsidies and other aids to overcome the formidable economic and geographic obstacles which confront the Japanese merchant marine in such traffic, though Japanese requirements for cotton, copper, iron ore, nitrate, and other bulky raw materials may serve as a partial corrective of this situation.

From the Latin American point of view, one of the most important reactions from the inauguration of the Dawes Plan was its stimulation of the demand for raw materials necessary for the European revival. The consequent stabilization of old world currencies almost instantaneously had its effect in every important Latin American market. This was particularly true in the important areas of temperate South America, the products of which in many instances had their only outlet across the Atlantic. An interesting phase of this strengthened relationship through the purchase of more Latin American raw materials by Europe is found in the overtures by various European nations for preferential tariff treatment for their fabricated exports in the southern markets. In several important Latin American countries such proposals have been advanced by the representatives of various European governments, in some instances with preliminary success. It will be interesting to observe the progress of such negotiations, particularly in view of the fact that the commercial policies of the American Government are being shaped in the opposite direction, namely, away from any proposals of preferential treatment. In fact, in some instances there has been a tendency in Latin America to concur with the general policy of the northern neighbor as to the dubious value of any such bargainings in preferential advantages. (A minor phase of this topic may be noted in the probable revival of the question of imperial preference under the new Baldwin Government in connection with the British West Indies, which have for some time been the scene of special trade promotion on the part of Canadian representatives. An intensification of this policy might well have considerable significance for the American flour

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trade, and possibly for one or two kinds of manufactured goods, in the lesser Caribbean markets.)

This naturally raises the question as to the effects upon the United States of the new European trade outlook in Latin America. Are we likely to be relegated to a minor position in this field, or has our undisturbed preëminence during the past decade given our economic interests in those regions something more than a surface foundation? There can be no doubt that our proportion of the trade in these lucrative markets has fallen since the peak years of 1917–21; but it is well to remember that our share in the import trade of the so-called ABC countries now stands at about 24 percent as against 16 percent in 1913. It should be carefully noted, however, that this was not entirely a war-time acquisition. There were ample indications as early as 1911 that America's advance in those three countries was gathering momentum far more rapidly than Germany's or Britain's. In fact, it could probably be demonstrated statistically by those who are fond of such hypothetical speculations that our present percentage of the trade of the three leading South American countries is not far from what we would have had if there had been no war.

Britain has already recovered her pre-war leadership in Argentina and Brazil. The United States still retains first place in Chile. Germany is making notable progress, especially in Chile, though she is still third in all three of the ABC countries. In the markets of the northern republics, particularly Mexico and Cuba, there are no indications of any serious inroads upon the supremacy of the United States. Whereas a decade ago Europe was supplying about half of their needs, it is now contributing a bare 30 percent, and this figure is showing signs of further diminution at an early date. The interesting feature of the trade struggle in this particular section of Latin America is the rivalry between Britain and Germany. In Mexico, for instance, each of them supplied about 13 percent of the pre-war import trade, whereas today each contributes slightly more than six percent. Germany is now again on even terms with her rival; she has far outdistanced France, which held a momentary advantage during the years immediately after the armistice.

Certain potent factors will bring about the concentration of the European drive very largely on the lucrative markets of the River Plate and Brazil. Elsewhere in Latin America the Euro-

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pean trades is confronted with formidable opposition in the shape of greatly improved American shipping service, made especially effective in the case of the West Coast through the agency of the Panama Canal; the heavy expansion of American investments and of American branch banks; the creation of a dozen new American Chambers of Commerce since 1912; the establishment of direct commercial agencies; and the growth of vastly improved communication facilities, and other ties of similar nature.

A significant feature of this commercial advance by the United States is the fact that much of it is what might be called new trade, made up of commodities which previous to the war had been sold only in small quantities—such lines as cheap automobiles, films, office furniture, construction material, ready-made clothing, machinery for new industries, etc. These at present represent important elements in the Latin American import trade which formed only a very small item in the trade before the war. Even in such an apparently competitive line as textiles it is evident that although the United Kingdom is about holding its own in Brazil, Peru, Mexico, and elsewhere, the United States is taking a larger proportion of the new business which has grown out of the recently increased purchasing power of those countries.

It is true that hereafter Europe will be laboring to a lesser degree under the disadvantage of quoting prices in wildly fluctuating currencies. Furthermore, the decreasing uncertainty of her own industrial conditions will facilitate that long-distance planning and operation which is indispensable to any successful export policy. But even allowing for these advantages she will find the United States in a decidedly formidable position, thanks to certain important factors which have always been contributory to success in foreign trade.

Of these factors there first of all is the trebling, during the past decade, of American industrial and commercial investments (exclusive of government bonds) throughout Latin America. They now stand well over three billion dollars as against a little over one billion in 1913. American capital has a dominant position in such basic industries as mining on the West Coast and in Mexico, meat packing in the River Plate region, petroleum in Mexico, Colombia and Peru, and sugar and tobacco in Cuba. Significant advances are also probable along certain lines in Brazil. This participation by America capital in the economic

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development of Latin America not only stimulates the growth of an important market for American supplies incident to such large scale operations, but makes an even more important contribution by bringing into use hitherto untouched sources of wealth and well being, which has reacted profoundly upon the standards of living and the general social and economic outlook for great masses of population in the southern republics. The striking feature of this investment situation is the tendency toward a diversification of our interests. Whereas before the war American capital was concentrated in a few great mining and meat packing enterprises, it is now seeking a wide range of development opportunities.

But we are not to have a completely undisturbed monopoly of this business of supplying new capital to the Latin Republics. Just before the war British investors were each year sending about $460,000,000 worth of new capital abroad. About half of it was going to Latin America. Their annual investments during 1919–22 averaged far below this figure, but in 1923 they ran considerably above half a billion dollars, an ample indication of the revival of British investment activity along the pre-war lines. This was particularly noticeable in Brazil in connection with the work of the British financial mission to that country last year, an important phase of their interest was being centered on the possible expansion of the Brazilian cotton industry with the aid of British capital. We may look for a rapid expansion of British interests along this line in various parts of Latin America as one phase of the new Baldwin Government's program. It is well to remember that British holdings in Argentina and Brazil alone are about equal to the entire three billions or more of American investments throughout the twenty Republics. Her nationals still hold nearly a hundred railway and tram-line companies and more than forty light and power stations throughout Latin America; and there is every indication that this formidable total is likely to be increased, especially in leading industrial fields.

One of the most important contributions to American commercial advancement in Latin America is the notable increase which has been made since 1914 in the number of direct representations—agencies and branches—of American trading firms and banks. Before that date a very large proportion of American trade was being handled through European agencies which have now been largely replaced either with American or with

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non-competing native contacts. This new development, which has found expression in the organization of American Chambers of Commerce in most of the important trade centers along the Latin American seaboards, is counterbalancing to a certain extent the old advantage which Europe had always enjoyed in the possession of large colonies of young, expert, commercial personnel resident overseas. These colonies played a prominent part in the maritime and trade advancement of Britain and Germany, though they had in many instances been kept alive through their service as intermediaries for American firms.

It is well to note in this connection that the nationals of many smaller European countries have been active in such commercial operations in Latin American trade centers. Witness the Jugoslav bankers in Antofagasta and wool traders in Punta Arenas, the Scandinavian insurance and ship-chandlery concerns in most South American seaports, the Spanish retailers in Cuba and Mexico, the Poles in the timber trade of South Brazil, and the Italian grocery dealers in all parts of the Southern Republics. This inconspicuous but none the less active participation in the last stages of foreign trade, namely, transactions with the ultimate native consumers, has given and still gives our European rivals an important advantage in Latin American commerce which will probably be theirs for many years to come. Conditions in the United States will not for decades or even generations be such as to force any considerable numbers of young men to seek commercial futures abroad. As was indicated, however, there is a rapidly expanding appreciation among American export firms of the desirability of direct trade through nationally owned agencies and a nucleus of such outposts is steadily growing in each important Latin American trade center.

The tax policy prevalent among European nations with reference to overseas enterprises is lenient in comparison with the policy of the United States. Their general practice of exempting incomes earned abroad from the payment of income taxes has given their overseas nationals a decided advantage which must eventually be overcome by their American rivals if the latter are to prosper. This is particularly true in such highly competitive markets as Argentina, where the margin of superiority one way or another is apt to be very slight.

One notable advance which has been made by American interests in the past decade is in the field of cable service. Euro-

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pean owned cables in Latin American waters now total about 25,000 miles, which is slightly less than the pre-war figure. The American mileage, however, has increased from about 14,000 before the war to 34,000 at the present time. There were few things which contributed more directly to European prestige in the eyes of the average Latin American before 1914 than the vastly superior news service from the Old World in comparison with that from the United States. Today the situation is precisely reversed; the average large Latin American newspaper now carries as much material on the United States as it does on all the rest of the world put together. The result is that the episodes of our day-to-day existence are being viewed in a much fairer light than was the case before the war.

Latin American technical experts and graduate students are now coming to the United States in hundreds as against the few scores of a decade ago. There is an increasing appreciation of the fact that our economic evolution confronted us a generation or so ago with precisely the same type of problems and obstacles as those which are now before the peoples of the south. The technique of Latin American agriculture, mining, road-building, hydro-electric and irrigation development is being inspired from American rather than European schools. It would be difficult to over-estimate the importance of this factor in the future relationships among the American republics.

From the European point of view, however, the fundamentally significant thing about this new era is not the possibility of American commercial or economic preëminence in a field which a generation or so ago was largely under the sway of Old World trade, shipping, finance, and industrial enterprise. The participation of the United States in the great new development of South America will bring advantages not to this country alone; our contribution toward the new economic life and strength of the southern empires will also be a vital contribution toward the increase of essential resources that are absolutely necessary for the recovery of the Old World. Latin America's truly extraordinary advance during the past decade offers secure ground for the conviction that there is not only ample room but an actual need for the United States and Europe to join together in collaboration with the rapidly growing native commercial, financial, and industrial communities in bringing that territory into its deserved position in the world's economy.

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THE REPARATIONS PROBLEM AFTER LONDON

By Jean Parmentier

THE London Conference, which was summoned with the purpose of bringing the Dawes Plan into operation and of determining the conditions of its execution, fulfilled its object; it culminated in the signing of the various agreements between the German Government, the Allied Governments and the Reparation Commission necessary to establish the new reparation régime in conformity with the Dawes Plan.

This new régime could not be imposed on Germany either by the Allied Governments or by the Reparation Commission. The peace treaty (and its provisions in this respect had again been defined by the letter under date of June 16, 1918, addressed to the German Delegation by M. Clemenceau) conferred no right upon the Allied Governments to intervene in the exercise of Germany's sovereignty in regard to the steps taken by the German Government to obtain the sums required for the payment of reparation. Neither was this right held by the Reparation Commission, which was merely authorized to fix the amount of reparation due, to draw up the schedule and the conditions of payment, to estimate Germany's financial resources and ability to make payment (and hence to exercise extensive supervision in this respect), to refer all cases of German default to the Allied Governments, and, finally, to interpret the reparation clauses of the treaty.

The plan set up by the treaty might no doubt have functioned satisfactorily if the reparation debt had been fixed at a low figure, if the debtor nation had been willing to pay, and if it had had a powerful government. Since none of these conditions was fulfilled the primary demands of the treaty itself remained unsatisfied. The depreciation of the German currency grew considerably worse and the schedule of payments drawn up by the Reparation Commission was soon suspended by a moratorium; no improvement having taken place in the situation at the expiration of this moratorium a further period of grace was demanded by the debtor. The most interested nations, for whom the payment of reparation was a vital necessity, occupied the Ruhr in order to take possession of real

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guarantees; the German Government retaliated by passive resistance, which led to the complete collapse of the German currency and brought the country perilously near to absolute social disintegration. The end of passive resistance, the introduction of the Rentenmark, and the wiping out of public and private debts made it possible for the German Government temporarily to restore budgetary and currency stability. These results, however, were obviously of a precarious nature and would no doubt have been destroyed by any large reparation payments on an unorganized basis.

Such was the situation when the Committee of Experts first met under the chairmanship of General Dawes, instructed by the Reparation Commission to devise a means of balancing the German budget and of stabilizing the currency. The committee's terms of reference indicated in themselves the two essential conditions that had to be realized before any large and continued reparation payments could become possible. In order to fulfil these conditions, the experts were obliged to recommend a very intricate organization which was in no way provided for by the peace treaty. In order to ensure monetary stability, they demanded that the exclusive right to issue notes be conferred upon a bank of issue controlled by the strictest regulations, and, in particular, that it be prohibited from making any advances to the state or to any political body whatsoever. The capital of this bank must be partly constituted by the floating of an external loan of 800 million gold marks. To ensure the balancing of the budget, the experts determined the revenues to be assigned to reparation; they then recommended the creation of a Reich Railway Company, which should be entrusted with the working of the railways and which should be encumbered with a debt of 11 milliard gold marks, representing far less than half the present value of the undertaking; they also recommended a capital levy, up to 5 milliard gold marks, on German industry in the form of individual and mortgage bonds, a levy which is less than the pre-war industrial debt that disappeared with the collapse of the mark. The experts provided for a two years' budget moratorium but designated the revenues which must, in the future, provide given funds and serve as security for the industrial and railway bonds; they organized the collection of controlled revenues under the supervision of agents appointed by the Reparation Commission. In order

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that the reparation payments should not affect the currency stability, they decided that Germany's liability must be considered as having been met by the payment of the prescribed sums in German currency, the duty of transferring these sums as far as possible without bringing about a fall of the currency being exclusively entrusted to a committee known as the Transfer Committee.

The obligations thus imposed on Germany by the Experts' Plan, and which define the general obligation assumed under the treaty, evidently required the formal acceptance of the German Government. Certain differences of opinion as to the manner in which this acceptance should be given having been settled, and unanimity having been reached on a report submitted by the legal advisers of the Conference, the Reparation Commission and the German Government signed an agreement in which the German Government undertook to take all the measures necessary for bringing the Experts' Plan into operation. The Reparation Commission, for its part, undertook to take all necessary steps for achieving the same object, in particular for facilitating the issue of a German loan, an essential factor in the Plan. The two parties also agreed to apply such further agreements as might be concluded between the German and the Allied Governments assembled at the London Conference. Finally, it was agreed to submit to arbitration any dispute arising out of the agreement itself or its annexes, the Experts' Plan, or German legislation introduced in execution of the Plan.

This agreement, however important it may be, did not complete the task undertaken by the London Conference. The execution of the Experts' Plan, in fact, involved a certain number of measures to be taken by the Allies vis-à-vis Germany and by the Allies among themselves, such as the restoration of Germany's fiscal and economic unity and the announcement of possible default and relevant penalties. Various details regarding the application of the plan also figured on the official agenda of the Conference and had to be settled without delay.

The most delicate of these questions was that concerning possible default. Two arguments were advanced. According to one, the provisions of the Dawes Plan were a new departure in so far as the Treaty of Versailles was concerned, and it was necessary to institute a special procedure to deal with defaults and penalties irrespective of the treaty provisions. According

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to the second argument, the Dawes Plan was an outcome of the treaty in accordance with a procedure provided by the treaty itself; once it had been accepted by Germany, there was no reason whatsoever to modify the rules concerning defaults, the announcement of which is entrusted by the treaty to the Reparation Commission, acting on a majority vote. The first of these arguments was upheld by those Powers which, being but little interested in reparation, were willing to accept the axiom that there would be no further default, and which in any case wished that such default could be declared only by a unanimous vote of the Commission; it was moreover supported by a body of public opinion which it was essential should coöperate if the loan on which the Dawes Plan was based was to be successful. The other argument was upheld by the Powers vitally interested in reparation, the public opinion of which took the view that the maintenance of the rights of the Reparation Commission under the treaty would be a safeguard.

The first compromise was only temporarily successful. It consisted in remedying the fundamental difference between the Reparation Commission as it existed and the Commission as conceived by the authors of the treaty, this difference being due to the absence of an official American member. As a result of this absence and owing to the Chairman's right to give the casting vote, France and Belgium combined could always hold the majority. It is to be noted, however, that no majority vote on any important question has ever been thus obtained. However this may be, a compromise was at first accepted by all the Governments. It was agreed that any declaration of default should be made by the Reparation Commission supplemented by an American citizen appointed unanimously by the Commission, or failing such unanimity, by the President in office of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. This compromise was soon found to be inadequate, and a deadlock seemed imminent when the French delegation proposed that the powers of the Reparation Commission be left intact but that, in the event of failure to obtain a unanimous vote, the minority should be entitled to submit the question at issue to the arbitration of an impartial Committee appointed unanimously by the Reparation Commission, or failing such unanimity, by the President of the Hague Court. The French delegation also proposed to extend this arbitration procedure to all

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disputes arising out of the application of the Experts' Plan. This proposal, which was accepted by the Governments, was, as far as default was concerned, embodied in an agreement concluded between the Allied Governments, and, as far as concerned disputes between the Reparation Commission and Germany regarding the interpretation of their agreements, the Dawes Plan and the laws passed in execution of the Plan, was embodied in an agreement concluded between the Allied Governments and the German Government. In the Inter-Allied agreement it was further prescribed that no penalties should be imposed on Germany under the treaty unless declaration was made, in the foregoing conditions, of flagrant default within the meaning of the Experts' Report. In this case the Governments, "acting with the consciousness of joint trusteeship for the financial interests of themselves and of others who will have advanced money upon the lines of the Plan," should immediately and conjointly determine "the nature of sanctions to be applied and the method of their rapid and effective application." Finally, the signatory Governments made declarations intended to safeguard, in all circumstances, the service of the 800 million gold mark loan necessary for the execution of the Dawes Plan.

An agreement with the German Government concerning measures to be adopted by all parties for the execution of the Dawes Plan was necessary; this agreement was signed in London. It provides for the voting of the necessary laws by the Reichstag, the instalment of the executive and controlling organizations, the final constitution of the Bank and of the Railway Company, the transfer to the trustees of certificates representing railway and industrial bonds, the conclusion of contracts guaranteeing the issue of a loan of 800,000,000 gold marks and the reëstablishment of Germany's fiscal and economic unity. It also fixes the dates of execution. Furthermore, measures applicable to the interim period are arranged, as well as amnesty measures designed in so far as possible to wipe out the past.

Under this agreement, the Dawes Plan is considered to be in operation as from the conclusion of the London Conference, without awaiting the subscription of the 800,000,000 gold mark loan which forms the very basis of the Plan. Consequently, the first year of operation began on August 15, 1924.

The question of the military occupation of the Ruhr did not appear on the agenda of the Conference; nor was it dealt with

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by the Committee of Experts, who considered that it did not come within their jurisdiction. It was inevitable, however, that it should be raised in London outside the Conference. By a letter to the Reich Chancellor, dated August 16, 1924, MM. Herriot, Theunis, and Hymans declared that if the London Agreements for the application of the Experts' Plan were carried out in the same spirit of loyalty and peace which underlay the discussions of the Conference, the French and Belgian Governments would proceed to the military evacuation of the Ruhr within a maximum period of one year. By a second letter of the same date, the Chancellor was informed that on the day following the definitive signing of the London Agreement the French and Belgian Governments would order the military evacuation of the Hoerde in the Dortmund zone and of districts outside the Ruhr occupied since January 11, 1923.

In addition to these agreements essential for the application of the Dawes Plan, the London Conference gave special consideration to the details of the report relating to deliveries in kind and the functioning of the Transfer Committee.

The Experts' Report calls attention to the fact that from a financial point of view deliveries in kind do not in reality differ from cash payments and that in the long run they cannot exceed the actual and exportable surplus of German production in relation to consumption without a resulting disturbance in exchange or the necessity of resorting to external loans. Considering, moreover, that deliveries in kind are prescribed by the treaty, that at the present moment they form an essential factor in the economic life of several Allied Powers, that if maintained within reasonable limits they may act as a stimulant to Germany's productivity and therefore contribute to increasing the surplus of the commercial balance, and that they may help to prevent this surplus being absorbed by foreign investments (thus facilitating transfer), the Committee recognizes the necessity of continuing deliveries in kind, while recommending that they be limited to Germany's natural productions and to exports which do not involve previous large importations of raw materials.

Moreover, the Experts' Plan completely changes the system of deliveries in kind. Under the treaty, deliveries in kind formed an obligation imposed on the German Government, which was to execute the orders of the Reparation Commission, placing them with German dealers whom it would reimburse.

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Under the Dawes Plan, the German dealers must be paid for deliveries in kind out of the funds accumulated to the account of the Agent for Reparation Payments.

In view of the very radical change which the Dawes Report has brought about in the idea of deliveries in kind, it was extremely desirable (in order to avoid any subsequent dispute) that the German Government should recognize that under the new régime deliveries in kind are released from all the restrictions as to kind, quantity and time provided for by the Treaty of Versailles. Such recognition was obtained in London in an agreement concluded between the German Government and the Allied Governments with the stipulation that the schedules were to be drawn up with due regard to Germany's productive capacity, to the conditions of her supplies of raw materials and to her internal requirements, in so far as was necessary for the maintenance of her social and economic life and taking into account also the restrictions laid down in the Experts' Report.

It will be remembered that the Transfer Committee was set up in order to meet the difficulty of determining in advance large external payments, it being obvious that no country can make external payments substantially greater than the credit balance of its accounts without incurring the risk of monetary depreciation. Three solutions were alone possible. It was possible to fix large sums, the payment of which would have constituted an absolute liability; this procedure would undoubtedly have led to the same results brought about since the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles. Or it was possible to fix annual payments appreciably less than an anticipated surplus in the balance of accounts; the figures obtained by this means would certainly have been inacceptable to the reparation creditors, in addition to giving Germany an unwarranted advantage. The Dawes Committee decided to set aside these two solutions. It did not wish to fix the sums to be transferred on reparation account, it merely fixed those to be paid in German currency under this head, leaving a Transfer Committee, composed of five members under the chairmanship of the Agent General for Reparation Payments, to hand them over to the creditor countries. The Transfer Committee alone can decide what use is to be made of the sums received in German currency on reparation account; it must first assign them to payments to Germany on the account of creditor nations, thereby settling

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deliveries in kind and the costs of the armies of occupation; then, without affecting exchange conditions, it must convert the balance into foreign currencies. In so far as these conversions prove to be impossible, reparation payments will accumulate in Germany, first of all to the account of the Agent General at the Reichsbank. When the Reichsbank refuses to receive any further deposits, and in any case when the credit balance of the account reaches the figure of 2 milliard gold marks, the Transfer Committee must find other uses in Germany for the funds placed under its administration, it being understood that these funds must never exceed 5 milliard gold marks and that reparation payments must, if necessary, be reduced in order that this figure be not exceeded. The Transfer Committee is vested with sovereign powers in respect of all these functions; it must be constantly guided by its obligation to transfer the highest sums possible without, however, disturbing the stability of the German currency. The German Government and the Reichsbank have undertaken to facilitate the work of the Committee by every reasonable means within their power. In the event of concerted financial maneuvers, either by the Government or by any group, for the purpose of preventing such transfers, the Committee will take such action as may be necessary to defeat such maneuvers. In particular, it may decide that the reparation funds shall be allowed to accumulate without any limit and employ them in the purchase of any kind of property in Germany.

The London Conference made clear certain points as to the functioning of the Transfer Committee. One of the agreements signed there stipulates that if the Transfer Committee is equally divided as to whether concerted financial maneuvers have been set on foot, the question shall be referred to an independent and impartial arbitrator, who shall hear the views of each of the members of the Committees and decide between them. On all other questions, if the Transfer Committee is equally divided, the Chairman shall have a casting vote. Finally, if the funds at the disposal of the Agent-General for Reparation Payments are at any time accumulated up to the limit of 5 milliards of gold marks referred to in the Experts' Report, or such lower figure as may be fixed by the Transfer Committee, all decisions of the Committee concerning financial maneuvers may be referred by any member of the minority to an arbitral

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tribunal, whose decision shall be final. The arbitral tribunal shall consist of three independent and impartial financial experts, including a citizen of the United States of America, who shall act as Chairman.

The Experts' Plan provides that the Transfer Committee, on the instructions of the Reparation Commission and at the request of the creditor States, may, by debiting their accounts, transfer marks to private individuals for the purpose of making purchases in Germany, provided such reinvestment is not of a temporary character and provided the property concerned is of classes contained in a schedule agreed to between the Committee and the German Government. The London agreement decides that any disputes arising from the drawing up of the list are to be submitted to an arbitrator, if one of the parties so requests. Furthermore, the Allied Governments agree that no transfer of marks shall be made to private individuals unless the accumulated funds exceed the sum deposited with the bank of issue.

Lastly, the London Conference decided that if one of the Governments concerned (Allied or German) considers that there is any technical error in the operation of the Experts' Plan which may be remedied without affecting its basic principles, the necessary amendments may be made, either by agreement with the German Government and following a unanimous vote by the Reparation Commission, or, failing such agreement, by decision of the Committee of three independent and impartial experts chosen conjointly by the unanimous vote of the Reparation Commission and the German Government, or by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Such are the technical details of the decisions reached in London. The net result of the Conference has been to bring the Dawes Plan into operation. An economic solution has been found for the reparation problem, based on the good faith and sincere collaboration of all the parties concerned. The help of American citizens was enlisted for the operation of the Plan as well as in its preparation. This help affords all the parties concerned the most valuable guarantee of impartiality. At the proposal of the French Government, recourse to arbitration has been accepted as a means of settling any disputes which may arise. In this way perhaps the most important step since the Treaty of Versailles has been taken towards the economic revival and political pacification of Europe.

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THE DIFFICULTIES AND HOPES OF JAPAN

By Yusuke Tsurumi

I

A NEW Japan confronts the world. It is not the Japan of 1868,—the year dear to the hearts of Japanese as 1776 is to the hearts of Americans. Neither is it the Japan of 1905–6, the years of the Russo-Japanese War, nor the Japan of 1914, the first year of the World War. It is the Japan that has passed through two great events of historical importance,—the great war of 1914–18 and the great 1923 calamity of earthquake and fire. Japan with all her social heritage of thousands of generations is now finding herself in the maelstrom of economic and psychological changes. How she will emerge from all these is a problem that the coming decades only will decide.

But it will not be altogether out of place here to study some of the salient factors that will contribute to the conflict of forces at home, and to consider the eventual outcome in the realm of diplomacy. For careful students of foreign affairs will not deny that the internal changes always precede the change in the foreign policy of a nation and therefore that the study of diplomacy must always go hand in hand with that of internal policies. The time is passing, to my mind at least, when the world can ignore with complacency the internal politics of Japan. Just as the downfall of MacDonald's ministry created a sensation throughout the world and as the great victory of President Coolidge was watched with the keenest of interest in the remotest corners of Japan, so will Japanese cabinet changes attract more attention in the outside world in the future. In the past Japanese internal politics were more or less blurred and vague owing to the lack of clean-cut issues along Western lines. But with the changing psychology of the nation, and still more with the changing economic fabric of the country, the conflict of forces in Japan is taking on a new phase and a novel feature. It is ceasing, or has ceased, to be the story of a distant country engaged in a unique social development of its own. It is part and parcel of the world drama rivaling in interest that of any of the Western countries. Japan's drawbacks in commanding the attention of the Western world are her geographic remoteness and her linguistic unlikeness which cut her away from the

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main line of world interest. But the first barrier was permanently broken down by the Great War, which ushered in a new era—the Pacific era. The countries bordering on that great ocean are destined to play great rôles and the center of world activities will inevitably shift to the American and Asiatic continents. And geography bestowed on Japan a strategic position in Asia. Happenings in the small Island Empire will, therefore, claim keener attention from the world, and particularly from America, in years to come.

II

Now let us study briefly the internal and external policies of Japan in the light of new historical researches. Japan has won a reputation in certain quarters of the world for being imperialistic and aggressive. No impartial student of politics can deny that there were grounds for the criticism, just as there were and still are reasons for other Western nations to be subjected to the same charge. The thing that interests us here is not the charge itself but the causes that brought about the existence of the situation.

The foreign policies of Japan in the past half-century revolved around two pivotal points. The one was security and the other equality. It was at a most precarious moment that Japan's long closed door was opened to foreign intercourse in 1858. It was the time when the flags of Great Britain and France from the south and of Russia from the north began to appear in the peaceful waters around Japan. Having the object lesson of Persia and Siam before their eyes, the concern of the young patriots of Japan in those days reached feverish heights. It was only America's timely arrival that saved the situation. The Monroe Doctrine closed the eastern coasts of the American continents to European aggression and forced the Old World to turn its attention to another sphere of operations, the Far East. But here again the imperialistic powers of Europe found themselves face to face with the same old stone wall—the declaration of President Monroe. The need of making secure the Pacific Coast drove the American Government to send naval fleets to Asian waters and opened a new page in the history of the East. The drama of the Far East in which Japan has been playing a prominent rôle is after all but a continuation of the action of the Monroe Doctrine. It was the same westward drive

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Those who believe the Government should retain its ships have uniformly insisted that their construction cost be the determining factor in fixing the sales price. The ships cost around $225 a deadweight ton, their market value today is around $25 a ton. Furthermore, there is a contradiction in the section. If a prudent business man is "forced to sell" he does not waste much time over original or replacement cost, he sells for what he can get. Finally, in discussing the sale of the ships it must be borne in mind that although in the Shipping Act of 1916 the Board was directed to sell its ships within five years after the end of the war, in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 the five-year proviso was stricken out; there is no longer a time limit.

The counsel of the Board in arguing that Congress intended the Government to remain in the shipping business pointed out in addition that in section 7 the Board is authorized to study trade routes and to establish and maintain those services which are essential. The reader will not be burdened with a piling up of evidence. A fair-minded person examining the details of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, is forced to the conclusion that Congress had its tongue in its cheek when it wrote those phrases which seem to indicate that the Government should get out of the shipping business.

The reasons for this policy are evident, if not flattering to our elected representatives. The Shipping Board appropriations are as widely spent as the appropriations for rivers and harbors. No Presidential economy drive is likely to make Congress forego either. In the first place, there are seven $12,500 jobs to be apportioned. That these jobs are not beneath the notice of Congress was proved when the section of the Shipping Act of 1916 dealing with this subject was revised in 1920. Originally the Shipping Board was to consist of five members, each to get $7,500 a year; not more than three of them were to be from one political party. When the Act was being revised in 1920 two Senators from the far West who had taken a public interest in shipping were up for reëlection, and neither was certain that his constituents would be as faithful to him as he had been to them. It was accordingly decided to increase the membership of the Board to seven, with salaries of $12,500 (the cost of living in Washington had increased greatly between 1916 and 1920). Furthermore, to avoid depending too much on the pleasure of the President, it was decided that two members should be

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elected from the states touching the Pacific (there are only three such states so the percentage for that region was greatly increased), two from the Atlantic states, one from the Gulf, one from the Great Lakes and one from the interior.

If this country were merely to suffer from a large dose of the European patent medicine of government ownership, one might be inclined to say that we deserve what we allow ourselves to be fed with. But the fact that our government is in the shipping business has grave international aspects; it has given rise to a spirit which may be described by the low word, bumptiousness. This spirit has often been in evidence during the last year. Three illustrations will be used. The first is drawn from the agitation over sections 28 and 34 of the Merchant Marine Act; the second is found in connection with the proposed German treaty; and the third has to do with certain utterances of officers in responsible positions.

Section 28 of the Merchant Marine Act stipulates that in this country all import and export rail rates which are lower than the domestic rates on the same commodity (going in the same direction for the same distance) shall apply only where the goods are carried on American vessels. The aim of the proposal, of course, is preferential treatment of American ships. Such indirect aids to shipping appeal especially to the Congressional mind because they call for no appropriation from the Treasury. As a matter of fact, if it were actually put into operation Section 28 would be highly expensive to the business of the country, and it has never been shown conclusively that it would greatly benefit our merchant marine. The most important bulk commodities which move to the seacoast on a substantial rail haul are low-grade articles such as grain, coal and lumber. Our ships do not desire additional freight of this variety; it does not pay them to carry it. The application of the section would tend to concentrate the foreign business of the country in a few coastal cities. Furthermore, there is a real danger that considerable traffic would be diverted to Canadian ports and railways. These disadvantages, and others, would react upon the business of the country as a whole; in compensation, some additional cargo might be secured for American ships.

The more serious aspect of the problem is that international retaliation would certainly follow, once the section were put in operation. It is a truism to say that discrimination of any kind

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is profitable only so long as the parties of the second part do not retaliate, which of course they always do when they can. Our country in its early days took the lead in getting the maritime countries of the world to abolish discriminating restrictions of various kinds. It is regrettable that we seem intent on reversing our long-established policy.

The manner in which section 28 has been dealt with throws additional light on the habits of the Shipping Board. The law provides that the section is to become operative when the Shipping Board has certified to the Interstate Commerce Commission that sufficient American tonnage exists to handle the traffic contemplated. Immediately after the passage of the Act in 1920, and on several subsequent occasions, the Shipping Board asked the Interstate Commerce Commission to postpone the application of the section. Early in 1924, however, without previous warning, the Board certified to the Commission that sufficient American services, with certain exceptions, existed. The Commission thereupon set June 20, 1924, as the date when the section was to become effective. Immediately a storm of protest arose. Bills were introduced in Congress to give complete jurisdiction in the matter to the Interstate Commerce Commission and to postpone the date of application. Congressional hearings were held. Dozens of business men testified against the section and, aside from the representatives of the Board, the only favorable witnesses were from some minor ports that had especially been favored by the Board. The Shipping Board had to bow to the popular protest and withdraw its certification to the Interstate Commerce Commission. They intimated, however, that they would bring up the matter again at the end of 1924, and as these paragraphs are being written rumblings to this effect are being heard. The section is still capable of causing trouble at home and abroad.

Section 34 of the Merchant Marine Act is of a piece with Section 28. It calls upon the President to take whatever steps are necessary to abrogate those commercial treaties which prevent discriminating duties in behalf of our shipping. Three Presidents have refused to take this action. The arguments against the section are so well-known as hardly to need mention. The proponents of the theory that discriminating duties are efficacious have built up their case as to what happened in the early days of this country on the basis of false and manufactured

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statistics. Not only can it not be proved that discriminating duties built up our merchant marine in the first two decades of the last century, but it can be shown that a large increase in our shipping took place after discriminating duties were abolished. Discriminating duties would apply to only 16 percent of the total volume of our trade today and hence would give small aid to our ships. The most important aspect of this section, as of section 28, is that it stirs up international animosities which our country was the first to try to allay.

The proponents of discriminatory action in favor of our shipping were able in the last session of Congress to block the passage of the German treaty. They objected to the usual clauses with reference to reciprocity of treatment for ships. Since this was one of a series of new treaties which the State Department has been negotiating with foreign countries, it is to be presumed that the same opposition will develop against each new treaty in turn.

Unfortunately, the delicate situation created by the discussions over sections 28 and 34 and by debates over the German treaty has been intensified by statements of some of the Commissioners of the Shipping Board. In the hearings before Congress two commissioners declared that the Government lines would carry cargo for $2.00 a ton—or even for nothing—in order to get cargo for the ships. Such statements from responsible public officials are almost equivalent to a declaration of commercial war, with the financial power of the Treasury behind the Shipping Board. It is hard enough in these days of intense commercial rivalry along nationalist lines for countries to keep out of disputes leading to war. With our Government engaged in a business which in a dozen ways is subject to international friction, we perhaps are nearer actual conflict than the ordinary citizen is willing to believe.

The competition between the merchant fleets of the various countries of the world has rarely been so keen. Part of the added intensity of rivalry is due to the chauvinism with which countries seem to be afflicted after a great war; part is due to the universal depression from which the shipping of the world is suffering. The first point is obvious, the second needs some elaboration. There are today in existence over 40 percent more steamers than there were in 1913, and there is only about 80 percent as much cargo moving over ocean routes for them to carry. Over 6,000,-

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000 tons of shipping are unable to find employment on any of the trade routes of the world. Ocean rates are far below the prevailing level of prices. The earnings of steamship companies are small and frequently the balances have to be written in red. In such conditions, when every effort is being made to get extra cargo for ships, shipping and trading men in every part of the world inevitably would resent bitterly any special treatment (particularly forms of preference which are regarded as unfair) being given by one country to its own shipping. Their resentment against the United States would be easily aroused by suggestions of preferential treatment for our ships because our people are already being taxed to the extent of $25,000 for each voyage a government ship makes, a fact which contributes directly to the unprofitableness of many foreign lines.

In conclusion, it may be said that the Shipping Board and governmental operation of ships seem to have come to stay. The taxpayer should try to accustom himself to the idea of the Government engaging in business, and to paying without too much complaint the extra taxes for the maintenance of that business. Indeed, there seems to be no other course open for the taxpayer to follow, at least until that final day when rust shall at last have caused the Shipping Board to give up its ships. In the meantime, he should hope that our public officials will go softly, so as not to start the chain of events leading to another war before peace is won from the last one.

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THE GENEVA PROTOCOL

By Manley O. Hudson

TWENTY-FIVE years ago the first international Peace Conference met at The Hague, having been called by the Czar as a "happy presage for the century about to open." Its chief accomplishment was the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, in which twenty-five states recognized the "solidarity which unites the members of the society of civilized nations" and undertook "to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of international differences." A procedure for such settlement was elaborated, but at that time no state was willing to agree to resort to it before going to war.

That was a quarter of a century ago. Today we seem a century removed from the first Hague Conference. A first step was taken at the second Hague Conference in 1907, when the delegates of forty-four states "admitted the principle of compulsory arbitration." But the effort to outlaw war was only begun when in 1919 the Covenant of the League of Nations, now accepted by fifty-five peoples, pronounced "any war or threat of war" to be "a matter of concern to the whole League," and bound each member of the League to refrain from going to war without first submitting its dispute to "arbitration or to inquiry by the Council."

For various reasons, however, this large advance over the work of the Hague Conferences has not been deemed adequate. The disappointment of the hopes engendered by the tripartite arrangement for the defense of France which was drawn up at the Paris Peace Conference, the non-inclusion of Germany, Russia, and the United States in the League, and the troubled polity which followed the war, all combined to prevent the Covenant from producing an adequate sense of security. At each stage of the efforts made in the League of Nations to cope with the problem of disarmament, this psychology of insecurity was encountered, until latterly it has been recognized that the existing state of armaments is more the effect than the cause of international tension.

By 1922 the Third Assembly of the League had begun to connect the subject of reduction of land armaments with a

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treaty of mutual guarantee. In 1923 a draft of such a treaty was laid before the Fourth Assembly by the Temporary Mixed Commission on Reduction of Armaments, and it was decided to submit this draft to the Governments for their consideration. The numerous replies received at Geneva during the early months of 1924—including replies from Germany, Russia, and the United States—revealed wide divergences of view as to the methods by which a sense of security might be quickened and additional stones might be laid in the bulwark which the world is gradually building against war. The draft treaty had been approved in principle by eighteen governments, but the misgivings and disagreement expressed by certain governments called for a new beginning.

When the Fifth Assembly addressed itself to the problem early in September, 1924, the prime ministers of France and Great Britain were present, advocating the compulsory arbitration or adjudication of all international disputes, and as the Third Assembly had linked disarmament with security the Fifth Assembly began to link security with arbitration. With the results of the five years' work before them, the delegates to the Fifth Assembly labored for five weeks to produce a new protocol on pacific settlement, based on the inter-relation of disarmament, security and arbitration. This Protocol is not planned to supersede the Covenant. It merely implements its provisions. To the extent that signatories of the Protocol are adding to their obligations as set out in the Covenant, eventual amendments of the latter instrument are contemplated. But the Covenant and the Protocol are planned to stand together. A state might accept the former without being bound in any way by the latter; but it is hardly conceivable that the Protocol will be accepted by any state which does not in some degree accept the Covenant.

The principal provisions of the Protocol embody: (1) a declaration that aggressive war is an international crime; (2) a definition of aggression as a resort to war without submission to adjudication or arbitration as stipulated; (3) an undertaking to employ police measures against aggressors; and (4) a plan for a world disarmament conference, on the success of which the Protocol depends.

(1) In the preamble of the Protocol the signatories recognize the "solidarity of the members of the international community"

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in much the same terms as were used by the two Hague Conferences; but they go further in "asserting that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity and an international crime." This is the first time in history that responsible statesmen have gone so far in an effort to "outlaw" war. Piracy has long been regarded as an international crime. International courts for its punishment have not existed, but during the past century the interdiction has effectively added to the safety of the seas. Now war is to be branded in the same way.

The phraseology of the Protocol, if not the conception, has undoubtedly been influenced by the insistence in America on the outlawry of war. The American phrase had already found place in the first article of the draft treaty of mutual assistance of 1923. But whereas Senator Borah's program of outlawry, as set forth in a resolution introduced into the Senate on February 13, 1923, made no reference to the utilization of existing international machinery, the Protocol is built entirely on resort to the Permanent Court of International Justice and the Council and Assembly of the League. In other words, the signatories of the Protocol do not stop with a fiat that aggressive war is a crime. They proceed to elaborate provisions which may prevent that crime from being committed.

(2) It was a more difficult task to define what the ban on aggressive war should cover. When is a state to be deemed an aggressor? Here a group of American citizens, represented by General Tasker H. Bliss, Mr. David Hunter Miller, and Professor James T. Shotwell came to the assistance of the Fifth Assembly with a suggestion that resort to war without previously following a specified procedure of pacific settlement should be deemed aggression. The Protocol is based on this conception. It brands as an aggressor any state which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the Protocol. Moreover, in the event of hostilities begun, it creates a presumption that a state is an aggressor unless a unanimous decision of the Council shall otherwise declare, if a state has violated any of these undertakings. The definition and the presumption called for elaborate detail in outlining the obligatory procedure.

First of all, the signatories agree to accept, within one month after the Protocol comes into force, the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice with reference

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of the American people that first crossed the vast prairies and then the immense expanse of water to the shores of Asia and faced there the aggressive forces of Europe. Great Britain, France, Russia, and later Germany had to face the formidable power of America in the Far East, first in Japan and then in China.

In the early days of the Emperor Meiji, beginning with 1868, the statesmen of Japan sensed the foreign danger, and their policies were all formulated accordingly. A curious trick of fate gave an American army officer an opportunity to lay the foundation of Japan's continental policy.

III

At the start, the new government of Meiji had no definite foreign policy. Officials were much exercised regarding frontier problems, and Japanese claims to the Loochoo and Bonin Islands were enforced. It proved necessary, on the other hand, to concede the northern half of Saghalien to Russia in exchange for the Kurile Islands. Japan's relations with Korea also were anything but satisfactory. The sending of a punitive expedition to Korea was urged immediately following the Restoration, because Korea had failed to reciprocate the courtesy of the new government which had sent an official emissary to report the change of régime. The surplus energy of the *samurai* class, however, had quite as much to do with this agitation as the offense taken at Korea's impolite attitude. The episode had no connection whatever with the questions which resulted later in the Japanese annexation of Korea and attracted the attention of all the world.

As I stated before, the diplomacy of the restored Imperial Government for half a century revolved about two pivots. In the first place, Japan desired the revision of the treaties she had signed with the foreign powers in 1858, so that she might attain a position of equality among the nations. In the second place, she realized the necessity of safeguarding her territorial integrity by the formulation of a definite Asiatic policy.

With the hope of achieving the first of these purposes, Prince Iwakura was sent abroad at the head of a mission in 1871. The mission was unsuccessful, but during Prince Iwakura's absence chance led to the formulation of Japan's continental policy. This policy in definite form came from an American citizen.[1]

[1] The following statement is written from material collected by Prof. Katsumaro Nakamura of the Tokyo Imperial University, with his kind permission.

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General Le Gendre, a Union officer in the American Civil War, after the close of hostilities was appointed American Consul-General at Amoy, China. While assigned to this post, he was obliged on one occasion to visit Formosa, just across the narrow straits, and conduct negotiations with the chiefs of the aborigines there. On his return to Amoy he sent his Government a dispatch in which he recommended the occupation of the island by the American navy. After a period of service at Amoy, General Le Gendre was appointed minister to a South American Republic and on his way to his new post he passed through Japan. Being introduced by the American Minister to Count Soyejima, Foreign Minister in the absence of Prince Iwakura, General Le Gendre took occasion to express his views regarding the policies he thought Japan should follow in order to consolidate her position. He impressed upon Soyejima the menace of Russian aggression from the north and the danger of British and French designs in the south. The American visitor said, in effect, that Japan would be secure only if she could formulate a continental policy and carry it out before it was too late. He even said that it was the duty as well as the right of Japan.

The policy recommended by General Le Gendre contemplated the expansion of Japanese territory to form a crescent skirting the Asiatic mainland, and embracing both Korea in the north and Formosa in the south. He emphasized the great danger which lurked in the possibility of a Russian occupation of Korea and of an English or French occupation of Formosa. In either of these events, he contended, Japan's security would be seriously threatened. Soyejima was urged to make the seizure of both Korea and Formosa a fundamental of Japan's foreign policy, and as precedents for such a plan the American General cited the Louisiana Purchase, the annexation of Texas and the acquisition of Alaska by the United States. These steps, he pointed out, had been made necessary by the Monroe Doctrine.

Count Soyejima was greatly influenced by General Le Gendre's arguments, which also found high favor with Saigo of Satsuma, who had served the Restoration cause with such distinction. Since the Imperial House had regained its long-lost authority, Saigo had withdrawn from the public eye and had found himself frequently in disagreement with the policies of the new government. Although he was a member of the Cabinet, his opinions

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frequently were overruled by a majority of his colleagues. When he heard of the new suggestion that had come from an American official he was intensely interested and sent his right-hand man, Kirino, to Soyejima to obtain a detailed explanation of Le Gendre's views. The idea fascinated him and immediately he began to advocate the military occupation of Korea.

The ambitious program was destined, however, to meet with determined opposition from Prince Iwakura, who soon returned from his travels with his able lieutenants, Okubo, Kido and Ito. The great Minister had been deeply impressed with the progress being made in western countries and returned home firmly convinced that Japan's first need was internal reform. This difference of opinion culminated in the civil war of 1878, in which Saigo attempted vainly to compel the adoption of his aggressive views. The Imperial Government at Tokyo emerged from the brief conflict with its position strengthened rather than otherwise.

It was just about this time that another American assisted in shaping Japan's foreign policy. General Grant, who was touring the world after the expiration of his term as President, reached Japan in 1877. The adoption of a policy of peace was strongly urged in a long and memorable interview between the former President and the young Emperor. At the very moment a war between China and Japan was impending over the possession of the Loochoo Islands, but General Grant explained how wars among Asiatic countries could not fail to advance the plans of European countries. He explained the example and spirit of the Monroe Doctrine and argued that Japan should strengthen herself by peaceful means. These calm views did much to influence the statesmen of Meiji in formulating their policy. General Grant's advice was followed and the Japanese house was put in order. It was only when they felt fully prepared that they acted upon Le Gendre's policies, acquiring Formosa in 1895 and Korea in 1910. Thus in the words of Professor Nakamura, Japan's Asiatic policy was thoroughly in accord with the suggestions of two American military men and, to an extent difficult to measure, grew out of their advice.

IV

The intensity with which the statesmen of Japan strove to carry out her continental policy did not work beneficially for the growth of liberalism advocated by groups of intellectuals. In

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the early days of Meiji radical ideas of the West (such as those of the Rousseau school) aroused enthusiasm in the minds of the young liberal leaders of the nation and they went pretty far in their political agitation. The sponsors of these radical ideas were gradually forced to leave the seat of power and went into the ranks of the opposition. They organized political parties, and after the promulgation of the Constitution in 1889 carried their fight to the House of Representatives.

But during the forty long years of agitation the liberals were not half as successful in registering popular support as were the conservatives who stood for vigorous foreign policies. Their failure may be traced to many causes, but particularly to the lack of the popular support which grew out of the nature of the country's economic fabric. The political change of 1868 did not really affect the economic life of the nation and the former feudal lords retained their power in a changed form. Landlords and big commercial houses ruled the country, and the middle and laboring classes occupied a very insignificant place in the economic as well as the political scheme of the nation. Therefore, the fight between the conservatives and liberals was one between factions belonging more or less to the same economic stratum of society and failed to arouse enthusiasm among the common people. The latter were rather inclined to sympathize with the conservatives who had a constructive program and who succeeded in giving them at least economic prosperity and national security.

The dominance of the conservatives during forty years created a unique political situation. It meant the preponderance of the executive branch of government over the legislative and tended to centralize power in the hands of a few. These few people in the seat of power began to be closely linked up with the equally small number of people controlling the business enterprises of the country. While, therefore, Japan as a nation was making a steady advance on the Asiatic mainland and in the world at large, the political conscience of the people itself was not given a needed chance to express itself. It gradually created an atmosphere of lamentable indifference to politics on the part of the majority of the people. They were not given suffrage to express themselves and even those few who had votes realized that the exercise of their power did not mean much in formulating the country's policy. No vital issues were fought on the

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days of election and the legislative branch of government gradually sank in the estimation of the people. The situation was such that it was impossible for a great leader to rise on a wave of strong popular support. The trained civil servants rose step by step quietly to seats in the cabinet, not by means of a hold on the people through their breadth of vision but by their sheer knowledge and skill in administrative work. In the early days following the Restoration the new government did not lack the vision and courage given by the infusion of new blood. In the later years of Meiji, however, the enthusiast elements gradually gave way to those with technical knowledge and loving routine work. The bureaucracy which had served to give Japan an orderly progress at home and a continuity of national policy abroad, began to lose freshness and vigor and sank to a mere unimaginative officialdom. It looked as though the government and the life of the people were two separate things. A rigid formality reigned in the former and an apathy toward politics ruled in the latter.

It was in such a mood and in such a situation that the World War caught Japan in 1914.

V

When the storm broke in August, 1914, Japan little dreamed what a great effect it was destined to have upon her. A temporary business depression was soon followed by a sudden boom and in 1915 practically every factory was humming with work and more work. Coincidently with the material change came another one no less marked. It was the change in political and social ideas.

The new spirit that was gaining ground both in Europe and America rushed into the Island Empire like an avalanche; democracy and liberty were much on the lips of the people. The speeches of European and American statesmen on the Allied side were followed with intense interest. It was the time when an American statesman thrilled the whole Japanese nation with the loftiness of his ideals—Woodrow Wilson.

The liberals at home were not idle. Men like Prof. Nitobe and Prof. Yoshino were active in disseminating the idea of democracy. The conservatives were frightened and tried to thwart the cause by stamping it with a peculiar brand of "dangerous thoughts." But they little realized that far more dangerous

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thoughts were being brewed by the changing social conditions, namely violent socialism and anarchism. By persecuting those who cherished sane ideas of liberalism and democracy they were driving sensitive and subtle minds further towards the radical cause, which from 1919 began to assume gigantic proportions in the field of labor. The newspapers of the country, with very few exceptions, were on the side of democracy. The Japanese newspapers need a word of description. Their circulation is large, and they are very powerful in formulating public opinion. The *Osaka Mainichi*, for example, has a daily circulation of a million and a quarter, and with its sister paper, the *Tokyo Nichi Nichi*, enjoys that of two millions. As Japanese newspapers derive most of their income by the sale of papers and not by advertisements their natural tendency is to cater to popularity. So they are always on the side of democracy when there is any issue at stake.

Thus in the later years of the World War Japan seemed to make a fair stride toward liberalism and democracy. The large, independent middle class that was created by the business prosperity of those days became bolder and bolder. Persons in this class began to take a keener interest in the field of politics, where they learned their ultimate fight was to be waged. The conservative rulers seemed on the ebbing tide. The sagacious Prince Yamagata, the greatest of the *genro*, was wise enough to read the signs of the times and was apparently withdrawing his tentacles.

The industrialization of Japan had occurred before the Russo-Japanese War, and labor problems began to appear thereafter. But the real labor problem of Japan may be said to date from the World War. The great industrial boom in the latter part of the war suddenly raised the standard of the laboring people. Strikes of a serious nature followed one after another, and at one time it seemed as though Japan were going to plunge into a period of serious internal trouble. The situation was aggravated by the acute problem of the agricultural laborers. Half of the Japanese population are connected with agriculture and seventy percent of these are tenants. The economic condition of these tenants had become very serious, and grave disputes arose between them and the landowners. The business depression after 1920 seemed to have a quieting influence on labor, and since the great calamity of earthquake and fire in 1923 the whole

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nation has begun to settle down. Today it may be said that labor, which was under the influence first of syndicalist and then of communist theories, seems to be moving slowly toward the reformist socialist views of the British Labor Party.

The rising tide of liberalism at the end of the World War had an entirely different significance from that of the early days of Meiji. In the first place it came from the people. The spread of education, the achievement of the conservative rulers, gave the people more power to think and to understand. Economic prosperity gave them more independence. The increasing power of big capital, the accumulation of which was speeded up by the World War, impressed upon them the vague need of defending themselves by popular representation against the oligarchic rule of the politicians, big business men and industrialists.

They looked beyond the waters and saw the great drama being played in the destruction of oligarchic militarism. The Japanese are very sensitive by nature. It was the victory of Prussian militarism in 1870 that impressed the young Yamagata deeply. Again, it was the intervention of the triple powers after the Chino-Japanese War of 1894–95 that drove many liberals into the ranks of the imperialists. And once again the outcome of the World War moved the Japanese profoundly. The League of Nations made a deep impression upon the Japanese. A formulation of a policy in an academic and theoretical form has a greater appeal to the Japanese mind than the solution of a particular issue in a practical businesslike way. In the project of the League they saw a translation of an ideal into a concrete policy. And it gave a new concept to the idea of international relationship. Not only the people in general but practical politicians began to change their outlook both on internal and international policies. Basing their ideas not on war but on peace, they thought they could build a new social and political policy on a more secure foundation. Therefore, when the Washington Conference came, people were in the frame of mind to accept the principles of the late Mr. Harding.

VI

Now, in what way is the rising tide of liberalism in Japan going to affect her internal and international policies, and hence the problems of the Pacific? Liberal influences are now converging on a single definite point at home, that is, universal manhood

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suffrage. Japan now has a limited suffrage which gives the right to vote to only three million people out of the whole population of sixty million. At the root of all political evils in Japan is the problem of the enormous election expenses. It grew out of the indifference of the people to politics. They voted carelessly and mostly as they were told by local professional politicians. The universal manhood suffrage bill is the issue on which the new liberalism will test its power. If it can awaken the conscience of the people and succeed in attracting more general attention to the statecraft of the country, Japan's future policy will take on a new color. I think I am safe in predicting that the bill will pass the two houses of Parliament in the coming winter and will become a law in April, 1925.

With the changing mood at home Japan's policy toward China began to show a marked change. Nothing is more baffling than the situation in that vast and ancient country. There existed in Japan many divergent views about that country. Japan's policy toward China has gone through many changes according to the party that has come to power, particularly in recent years. More than half the severe criticisms Japan earned from foreign nations came from her Chinese policy. In what relationship Japan will stand with China is a vital point that will mainly decide the fate of the East.

The genesis of Japan's Chinese policy was defense. This phase culminated in the war of 1894–95. The second chapter of it was Japan's imitation of the policies of Western Powers on the Asiatic continent,—namely, the extension of the sphere of influence and special privileges with a vague anticipation that China's integrity might some day be jeopardized. With the increasing population at home and with the realization of the grim, cold fact that the door was closed to Japanese immigrants in countries dominated by Caucasian races, Japan's Chinese policy began to take on a more definite form, to wit, the acquisition of raw material and the securing of markets. It culminated in the famous twenty-one demands of 1915. Subsequent changes abroad and the changing psychology at home, however, gradually worked toward the formulation of a new policy. Since the Washington Conference, Japan has definitely launched out upon a new policy toward China, namely, the policy of conciliation and peace. After the railway incident of Linshan, in 1923, Japan opposed the scheme of the foreign

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control of the railways suggested by a certain nation, on the ground that it infringed upon the sovereign rights of China and was in contradiction to the spirit of the Nine Power Treaty signed at the Washington Conference. In taking this position Japan clearly declared her disapproval of any form of foreign control of China. China was very grateful for this stand, and there has been no boycotting of Japanese goods this year. This policy of non-intervention was observed by the present Cabinet during the recent civil war in China. Suspicion has been expressed in certain quarters, but fair-minded critics should only give a verdict based on a record of facts.

Two years since, Japan embarked on a policy known as "Cultural Work in China." Japan decided to do the same thing that America had done years ago, although in a different manner. She is going to use the whole amount of the Boxer indemnity accruing to her from 1922 to 1935 to help advance the civilization and progress of China. The sum amounts to seventy-three million yen, or thirty-six and one-half million dollars gold. The first appropriation of 5,350,000 yen was granted by the July session of the Diet this year. This will be spent in six years for the creation of two institutes of research in Peking and Shanghai. The one in Peking will be devoted to research in the field of philosophy, literature and social science, the one in Shanghai to research in the field of natural sciences. These institutes are not to be confined merely to the benefit of Chinese and Japanese scholars but their doors will be wide open to all properly qualified foreigners. The findings of these institutes are to be published in Western languages.

But what are the thoughts at the back of all these changed policies of Japan towards China? Cynics may say that Japan has been forced by the United States and England to give up her plan for dominating China, in the interest of a wider distribution of the spoils. There is no doubt some necessity in our new virtue; such situations are not peculiar to the Orient. But the new orientation of Japan's continental policy has a deeper significance. It means the setting in of a new tide in the East. Japan realized after following vigorous foreign policies for half a century that these were not the road to her ultimate triumph and glory, which are not to be found in the mere extension of territory and the accumulation of material wealth. It also means that Japan is discovering that Western civilization, with

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all its parliaments, machines and laboratories, could not prevent wars, revolutions, devastations and the overthrow of states and civilizations. She has begun to turn her eyes once again to the new quest of old values, the social heritage of thousands of generations in the East.

VII

Japan's new policy toward China brings us to another phase of her foreign relations, that is, her policy toward a second neighbor, Russia. What Japan will ultimately do in regard to Russia is a matter of speculation. But this much can be safely said, that recent occurrences both in America and Europe are not conducive to driving Japan away from Russia. Although we once fought with the Russians, the sentiment of the Japanese people as a whole is not hostile to them. There was a strong desire even before and immediately after the war among a certain group of Japanese to find means for the friendly solution of problems arising between the two countries. The changing trend of intellectual currents in Japan in recent years worked in no way contrary to that desire. If the imperialistic designs of Soviet Russia are toned down, and when liberalism becomes securer in Japan, Japan's policy toward Russia will take on a new phase of conciliation and friendship.

The real significance of a new rapprochement between Russia and Japan does not so much lie, as some people would think, in Japan's finding a position in a new alignment of world powers, as in her ultimate relationship with China. Japan's vital issue in foreign affairs is China. Japan's Russian policy is important in the degree that Russia affects China. Russia and China are two contiguous countries, and a strong and aggressive Russia had been a constant source of danger to the stability of China. Although it has been often said to the contrary, Japan has been the only stabilizing force in the East. Without Japan the Balkanization of China might have occurred. People failed to divine the danger that was lurking underneath the apparent tranquillity of the East. The concern of the statesmen of Japan has been, therefore, how to come to an understanding with Russia in order to give stability to China. Prince Ito attempted a trip to Russia in 1909 and met his death in Harbin. In 1912 Prince Katsura and Viscount Goto went to Russia apparently with the same object in view. The pending negotiations be-

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tween Soviet Russia and Japan are dictated by the same fundamental motive. The Japanese are not yet of one mind in regard to their country's Russian policy, but with the rising tide of liberalism, and in particular with the growth of labor movement, she will gradually formulate a new Russian policy of friendship and coöperation.

The story of Japan's foreign policy will never be complete without a few lines about her relationship with America. This is not a proper place to discuss in full Japan's attitude toward America's new immigration bill. But this much must be said, that it was not the immigration problem itself that made such a deep impression in Japan. It was the method and the implication of discrimination that created profound feeling. The vital question between America and Japan is not California, but China. Perfect understanding between the two nations over the problem of China is the keynote of American-Japanese diplomacy. This again will depend much on the rise or fall of the liberal movement in Japan.

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AN INTERNATIONAL ETHIC

By L. P. Jacks

ONE of the most disconcerting phenomena of these times is the disparity between the enormous amount of idealist propaganda that goes on from pulpit, platform and press, and the inconsiderable effect that it seems to produce in the actual conduct of men and of nations. The whole world is humming and roaring with idealism of one kind and another, and if that were all we had to take account of the inference would be that the kingdom of heaven is not far off. But the greater part of this, by far the greater part, goes in at one ear of the world and comes out at the other. It leaves us standing morally pretty much where we were. We listen to it with approval, discuss it for a quarter of an hour, and then go on to the next.

To say that men are not in earnest about these things would be an overstatement. They are immensely in earnest, but their earnestness appears mainly in the discussion which rages fiercely on the surface of society but without disturbing the deep undercurrents of its practice. For some years past—to take an obvious example—a multitude of writers and orators have been proclaiming the self-evident truth that the problem of founding an effective League of Nations is insoluble without self renunciation all round in the matter of sovereign rights. Meanwhile the nations of the world, or more strictly speaking their governments, sometimes under the leadership of the very men who have made the aforesaid statement, have shown not the slightest disposition to renounce any portion of their sovereign rights, but have made it clear, whenever that danger-point was approached, that they intended to keep their sovereign rights intact. All the existing governments of the world are there for the avowed purpose of safeguarding the sovereign rights of the nations they rule or serve, and there is no one of them that could make surrender of these without being immediately hurled from power by the political forces behind it.

But just as there could be no morality between individuals if the rule were laid down that self-sacrifice is never to be practised, so, on those terms, there can be no morality between nations save of an elementary or barbaric kind. As things now are the

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sovereign wrongs of one nation are often involved in the sovereign rights of another. What, then, is the use of discussing the redress of these wrongs if every government is irrevocably determined to stand firm by the sovereign rights of the nation behind it? The bare possibility of an international ethic seems barred from the outset

It might be contended and, in fact, has been, that even between individuals a certain degree of morality is attainable without the principle of self-sacrifice entering into the picture—a morality of the "live and let live" order. That may conceivably be so. But it must be admitted that the best morality attainable on these terms would be a poor affair. It would never reach the level of mutual service but remain fixed at the level of self-protection, furnishing no scope for valor and loving-kindness, nor for any other of the virtues that give dignity and beauty to human life. It would have no heroes and no saints, and its highest achievements would hardly be worth remembering in history and certainly not worth celebrating in poetry or monumentalizing in any art.

And even that modest degree of attainment is not possible unless we think of all the parties to our non-self-sacrificing morality as starting perfectly fair. But if some of them to begin with were handicapped by wrongs out of which the others were reaping advantage—working as slaves, let us say, for idle and cruel masters who lived on the fruits of their labor—it is pretty obvious that the "morality" of live and let live would simply be another name for the perpetuation, under the form of law, of the existing wrong. Without self-sacrifice you and I cannot live in moral relations, even of the most elementary kind, so long as there is something that I value in my pocket which properly belongs to you or in yours that properly belongs to me. We must both start fair, with nothing in our pockets to which the other has a just claim, or we shall never rise even to the level of common decency in our relations to one another.

These considerations should be thoughtfully weighed by all who are interested in international ethics.

Such persons should make up their mind, in the first instance, as to what kind of an ethic would satisfy them. What degree of elevation is it to attain? Is it to be high enough in its ideals and wide enough in its principles to furnish the nations with scope for heroic actions in their dealings with one another? Is it to

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include mercy, pity, loving-kindness? Is it to be founded on the law of bearing one another's burdens? Is it, in short, to be Christian?

Our preachers talk glibly of "introducing the Christian spirit into international relations." Do they realize what that involves? Do they realize that the introduction of the Christian spirit into international relations is impossible without the willingness of all nations to sacrifice their national interests for the sake of international interests of greater importance? Are they themselves willing that their own nation should "die to live?" Are they prepared to go to their government with that demand, or to fight the next election on that basis? If not, let them talk no more of introducing the Christian spirit into international relations. The reign of cant has still to be overthrown.

Or would they be satisfied with something less than this for a beginning? Would it be enough if our international ethic began with the understanding that each nation should respect the "rights" of every other nation but without any surrender of its own—the principle of "live and let live?" That, they might admit, is not very heroic, but far better than nothing, and a promising basis on which building might begin. But do they see that even so little as this is not possible unless the parties to it start fair? What if nation A has in its pocket something which nation B claims as its own? What if nation C claims as one of its rights, which by hypothesis it will not surrender but expects all others to respect, the right to hold nation D in subjection? What if nation E has grown rich by means of a protective tariff which has impoverished F? Is it not somewhat of a mockery under these unequal conditions for the first nation to say to the second, "I will respect your rights on the understanding that you respect mine, but without surrender of right on my side," and to propose *that* as the basis of international ethic or as the growing point of its future development? It is the old difficulty about the Golden Rule. "Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you" is applicable only among equals, among those who *start fair*. Applied to unequals it breaks down at the first experiment and is apt to become, among those who profess it, a cloak for iniquities.

It would appear, then, that to attempt the foundation of an international ethic in which the principle of national self-sacrifice shall have no place is to attempt the impossible. The only

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effect of trying to solve the problem on these lines is that we give the name of "rights" to the "wrongs" that now exist and so defeat ourselves *ab initio*. On the other hand we are confronted with the fact that the principle of national self-sacrifice, without which an international ethic is impossible, in one which the existing governments of the world cannot admit. All these governments are, in the last analysis, the organs of nationalism; that is to say, they exist for the purpose, beyond all other purposes, of preventing national interest, as it exists for the time being, from being sacrificed.

The moral would seem to be that if an international ethic is ever to be created and made effective it will be done not by the action of nationalist governments, but by some other agency.

An international ethic, to be worthy of its name, must be acknowledged by the nations, *as nations*, in the same sense that the law which forbids stealing is acknowledged by individual citizens, or at least by the vast majority of them. We cannot affirm that an international ethic exists merely because a number of enlightened persons in various parts of the world hold exalted views as to the rules which should govern the nations in their dealings with one another. It is not enough, either, that some master mind should produce "the standard book on the subject" setting forth the rules and principles in a manner satisfactory to a committee of experts. The rules and principles in question must already be widely acknowledged and practised by the nations as such, or by the governments which act for them, before we can say that an international ethic *exists*. When Grotius (who wrote on international *law*) produced his great work, "De Jure Belli et Pacis," he did not construct or create the *jus* in question, but merely gathered together and classified the rules and customs already in operation throughout the most civilized parts of the world; the value of such a book being that it helps to steady and establish the practise of the rules and to extend their operation over wider areas. Had not international law of a kind already secured a wide acknowledgment there would have been nothing for Grotius to write about. Or—to put the matter in a different light—if the normal practice of the Israelites had been to steal each other's property whenever they got the chance, without shame incurred or penalty imposed, would it not be absurd to say that the ethics

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of Israel forbad stealing merely because an eminent leader among them, named Moses, had produced a book, or a table of stone, in which stealing was forbidden? Long before Moses produced the table of stone it was pretty well understood among the Israelites that any man who robbed his neighbor's hen roost was a rascal, and all that Moses did with the table of stone was to put the fear of God on that man and upon his would-be imitators. In the same way the fact that a number of enlightened persons in all nations hold the view that no nation has the right forcibly to deprive another of its territory, economic resources and trading facilities, and write books to that effect, does not entitle us to say that an international ethic exists to define the right and wrong of national practice in this matter. An ethic is not international until it is internationally acknowledged and practised as the rule, exceptions to which are visited with disgrace if not with punishment. In the absence of considerable international practice to give it effect it is doubtful if such a body of enlightened opinion could be called "an ethic" at all, or anything more than the pious opinion of certain individuals.

With this important distinction in mind it will hardly be denied that such an international ethic as can now be fairly said to exist is, at best, of the most elementary and uncertain kind and quite inadequate to give moral direction to the powerful national interests which come into collision and call for reconciliation on the field of foreign policy. No doubt there are multitudes of persons in many lands who are honestly persuaded and constantly proclaim that if the ethic of Jesus Christ ("love thy neighbor") or the ethic of Socrates ("it is better to suffer injustice than to be unjust") or the ethic of Kant ("treat every man as an end and not as a means") were consistently applied to international relations, peace and good-will would cover the earth. So unquestionably they would, and so far as peace and good-will are concerned it matters little whether the ethic of Jesus, the ethic of Socrates, or the ethic of Kant be chosen for the purpose. But the fact remains that the existing governments of the earth, when it comes to the point of adjusting the conflicting interests of nationalism, act on principles which would be pretty much what they are if Jesus, Socrates, and Kant had never been heard of. Each is intent on getting the best out of the bargain for itself and would be immediately hurled from power by its constituents (assuming it to be con-

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stitutional) if it showed any disposition to love its enemies, suffer injustice rather than cause it, or treat other nations as "ends in themselves." To be sure there are differences. The ethic of the Washington Conference and of the recent conferences in London was not quite so crude and barbaric as that which drew up the Treaty of Versailles. But what made the difference was not a growing regard in the negotiating parties for the ethic of Jesus, Socrates or Kant, but fear for their own skins, the dread of what might happen to them in the event of another Great War, and reluctance to endure the burdens of preparing for it. There is no great nation today that would not find itself plunged into war by the action of its government if the alternative lay between that and "loving its enemies," "suffering injustice rather than causing it," or treating other nations as "ends in themselves." "*Video meliora proboque*" is the international ethic of the enlightened citizen when meditating on these things; but it changes into "*deteriora sequor*" when he follows the action of his government in foreign policy. There is a tragic discrepancy at this point. It is only when we are considering what the best citizens think and feel that we can affirm the existence of an enlightened international ethic. Judging by what is acknowledged and practised by the nations as such, in their official dealings with one another, an international ethic is far from having reached the enlightened stage. It is unenlightened, elementary and barbaric. One may even doubt at times whether it exists at all.

If it be granted that an international ethic does not exist, save in an elementary and inadequate form, the question naturally arises as to what steps, if any, can be taken, what methods adopted with a view to changing so dangerous a state of things for the better.

Probably the first method that would occur to the modern mind is that of calling a conference of experts and wise men to deliberate upon the matter and record their findings. Let them define in the first instance the standard by which the actions of nations, in their dealings with one another, are to be judged right or wrong. Is it the same as, or different from, the standard which governs the actions of individuals?—a question by no means to be decided offhand. In either case, what, precisely, is it? Is it the greatest conceivable happiness of the race, or the

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largest liberty for self-development, or the utmost degree of organization, or the mere tendency to promote peace? This question answered, let the principles be defined which the application of such a standard involves. Finally, let a code of rules be drawn up, not necessarily a long one, for dealing with the main types or classes of international problems that call for ethical decision—the Ten Commandments, let us call them, of international morality.

I am far from saying that such a conference would be useless. At least it would have the use of revealing the enormous difficulty of the matter in hand, which few people at present seem to realize. I doubt, however, if it would agree, except perhaps on a compromise of little value. Its findings would probably be expressed in what Dean Inge calls "Resolution English, the essence of which is that each word should convey the least meaning that it can." And I greatly fear that our conference would be followed not by action on the lines laid down but by more discussion of the same sort.

In ethics the method of determining the principles on which we are going to act *before* the occasion arises for acting upon them is never very effective, because the principles are apt to be forgotten or qualified or explained away in the interval that elapses between their formulation and the occasion for applying them; and this danger is all the greater when the work of formulating them has been done by a committee or syndicate. Moreover, ethical principles which are defined in that manner are always felt by those who have to apply them to be fabrications or artifacts. They have no natural authority and the attempt to make them appear authoritative is immediately recognized as forced and disingenuous.

The truth is that in ethical advance the formulation of principles *follows* rather than *precedes* the actions to which they refer. It is not until somebody, or, in this case, some nation, without any authority behind it, has had the courage to perform an action which goes beyond the principle hitherto in force that the ethical expert can find a new principle to formulate. It is the heroic actor who suggests the new principle to the expert and not vice versa—an interesting difference between the conditions obtaining in ethics and those proper to the positive sciences. The most remarkable example of this was, of course, afforded by the Founder of Christianity, whose action in going

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up to Jerusalem, and in the sequel, embodied a principle which his followers were not able to formulate until the action in question revealed it to them. We are in error when we imagine, as many persons are in the habit of doing, that the Ten Commandments—to recur to our former example—announced to the Israelites a morality in which they were entirely unpractised. It is only as addressed to a people already practised, but not practised *enough*, that the Ten Commandments have any point or meaning. Their object was to steady, establish and extend a form of conduct already widely recognized as right. The attempt to reverse this method invariably leads to disappointing results and goes far to explain the phenomenon noted at an earlier point of this article—the astounding disparity between idealism of the modern world and the small effect it has on the actual conduct of men and nations—a disparity nowhere more conspicuous than on the field of international ethics. Indeed the very ardor with which we discuss what ought to be done often drains off and uses up the energy that might otherwise be used in doing it, and sometimes even leads us into mistaking the discussion for the performance. In this false security nothing decisive gets done.

Dismissing this method, then, as inadequate to the end in view, and useful only when used in conjunction with one far more effective, it remains to inquire whether we can find a better way. On that I have certain suggestions to offer, but before doing so I would call attention to a highly important point.

It is commonly assumed that an international ethic is simply an extension of domestic morality, of the "rules of conduct obtaining between individuals," to the sphere of foreign relations.

Before adopting that view it would be well to ask ourselves what the "rules of conduct obtaining between individuals" really are. Raising this question, we observe at once that the rules which "actually obtain" among individuals are by no means identical with the rules to which lip-service is paid. One of these latter runs "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." It would surely be an exaggeration to treat this, and the body of morality that goes with it, as "actually obtaining among individuals." Were this rule extended to the international field and observed as little as it is by those who profess it as a law of individual conduct, it may be doubted if universal peace and

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good-will would be any nearer or the world much better off, in any important particular, than it is today. Conceivably, and indeed probably, it would be worse off essentially. For the profession of these lofty precepts in conjunction with a current practice which belies them should not be cited as an instance of the morality obtaining among individuals but of the immorality so obtaining. The extension of *that* to the international sphere should be avoided at all costs by the would-be founders of an international ethic. It would amount to nothing better than the internationalizing of hypocrisy.

It is by no means easy to give a concrete meaning to so vague a phrase as "the morality obtaining among individuals"; but a glance at the law of the land will furnish a helpful indication of what it really is. "In no circumstances," remarks a recent writer on jurisprudence, "do we recognize a legal duty of self-sacrifice. 'The law,' said Baron Bramwell, 'allows what I may term a reasonable selfishness . . . ; it says, let every one look out for himself and protect his own interests, and he who puts up a barricade against a flood is entitled to say to his neighbor who complains of it, Why did not you do the same?' "

The ethic of "the law" indicated in these statements is by no means coincident at all points with the "rules of conduct obtaining between individuals." At some points it stands above and at others below the current morality of business and of daily life. But I venture to think these words of Baron Bramwell bring us much nearer the concrete meaning we are in search of than we are brought by reference to "love thy neighbor as thyself" or any similar maxim.

Is an international ethic, then, nothing more than the extension of this kind of thing to the dealings of the nations with one another? Will our ethic be adequately founded when the nations have agreed on the principle that every one is "to look out for himself and protect his own interests and he who puts up a barricade against a flood is entitled to say to his neighbor, Why did not you do the same?"

In that case I offer the opinion that international ethic is not worth striving for. It is not worth striving for because, at that level, it is already in existence. To be sure there are, as yet, no law courts to enforce it, and law courts are not to be despised. But if the movement for "federation of the peoples" or "the unity of mankind" aims only at creating legal machinery for

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protecting the nations in the process of looking after themselves it will be condemned by future historians as having made no contribution whatever to the advance of morality, but rather for having stereotyped morality in a low form to which it had already attained. It may also be doubted whether such an enterprise would have the effect so commonly predicted of it—that of establishing universal peace. The pursuit of self-interest, no matter how artfully it be managed, inevitably leads to war in the long run, and all the more inevitably when the management is artful than when it is crude. By adjusting the war-making tendencies of self-interest among the members of a particular nation, by substituting civil procedure for violence, we do not destroy them; we concentrate them more effectually against the foreigner. From which it may be inferred that the main effect of bottling them all up in a unitary system would be, so far as war is concerned, to change its character from that it now has of strife with foreigners into that of armed rebellion against the decisions of the world court, in short to substitute civil war for foreign. The remark has been made that "where picking pockets is the business in hand three men are less likely to quarrel when they stand under three umbrellas than when they stand under one." If you substitute "the pursuit of a reasonable selfishness" for picking pockets, the remark may be applied without further qualification to a League of Nations constituted on the principle we are discussing.

The point emerging from all this that I am anxious to bring out is, that an international ethic, if it is to have any value at all, must be something other than an extension of the "morality actually obtaining among individuals." It must stand on a higher level. The altruism which the law of the land does not recognize must be its foundation. Or, to say the same thing in other words, unless international ethic means ethic of a higher quality than that now sanctioned by law it either means nothing at all or means something that is not intrinsically worth while. To state the problem thus is no doubt to increase its difficulty. But something is gained if the statement be true.

It is extremely doubtful that the problem before us is susceptible of solution by the method of direct frontal attack on the salient difficulties—the method now most in favor. A far-sighted and comprehensive strategy, wide encircling movements

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on both flanks, combined with steady pressure on the front and rear, and constant attention to cutting off the enemies' supplies, is called for.

Instead therefore of attempting a fully worked out system of international ethics, which, for reasons given, would be premature, I suggest that effort should rather be directed to promoting closer relations between the peoples of the world in every form where common action is possible: the certainty being that in whatever degree or form coöperation takes place the ethic appropriate to coöperation will presently appear and assert itself, not as a code of rules laid down in advance of the performance, but as the flower and fruit naturally growing out of the performance itself. In this way it is that all morality has come into being and I cannot imagine that it will be otherwise with an international ethic.

With this purpose in view it would be well if attention were turned aside for a little from the question of *political* coöperations—with which the League of Nations is mainly occupied—and consideration given to what can be done on other lines—lines which point not so much to a League of Governments but to that far greater thing, a League of Peoples. The world needs good government—needs it on a coöperative basis—but it has many other interests equally important and equally unattainable without international coöperation. Immense possibilities are waiting to be explored and, if the word may be used, to be exploited, in this direction. Among the interests of mankind that rank on at least an equal footing with good government is good education. Education will never be raised to a level adequate to the demands of the present form of civilization—it is woefully inadequate now—till international ethical action raises it. Beyond this, or perhaps included in it, lie the whole range of interests covered by science, art, philosophy, religion, and, not least, by labor, all of which at the moment participate in the moral anarchy that characterizes the political situation, and are to a very large extent the cause of it. These also will never discover the moral ideal that is to unify them, each with itself and all with one another, until they are internationally pursued. That ideal at present is known to no man; its emergence will not take place till a world-wide coöperation has revealed it; but it will assuredly take place then. When it takes place an international ethic will be on the way.

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FIVE YEARS OF FRENCH POLICY IN THE NEAR EAST

By Auguste Gauvain

THE Turks have always owed their power to the dissensions of Christendom. Quarrels between the Greeks and Bulgars first opened the Balkan Peninsula to the Sultans. In 1453 Christianity allowed Constantinople to fall into the hands of Mahomet II. In the nineteenth century Anglo-Russian rivalry preserved the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. In the twentieth century, at the close of the World War, it was Anglo-French rivalry that allowed Turkey, guilty and defeated, exhausted and disheartened, to reëstablish herself on both sides of the Straits and to set up her power anew in Constantinople, where, for the first time since the fall of Constantine Dragoses, there was a garrison of Christian troops. Baffled in their immense hopes, the old *raias* whom the armies of the West delivered from an oppression centuries old, have now suffered a fate more atrocious than after the greatest of the Osmanlis' victories. It is a fact unique in the annals of the civilized world that populations which were settled here for thousands of years before the Turks made their appearance in history have been driven out *en masse* by a treaty of peace to leave room for the Turkish invaders who pretend that this is their "homeland."

How could such a thing occur? Who is responsible? A part of the responsibility does, indeed, weigh upon France—but a part only. Let us see how large a part.

THE MUDROS ARMISTICE

On September 29, 1918, the armistice granted to the Bulgars by General Franchet d'Espérey seemed to the whole Near East to be the preface to a Turkish capitulation. While General Franchet d'Espérey, commander-in-chief of the Allied Armies in the Balkans, was pursuing his victorious march to Belgrade (which the Serbs entered on November 1st) he ordered the English General Milne to march on the Turkish frontier and Constantinople with eight divisions, three of which were British. Even though it should encounter more or less serious opposition, this movement must inevitably end upon the Bosphorus. The Committee of Union and Progress, which had been sovereign

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since August, 1914, knew that it was lost. Enver Pasha, one of the triumvirate, did indeed propose bringing up divisions from Anatolia and organizing resistance upon the Tchataldja line, but his suggestion was not carried out. Feeling that serious resistance was impossible, the Committee's sole concern was to prevent the fall of Constantinople and a massacre of the Mussulmans. The triumvirate resigned and was replaced by a ministry headed by Izzet Pasha which was thereafter dominated by a single idea: the conclusion of an armistice.

Naturally enough, and in spite of some ministers who preferred negotiating with the English, Izzet Pasha tried first to get in touch with the commander-in-chief of the Allied Armies, General Franchet d'Espérey; but his first envoy, Colonel Mehmet Bey, was arrested at Dedeagatch by the English military authorities. The colonel returned to Constantinople bearing word that the English did not wish Turkey to make peace with the French. A second emissary—this time a secret one—a Frenchman, M. Savoie, was no more fortunate. British outpost commanders suspected him and held him. Izzet Pasha, having received no word from M. Savoie, and finding the situation growing steadily more critical, consulted his colleagues afresh. Acting upon their opinion he telegraphed to the Vali of Smyrna, Rahmi Bey, a friend of the English, to negotiate with them for an armistice.

In the Mediterranean as in the Balkans the commander-in-chief of the Allied fleets—as provided in agreements with London—had from the beginning of the war been a Frenchman, Admiral Gauchet. If, therefore, the Turkish Government wished to negotiate with the commander of the fleet it had to address either Admiral Gauchet or his immediate subordinate, Vice-Admiral Amet, commander of the second squadron, stationed in the road at Mudros, to the south of Lemnos. But instead the Vali of Smyrna got in touch with Vice-Admiral Calthorpe, commander-in-chief of the British naval forces at Malta. At the same time General Townshend, who had surrendered to the Turks in April, 1916, at Kut-el-Amara, and had been interned at Prinkipo, was set free and summoned to the Sublime Porte. On October 17th he had a long conversation with Izzet Pasha, and that same evening discussed armistice conditions for two hours with Rauf Bey, Minister of Marine. Rauf asked British friendship and protection, stipulating that the Dardanelles should not be forced. On the 18th Rahmi Bey conducted

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General Townshend and an English captain to Panderma, and thence to Smyrna, whence they set out for Mytilene and Mudros. On the 20th, at Mudros, the general became the guest of Admiral Seymour, commanding the British naval forces in the Aegean Sea.

Without the consent of its allies the British Government concluded a bungled armistice, the gaps in which—especially as concerned the disarmament of the Turkish army—later permitted the Turks to pull themselves together and reëstablish their military situation. At this time it was the French Government that desired to smash Ottoman military power once for all, and it was England that held the French back in order to gain a preponderance in Turkey.

AT CONSTANTINOPLE AND IN SYRIA

Confronted by the *fait accompli*, neither France nor the other Allies could withhold ratification of an armistice which had been published everywhere and which the whole world regarded as Turkey's capitulation. France refrained from quibbling over the omissions which at that time the great public did not clearly discern, but she held herself in reserve for the outcome. Now the British authorities began again playing the same double game as in October. While assuming an attitude of perfect courtesy toward the French authorities, they did their best to hold them at a distance. Some weeks later, when General Franchet d'Espérey made his formal entry into Constantinople and set up his general headquarters in the Yali of Enver Pasha, at the foot of the Yildiz cliffs, the positions of political importance were solidly in the grip of the British.

Nevertheless the policy of the Clemenceau Cabinet and the feeling of the French public did not change a bit. General Franchet d'Espérey manifested the greatest spirit of conciliation in his dealings with the British authorities and adopted a sympathetic attitude toward the various Christian communities. At this time the conviction was dominant in France that the Christian nations of the Balkans would resume complete possession of the territories once conquered by the Sultan and that the Straits would be internationalized under control of the Western Powers. The sole hesitation was over the fate of Constantinople. The feeling prevailed that in October, 1914, the Turkish Government had committed an inexcusable crime in taking part against France and England, that their intervention, followed by the

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closing of the Straits, had caused incalculable misery, and that no punishment could be too severe for that Government and the people who had obeyed it. The 700,000 Christians at Constantinople were so well aware of these feelings that on the day of General Franchet d'Espérey's triumphant entry they frantically acclaimed the French regiments. It never occurred to them that the Turk could ever return as a master to the ancient Byzantine capital. The Mussulmans themselves, weighed down by the blows of fate, awaited the worst.

Within a few months the French educational institutions filled with pupils. In the fifty-two French schools at Constantinople and in our missionary establishments in Asia Minor more than 90,000 children hastened to take up the study of our language and receive our instruction. The prestige of the Western Powers extended in all directions throughout the Ottoman Empire, and the Turks, overwhelmed by their defeat, never even thought of revenge. Their tattered emaciated soldiers presented a pitiable spectacle. The Allies, however, treated their enemies at Constantinople so mildly, affected so little the mien of conquerors thirsty for vengeance, and showed themselves so pliable toward the numerous Turks who endeavored, with the refinements of Oriental hypocrisy, to fix all responsibility for the intervention of 1914 upon a little group of men, that the Mussulman population plucked up heart and lost both fear and respect together. The former chiefs of the Committee of Union and Progress thereupon did two things: they changed their label to "Renovation," and they set up a cunning propaganda in France. A number of them returned to Paris to exploit their former relations with influential political leaders. They posed as victims of Enver and Talaat, swearing that their sole ambition henceforward would be to make their country an auxiliary of France. Some of them were warmly received by dilettantes bred on the novels of Pierre Loti and Claude Farrere, and by artists, archeologists and tourists who retained pleasant memories of the Turkish peasantry.

In spite of this the Cabinet at Paris remained very firm in its attitude toward Turkey. It even pushed its firmness to the verge of imprudence, for in May, 1919, while the Italian delegation was absent from the Peace Conference, M. Clemenceau joined with Mr. Lloyd George in proposing the occupation of Smyrna to M. Venizelos. Moreover, in June, when the Turkish

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delegation (led by Damad Ferid Pasha, the opponent of the Committee of Union and Progress) came to Paris to negotiate peace, the French premier administered a glacial douche. On June 29 a note signed by Clemenceau reminded them that Turkey had without any excuse shown herself Germany's willing instrument, and had been guilty of massacres "whose deliberate atrocity equals or surpasses anything in recorded history." Inviting the Turkish Government to "break with an evil tradition of corruption and intrigue," the note did not conceal the fact that the Supreme Council had no desire for further interviews with the Turkish Delegation until Turkey was resigned to the inevitable consequences of her sins.

This blunt dismissal of the men who in 1914 had had the courage to protest against the exploits of Enver, Talaat and Djemal was not very clever. It has been intimated that the British Delegation was at the bottom of the proceeding. In any case, M. Clemenceau fell in with it, forgeting the invariable Oriental custom of demanding more than is expected, and the fact that time out of mind the plenipotentiaries of the Sublime Porte have begun all negotiation by raising the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This piece of clumsiness provided food for the growth of Turkish nationalism.

At this moment there appeared a leader for the Mussulmans, now infuriated by the occupation of Smyrna. Mustapha Kemal, famous for his gallantry at the Dardanelles and his record in Syria under Falkenhayn and Liman von Sanders, had been sent to Anatolia as inspector of the Third Corps. Damad Ferid hoped thus to get rid of a troublesome soldier and at the same time use him to pull together the military forces which had become disorganized since the armistice. Only the second half of the Grand Vizir's hopes were fulfilled. Mustapha Kemal got hold of the munitions depots that the Allies failed to guard. He armed the Nationalists and laid in a reserve of munitions. Once master of the situation in Anatolia, he defied Damad Ferid, who had him rebuked by the Sheik-ul-Islam instead of laying hands on the man himself. Mustapha Kemal resigned and in July assembled at Erzerum a congress which on August 7th proclaimed a National Pact and affirmed its determination to defend Anatolia against the Entente, the Greeks and the Armenians. Adhesions came from all parts of the country. A second and more numerous National Assembly met at Sivas in September.

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It demanded the immediate election of a national Parliament and by telegraph summoned the Sultan to cause the evacuation by the Powers of all territories beyond an established line drawn straight from the south of Mosul to Alexandretta. The Sultan in terror dismissed Damad Ferid and on October 20 replaced him by Marshal Ali Riza Pasha.

Disagreements between the English and French now became obvious. The former openly took sides with Damad Ferid, while the latter showed their sympathy for the Nationalists. The British authorities at Constantinople made less and less secret of their purpose of keeping the Sultan in leading strings and ousting the Allies by degrees. In Syria they took it on themselves to install as King the Emir Feisal, son of Hussein, Sherif of Mecca, on the pretext that the London Cabinet had during the war promised Hussein to create a union of the Arab lands under his rule. Enthroned as King of the Hedjaz, Hussein was in London's pay. Another of his sons, Abdullah, was installed, likewise with the title of King, in another region which was split off from Syria and baptized Transjordania. The Paris Cabinet permitted Feisal to govern Damascus under the direction of a French agent, but it would not tolerate this princeling's stretching out his hand over the rest of Syria. At the instigation and with the active aid of such British agents as Colonel Lawrence, Feisal obstinately persisted in his design of creating an Arab Empire. Even when the treaties had entrusted us with the Syrian mandate and when French troops, at length freed from other cares, had occupied Syria, Feisal did not cease to stir up trouble from his palace at Damascus. He even egged on bands to attack General Gouraud during the course of a tour of inspection, and employed the supplies with which we provided him to combat us. The French Government, annoyed at this, concluded an agreement with London and got rid of Feisal, whom the British sent to reign over Irak at Bagdad. But these numerous and highly disagreeable incidents had aroused and irritated the old latent antagonism between the two great occidental powers. Friction between the two Cabinets was increased with each of a series of conferences.

Many French officers, for their part, embittered the situation by an unfriendly attitude toward England and Greece. They harbored grudges against these two countries because of the persistent unwillingness of the British staff to coöperate with us

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in the Balkans and because of the treachery of Constantine's army. Having served under the bitter and prejudiced General Sarrail, they shared his prejudices and his passions. Some of them thought of snatching the benefits of victory from a Greece which had once more become Venizelist. In conversation with the Serbs and Bulgars they counselled them to descend, the first on Saloniki and the second on Kavalla. In correspondence with friends and relatives in France they blackened the name of our allies to the advantage of the "good old Turks," whose chivalrous conduct at the Dardanelles they lauded. Meantime the "good old Turks" of Anatolia were massacring in Cilicia all our soldiers who fell into their hands, as well as our missionaries and protégés. At the Trappist monastery of Cheiklé they crucified Père Philippe in front of his burning convent. Near Urfa, in April, 1920, they wiped out a column of French troops who were withdrawing in the belief that they were protected by a pledge of honor. At Marache they renewed the worst horrors of Enver's time. But these facts were kept strictly secret by the French Government and were not known in France. When divulged by a few independent journalists they were denied or else branded as exaggerations. The Cabinet, of which M. Millerand had become the chief after M. Clemenceau's resignation, let itself be won over gradually to Kemalism. Individuals who had been engaged in financial ventures in the Near East before the war, or who sought to obtain profitable concessions, spread the opinion in political circles that the future belonged to Kemalism, and that if we lent it our favor we should profit marvelously.

This state of mind was aggravated by events in the spring of 1920. At dawn on March 16th the English General Milne, local commander at Constantinople, occupied the most important points in the capital and arrested a number of politicians suspected of hostility to the occupying authorities. At the same time Lieutenant-General Wilson proclaimed a state of siege. Although the French High Commissioner had joined his two colleagues in authorizing these steps most of the persons arrested were known to be friends of France. On April 5th the Grand-Vizir Salih Pasha, who had succeeded Marshal Ali Riza, was replaced by Damad Ferid. April 13th the Sheik-ul-Islam declared Mustapha Kemal and his Nationalists to be rebels and formally cast them out of the religious community. In reply Mustapha Kemal decreed elections for a National Assembly at

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Angora, and had the English officers of the Control Commission arrested. April 28th the Grand National Assembly began its work by setting up a government over which Mustapha Kemal presided, and by declaring war on England. Thereafter the outbreak of xenophobia was unrestrained.

At Paris the *Temps* took its stand openly for the Kemalists, supporting "the loyal endeavor of the Nationalist régime." Negotiations for peace in the Near East being in progress, it campaigned against the internationalization of Constantinople and the Straits, asserting that internationalization simply amounted to English domination. It averred, however, that Mustapha Kemal, the former leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress (who had taken refuge in Germany) and the opponents of Damad Ferid were having dealings with German agents, who could provide munitions, and with emissaries of Lenine. It was also known that the Nationalists were demanding all of Cilicia, which M. Briand congratulated himself on having gained for France in 1916 through the agreements relative to Asia Minor. On March 27th and June 25th, 1922, in the Chamber of Deputies, M. Briand asserted that France would commit an irreparable blunder in leaving Cilicia, that it was a question of honor and honesty for her to remain there.

At this epoch, too, in spite of the recriminations of army and navy officers, and in spite of the misunderstandings that Parisian journalists had created over the affair of March 13th, the French Government was upholding the cause of the West and of Christianity in the Near East. When negotiations were resumed in May with a new Ottoman delegation, installed first at Versailles and then at Sèvres, M. Millerand joined in the harsh conditions which were imposed on Turkey. He authorized the Greek troops to enter Thrace. August 10th he signed the Treaty of Sèvres, which gave Thrace to Greece, placed Smyrna under Greek control, promised autonomy to the Kurds and complete guarantees to the Assyro-Chaldeans, created a free and independent Armenia, and released all the Arabs lands from Turkish domination. Perhaps the French ministers were not convinced of the fairness and practicability of these various clauses, but they deferred none the less willingly to the wishes of England and of M. Venizelos. Similarly they yielded to Mr. Wilson's desires on the subject of Armenia. With the exception of the Anglo-French agreements of 1916, which gave France a mandate

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over certain Armenian territories, they left it to Mr. Wilson to fix the frontiers between Turkey and the new Armenian state. If Armenian affairs eventually turned out so ill, it is largely due to the long uncertainty surrounding the intentions of the United States. At the beginning of the negotiations, Mr. Morgenthau, Mr. Wilson's ambassador at Constantinople from 1913 to 1916, felt justified in giving assurances at Paris that the United States would assume the mandate not only for Armenia but for all of Turkey. Events showed that the American people were unwilling to trouble themselves even with Armenia. The Americans, however, followed the European example and threw themselves into the concession hunt at Angora.

AFFAIRS IN GREECE

The electoral defeat of M. Venizelos on November 14th, 1920, profoundly modified French policy in the Near East. The plebiscite in favor of King Constantine, who had been driven from Greece in June, 1917, by M. Jonnart, High Commissioner of the Allied Powers, and the monarch's triumphant return to Athens finally turned French opinion against the Greeks.

When M. Venizelos agreed to occupy Smyrna it was with the conviction that he would be supported by the Allied Powers. In order better to defend the occupied zone against Kemalist attack, he had considerably enlarged it and had established a solid front on a strategic line of advanced positions. Once Constantine was on the throne the support of the Western states vanished, and prudence would have dictated the withdrawal of the line of occupation to approximately the limit fixed by Article 66 of the Treaty of Sèvres. In this way Greece would have been able to protect with a very much smaller force the territory where sovereign rights had been officially conferred upon her. Unfortunately, Constantine dreamed of extending rather than restricting the occupied zone. Posing as a savior and a restorer of the Byzantine Empire, he let his people in their madness believe that he would soon lead them to Saint Sophia.

To head off the catastrophe the Allied Cabinets summoned the Greek and Turkish plenipotentiaries to London in February, 1921. M. Briand did his best to bring about a conciliation, urging Bekir Sami, the principal Turkish plenipotentiary, to accept a revision of the Treaty which would have been more honorable for the Turks than the Greeks. The Greek Cabinet

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was rescued from its embarrassment by the National Assembly, which disavowed Bekir Sami and rejected the London accords.

At about the same time, on March 16th, the Kemalist plenipotentiaries led by Yussuf Kemal Bey signed an agreement "of union and fraternity" with the Soviets, which gave Turkey the frontiers of the National Pact of January 28, 1920, together with Kars and Ardahan but without Batum, which was ceded to Georgia. In return for this advantage and several others of an administrative and financial order, Turkey engaged not to conclude peace with any of the Allies without the previous consent of Moscow. M. Briand, who had flattered himself he was getting ahead of the Soviets, was baffled. He fared little better on the Greek side.

Released from diplomatic scruples by the refusal of Angora, Constantine gave free rein to his grandiose designs. March 23rd he had an attack on the Turkish lines in Ionia begun by General Papoulas. After taking Afium-Karahissar the Greek troops failed before Eski-Shehir and withdrew in good order. The better class of Greek partisans in France vigorously urged their Greek friends to oppose any new enterprise, representing that even if they were victorious an advance by the Greek armies must lead to eventual disaster because, once having reached Angora, they would be cut off from their base and menaced with slow destruction by an enemy whom they could not wipe out once for all. They pointed out that Greece lacked the necessary resources in men, money, and material to drive the Turks clear back into Anatolia and force them to make peace. These warnings found no response, nor did those of M. Venizelos and the three Allied Cabinets. Lord Curzon, who had come to Paris in June to settle various questions, agreed with M. Briand that they should join Italy in urging the Cabinet at Athens to accept the mediation of the three Powers and to put itself completely in their hands. From Aix-les-Bains, where he was taking the cure, M. Venizelos begged his friend and former collaborator, M. Repoulis, then in Paris, to warn the Cabinet at Athens through the Paris legation of its opportunity to accept Allied mediation. But Constantine and his ministers aspired to revenge. They rejected the offer of mediation, and Constantine, installed at Smyrna, pushed the preparations for a second offensive. On June 19th the three Allied Cabinets addressed to M. Baltazzi, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Gounaris

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Cabinet, a note which "left responsibility for the consequences of a resumption of hostilities exclusively to the Greeks themselves." Venizelos, for his part, wrote General Danglis, leader of the Liberal Party at Athens, a far-sighted and vigorous letter in which he showed that a military victory was out of the question so long as Greece was diplomatically isolated. But objurgation of every kind was useless. Followers of Constantine and former Venizelists alike seemed smitten with vertigo.

The second offensive, better prepared than the first, succeeded. During July the Greek army commanded by General Papoulas took possession of Eski-Shehir, Afium-Karahissar, and Kutahia, and established itself in the mountain region in strong positions served by good railways. This precarious victory turned the heads of the Greeks. Without waiting for the end of the operations, the Chamber of Deputies abandoned itself to grandiloquent manifestations. On July 14th the leaders of all parties declared one after another that the Greek army was no longer fighting to maintain the Treaty of Sèvres but for the complete realization of the national ideals. There was talk of marching on Byzantium. Constantine, Son of the Eagle, would speedily realize popular predictions and the Great Idea. The dizziness spread to a part of the British world. The Anglican Church and the Ecumenical Patriarch negotiated for a fusion of the two churches. A member of the House of Commons, Sir David Davis, proposed transferring the seat of the League of Nations from Geneva to Constantinople. At London as well as at Athens responsible ministers believed it possible to settle the score with the Turks once for all, and the Gounaris Cabinet decided to push on to Angora itself in quest of a definitive peace and the consecration of the Hellenic Empire. Despite fresh warnings from France and from M. Venizelos, a third offensive began. It was stopped on the banks of the Sakaria. Once more the Greek army had to yield for lack of munitions and rations. The Greek dream was dissipated. The drachma fell to a fourth of its 1920 value. The Kemalists sang of victory and became more and more arrogant.

ANGORA AND LAUSANNE

Many Frenchmen rejoiced with them because they suspected that England had encouraged if not subsidized Constantine and was using the Greeks to dominate the Near East. If Con-

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stantine had listened to the advice of one branch of his family and abdicated in favor of the Diadoch, the Greek people, if not the new sovereign, would have benefited by a change in French public opinion; but Constantine was obstinate. When M. Gounaris came to Paris toward the end of October for credit and consolation M. Briand informed him that M. Franklin Bouillon had just signed a treaty of peace with Angora.

Faced by the stubbornness of the Greek Government, M. Briand had determined to end the French conflict with Turkey. His emissary, M. Franklin Bouillon, a hasty man unconcerned with religious or merely humanitarian considerations, completed his mission without discernment. Instructed to complete matters before M. Briand left for the Washington Conference, he accepted conditions which accorded with his well known Turkish leanings. He signed the Angora convention on October 20th with Yussuf Kemal, and returned as speedily as possible to Paris. The convention was examined without delay by the Conseil des Ministres, and ratified at the Elysée without troubling Parliament. Then M. Briand set out for Washington.

Though not, as M. Briand would have us believe, a mere reproduction of the agreement accepted by Bekir Sami at London, the Angora Convention constitutes a true treaty of peace between France and Turkey. Not only was it contrary to the engagement made by the Allies not to make a separate peace, but it also violated Articles 8 and 9 of the tripartite agreement made between England, France, and Italy on August 10, 1920, when they signed the Treaty of Sèvres. It did away with the guarantees promised to the Christian minorities and handed over to the Kemalists the richest Anatolian territories and strategic positions of the first order. It permitted the Turks to strip their Syrian frontier and concentrate all their forces against the Greeks. Besides which it was accompanied by annexes which long remained secret and which contained more or less formal engagements involving France. A letter from Yussuf Kemal to M. Bouillon indicated that Turkey relied upon French aid in "solving in a spirit of cordial understanding all questions relating to the independence and sovereignty of Turkey." One may discern in these words a kind of alliance, and the language used by M. Bouillon at Angora, Constantinople and Paris supports that idea.

The London Cabinet naturally demanded explanations. It

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had already registered objections to the agreement of March 9th. If it refrained on that occasion from insisting, it was because Bekir Sami had been disavowed by Angora; but after the agreement of October 20th it was more pressing. Upon his return from Washington M. Briand supplied Parliament with a defense of his course which neither was altogether clear nor seemed entirely based on fact. Ill-informed and deaf to the advice of independent observers, Parliament held its peace. As for Mr. Lloyd George, he needed M. Briand to ensure the success of the Genoa Conference. He tried to gain ground by drawing his French colleague into general engagements of great scope, but at the beginning of January, 1922, M. Briand, caught in his own net, found himself obliged to resign.

The year 1922 was one of expectancy, for though M. Poincaré, the new Premier, had in 1920 criticized M. Briand's policy, he felt obliged to support him so far as the Near East was concerned. On March 22nd, MM. Poincaré, Schanzer, and Lord Curzon addressed an urgent recommendation for suspension of hostilities to Angora, Constantinople, and Athens, together with a detailed armistice plan. On the 26th they invited all three Governments to examine the proposals of the Western Powers for a general adjustment of Near Eastern affairs and an extensive revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, returning to Turkey the part of Thrace east of a line running from the Stroudja mountains to the west of Rodosto, and the whole Smyrna zone, after providing for the rights of non-Mussulman minorities. M. Venizelos recommended adoption of this solution which, though not entirely satisfactory, was honorable; but Constantine and his ministers refused, not daring to admit failure. Subordinating the general interests of Greece and Hellenism to their own, and relying on Mr. Lloyd George (all of whose opinions on the Near East Lord Curzon did not share) they trusted to luck. During the Genoa Conference they even hoped that a break between France and England would improve their chances, thus letting slip—in spite of the repeated advice of pro-Greek Frenchmen— the season favorable for a retreat without much risk from the Eski-Shehir and Afium-Karahissar front, which was too long and costly to defend, back to the zone laid down in the treaty, which could easily be defended with three or four divisions. The army, ill-nourished, badly led and with its morale going from bad to worse, asked—each day with more discouragement

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—why it was being kept indefinitely in territory which Greece was doomed to lose.

With supreme rashness the Gounaris Cabinet chose this moment to attempt a bold stroke. At the end of July they withdrew fifty thousand men from the Asiatic front to Thrace and asked the Western Governments for authority to occupy Constantinople. By all accounts this was a deplorable blunder. The Anatolian front, stripped of its best troops, was exposed to attack by a confident enemy. On the other hand, the threat to occupy Constantinople raised irreducible objections in other countries, especially in France. Shattering the *modus vivendi* in force for more than three years, it brought the Eastern question into most ticklish territory. All Frenchmen in Constantinople were convinced that Lloyd George had promised Byzantium to Constantine, and these suspicions, reënforced by the fanatical exhortations of the Ecumenical Patriarch, were not lessened by Mr. Lloyd George's speech of August 4th in the House of Commons. Declaring that the Allied troops would protect Constantinople, the Prime Minister uttered threats against Turkey which were the more sensational because followed by praise of the Greeks. His criticisms of Turkish massacres, were, to be sure, perfectly justified; but at the moment when Constantine's supporters were announcing that their King was going to be crowned Emperor of Byzantium at Saint Sophia this public praise of the Greeks coupled with threats against the Turks looked very much like approval of the Gounaris Cabinet's policy. As this language coincided with a refusal to receive Angora's agents who had come to London to discuss peace, Mr. Lloyd George gave an impression of sympathizing with the Greek expedition. The British High Commissioner at Constantinople joined, none the less, with his French and Italian colleagues in forbidding the Greek army access to the Tchataldja line. During the month the London and Paris Cabinets studied a project for a new Near Eastern conference and proposed Venice as the meeting-place.

It was under these conditions that on the 26th of August Mustapha Kemal launched against the Greek front an offensive which almost nowhere met with any serious resistance. The Greek retreat speedily became a panic. The terrified Christian populations joined the fugitives. Within a few weeks the troops of Kemal were at Smyrna—which was burned—and on the banks

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of the Marmora. The situation became embarrassing for the Western Powers. In France neither the Government nor public opinion entirely appreciated the importance of what had happened. Prejudice against British policy and in favor of the Turks prevailed over the spirit of solidarity of Christendom. Hence, when Mr. Lloyd George appealed to the British Dominions and to the Balkan states to fight against the Turks and directed the Inter-Allied contingents occupying the neutralized area of the Straits to oppose the Kemalists' passage by force, M. Poincaré withdrew to the European side the French troops which had hitherto coöperated with the British troops on the Asiatic side. This abrupt end to a military collaboration which had gone on since the armistice in 1918 just missed causing a diplomatic rupture. Vigorously criticized though it was by a minority which was better informed than the man in the street, it was nevertheless approved by most Frenchmen, who were inclined to believe in their Government and to follow it. On both sides, however, a willingness for conciliation manifested itself. Neither the Dominions nor the Balkan states supported Mr. Lloyd George, and M. Poincaré felt obliged to satisfy both the advocates of the Entente Cordiale and the defenders of Christian civilization in the Near East. Lord Curzon came to Paris to arrange matters. An agreement made on September 23rd, with the participation of Italy, laid down the general lines of a new treaty of peace with Turkey. Military representatives met at Mudania on the Sea of Marmora, and signed an armistice which was presently to be followed by peace negotiations.

Every one recalls what kind of peace it turned out to be. Painfully elaborated at Lausanne from November 21, 1922, to July, 1923, it ended in the ruin of all the ancient institutions of the West and of Christianity in Turkey, especially those traditionally under French protection. England suffered less than we because she showed more firmness. First of all the parliamentary coalition which had governed since 1915 got rid of Mr. Lloyd George, who was regarded as too dangerous, and set up a wholly Conservative Cabinet over which Mr. Bonar Law presided. Lord Curzon, the chief plenipotentiary at Lausanne, was able to safeguard British interests. Where Turkey was concerned, he understood the system of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the "Great Elchi," five times Ambassador at Constantinople: "A force from without to keep up a steady animating pressure

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on the Government." Certainly, it was no longer possible to apply to the Republic of Angora the system of coercion that used to make the Sultans tremble, but it would have been both clever and fair for the French to join the English in certain proceedings. M. Bompard and his collaborators, however, displayed a candid faith in the good-will of Ismet Pasha and of Angora. They were alone in a confidence that nothing could discourage. One by one they abandoned all our old positions, contenting themselves with deceptive formulae that concealed surrender. Even the Greeks took better care of their interests. After a revolutionary Government headed by the gallant Colonel Plastiras had driven out Constantine and shot his principal ministers, the Greeks reorganized their army, and when in May Ismet demanded an indemnity they put ten divisions in line on the Maritza. In spite of untimely French representations they held firm, and the Angora Government gave up its demand for indemnity.

CONCLUSION

Since then France has suffered in Turkey the consequences of the aberrations of her ministers and the blindness of her public opinion. Her schools are empty, her former concessions are compromised, her credits dissipated, her commerce reduced to almost nothing, her prestige destroyed. Certain of her rivals are congratulating themselves. They hope to profit from her failure. But they are mistaken. In the Moslem East all Christian interests are inseparable. The misfortune of one does not make for the good fortune of the rest, as concession-hunters—even those from America—have already had reason to learn, and as the turn taken by affairs in Mesopotamia equally demonstrates. The simple recital of facts in the preceding pages is, we believe, more instructive than a philosophic dissertation. To form a sound judgment it is essential to know all the facts in their chronological order. Too frequently the statesman's art consists in confusing dates and events so that there is no fixing his own responsibility. If incredible calamities have overtaken the Christians of the Near East because of the blunders of national leaders, let us at least profit by so cruel an experience to draw closer the bonds between civilized nations.

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THE NEW BALKANS

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

THE five Balkan nations which emerged from the greatest of wars—begun, be it noted, by the shot of a Balkan fanatic—were alike in one thing if in nothing else; all required a peaceful interlude for the development of agricultural and manufacturing arts if their citizens were to become sufficiently prosperous and contented to resist the demagogic leaders who were sure to seek in new wars, civil or foreign, the opportunity of furthering their private fortunes. They have enjoyed such an interlude in varying degrees of completeness and for varying periods of time. They have sometimes trusted themselves to leaders who placed the interests of a particular class or faction above the interests of the country at large, but it may fairly be said that the men who have ruled the destinies of the Balkan states during the past five years have been neither more nor less scrupulous than their colleagues in Western Europe.

People seldom realize that even from the physical point of view the Balkan states are far from insignificant. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, known better perhaps as Jugoslavia, has an area of 96,134 square miles and over twelve million inhabitants. Rumania is even larger; its area, including the former Russian province of Bessarabia, is 122,282 square miles (that is, some ten thousand square miles larger than Italy) and its population is over seventeen millions. Bulgaria, as a result of the Treaty of Neuilly, finds her territory reduced to 39,824 square miles and her population to something less than five millions. Greece today has a total area of about 49,000 square miles and a population, counting recent fugitives from Asia Minor, of a good deal more than six millions. Albania, the smallest and most backward of the Balkan states, covers an area estimated at 17,000 square miles and has a population of about 830,000. In all, then, the states of the Balkan peninsula contain over forty million souls and cover over three hundred and twenty thousand square miles.

JUGOSLAVIA

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes has enjoyed a fair degree of domestic tranquillity and has been at formal peace

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with its neighbors since the signature of the peace treaties which marked the end of the Great War. There was some desultory fighting between Jugoslavs and Austrians along the Slovenian frontier early in 1919, but the springs of this dispute dried up after the peaceful Klagenfurt plebiscite and the subsequent resumption of profitable trade between the two peoples. In the vicinity of Fiume there were frontier incidents which often threatened complications of a most serious nature with Italy; and in Macedonia the activities of Bulgarian *komitadji* bands have nullified the efforts of various Jugoslav and Bulgarian statesmen to strengthen the affinites which, despite blood-stained rivalries, still connect these two essentially Slavic nations. But in neither case have the regular forces of the state been formally engaged. With Rumania, Greece and Hungary the relations of Jugoslavia have been increasingly satisfactory.

The improvement in the international situation of Jugoslavia dates from the signature of the Italo-Jugoslav agreement at Rome last January. It is not too much to say that this treaty opened a new era in Balkan politics. By it was ended Italy's disastrous controversy with the new state which, even before the armistice, she saw rising to leadership across the Adriatic,—a state which she feared might prove as dangerous a military rival as the Austro-Hungarian Empire had been and which she imagined would interfere with her ambitions for both political and economic hegemony in the Balkan peninsula. As a matter of fact, Italy's course through the successive phases of the "Adriatic Question" did not prove profitable, either as a means of strengthening Italian diplomatic prestige or broadening Italian channels of commerce. The influence which the Balkan states were naturally disposed to grant her at the cessation of hostilities in 1918 was wiped out when it became evident that she intended exacting the exorbitant territorial benefits promised by the Treaty of London; and with it died the dominant commercial

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rôle which in the usual course of events would have been hers.

But if quite evident benefits have accrued to Italy through a settlement of the Adriatic question (and the settlement of 1923 gave her specific benefits to which I have not referred, notably the annexation of Fiume), Jugoslavia has profited also. True, she has lost Fiume, and with it the only existing port equipped to handle her commerce toward the west, but even this loss is better for her than to have the old dispute with Italy pending; now she at least knows that Fiume is not to be hers at present, and she can turn energetically to the task of preparing a substitute port and connecting it by rail with the back country. And in the realm of foreign affairs she finds herself greatly strengthened. Before the conclusion of the Italo-Jugoslav agreement there was not much secret about the encouragement which Italy's representatives abroad were giving the governments hostile to Jugoslavia. Especially was this tendency noticeable in Sofia and Budapest. Not only has Italy loyally carried out her agreement to cut off her semi-official support of Bulgaria and Hungary in their plans against Jugoslavia, but she has expelled from Rome the little band of former adherents of the late King Nicholas of Montenegro who were engaged in fruitless but noisy efforts to stir up trouble. As a result, anti-Italian feeling is dying out in Belgrade and even in Zagreb, and now that an Italo-Jugoslav commercial treaty has been negotiated, much closer trade relations will undoubtedly grow up between the two countries, whose natural products complement each other excellently and are not competitors in any foreign market. Fiume itself will probably continue to languish; the Jugoslavs seem unable to bring themselves to establish a foreign city permanently as the chief commercial portal of their country. But the gradual extinction of Fiume is in line with Italian desires, for Italy has always worried more about what a foreign-controlled Fiume might do to the trade of Trieste than about the personal fortunes of its few thousands of citizens of Italian blood.

The economic condition of Jugoslavia also reflects the improved international situation resulting from the agreement with Italy. Today there is a balance between Jugoslav exports and imports. The receipts from state monopolies, customs and railways are steadily increasing,—a fact of importance, as they are to be the guarantee for the new Jugoslav railway loan soon to be floated in the United States. The currency, while tending

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slightly upward, is fairly stable. In Belgrade, Zagreb, Susak, Skoplje, and other cities in widely separated parts of the country which I have visited within the last few months, there is great building activity. More important, however, is the building which is taking place in the country districts. New farmhouses and farm buildings, new coöperative marketing centers and exchanges, are springing up, showing that the peasantry, which makes up over eighty percent of the country, counts on enjoying the novelty of an era of peace and is setting to work to win its share of the accompanying prosperity.

In internal politics the country has not been so happy. Had it not been for the general increase in prosperity, the propaganda of Raditch, the leader of the Croatian peasants, would undoubtedly have assumed a more anti-dynastic color and received much wider and more aggressive support. But even so it was successful enough to give Raditch a group of about 65 deputies in parliament, the total membership of which is 314. After much debate, the Pashitch government last May agreed to the confirmation of the mandates of the Raditch deputies. By July the latter had come to terms with one wing of the Democrats under Davidovitch, with the Slovenes under the Roman Catholic priest Koroshetz, and with the Bosnian Mohammedans under Spaho, which elements proceeded to overthrow Pashitch and set up a coalition.

Raditch, one of the most interesting figures in European politics, has as his primary characteristic inconsistency. During the war he was an effusive admirer of the Hapsburgs. Lately he has talked menacingly about a Croatian Peasant Republic, though usually in the same breath denying any traitorous designs against King Alexander and sometimes even praising him. He has managed to hold the support of well-to-do tradesmen and politicians in Zagreb even while off in Moscow being entertained by Chicherin. His varying poses have interfered less with his popularity than might be expected, because they have been accepted as unimportant manifestations of a notoriously erratic character, and because they are known to have no real connection with his essential and only unvarying demand—that a federalistic system be substituted for the centralized system of government now in force. To this the Democrats under Davidovitch were willing enough to consent. But they found it difficult to meet Raditch's demand for a special Minister for Croatia, be-

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cause such action would necessarily be only the first step in the appointment of similar ministers for all the different provinces—Macedonia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Montenegro, etc. In such a cabinet the will of Serbia would soon become entirely negatived. Davidovitch, himself a Serb, liked that idea as little as Pashitch would. And while he was willing to give much wider autonomy to local authorities, he wanted some form of decentralization which would not recognize the frontiers of the old historic provinces.

Though anxious for power, Raditch avoided taking his natural share of regular seats in the cabinet. The Democrats were anxious to divide responsibility, and suggested allotting the Croatian Peasant Party four seats. This was acceptable to the King, who stipulated only that the Prime Minister and Raditch should beforehand sign a protocol specifying the terms of their coöperation and laying down a legislative program. One of the conditions advanced by Raditch was that the army should be cut in half. To this the King refused to agree, and the Minister of War resigned his portfolio in protest that the proposal should even have been entertained. Raditch thereupon withdrew his support from the government, and the cabinet fell on October 15. At the moment this is being written, news comes that the crisis has been met by giving Pashitch a mandate to take office until a general election can be held in February, thus justifying his fixed belief that his opponents are so diversified that all he need do when they unite against him is simply to wait until their innate disruptive forces operate to return him once more to power.

But even if Pashitch is victor at the polls an extension of local administrative authority seems bound to come, and would come better from Pashitch than from the opposition. The first necessity of the politically heterogeneous nation that came into being after the war was the establishment of a strong central government capable of whipping dissident elements into line and presenting a firm front to attacks from without. But it cannot be denied that Pashitch pressed the unification process too fast and too far, and that there were not enough trained officials to run the complicated centralized machine which he set up. He now would be wise to concede something, though taking pains not to allow the devolution of authority to be used by ambitious local leaders to keep alive memories of pre-war geographical divisions. If this is done the importance of Raditch will disappear.

If Pashitch has seemed obstinate, Raditch has been obtuse.

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The Croatian leader is shut up in his historical enclave. He can think only of a federative state on Austro-Hungarian lines. He does not see the impossibility of giving precisely the same autonomy to Slovenia, where nearly every peasant can read, and to Bosnia, where a large percentage are illiterate. Slovenia, again, is compact—one race, one religion—whereas Bosnia has three racial sub-divisions and three religions. Even if Slovenia or Croatia is ready for complete autonomy, Bosnia or Macedonia may need a bureaucracy. Many Croatians fear Serbian imperialism—which does not exist. Many Serbians fear Croatian separatism—which does not exist. There are individual Serbian imperialists and individual Croatian separatists, but the masses do not follow either. Since the Serbians have had more political experience, theirs is the responsibility for showing the lead in conciliation. If they do so, I feel sure they will find sensible men in the Croatian peasant group with whom they can work, and who will forget the pet projects of Raditch in accomplishing the larger task. That is why I say that provided due wisdom is now shown the importance of Raditch will come to an end.

An important aspect of the Raditch movement has been its relation to affairs in Bulgaria, and above all in Macedonia. The connecton between Raditch and the Macedonian *komitadji* leader Alexandroff, recently assassinated, has not been clear. Alexandroff maintained diplomatic agents in many European capitals and one of his associates told me of his plans to visit the United States this winter to collect funds. Just before his death he was in negotiation with Raditch regarding the organization of Jugoslavia as a loosely federalized state, in which Bulgaria should eventually be merged and in which autonomy should meantime be given Macedonia, Croatia and other component parts. While these negotiations were under way Raditch fled from Zagreb to Vienna, and later went on to Moscow. It seems as though for a moment he dreamed of attempting to cast his Croatian Peasant Party in a communist mould, of persuading Alexandroff to do the same with his *komitadji* organization, and of then joining forces under the aegis of Moscow to overturn the Pashitch government in Belgrade and Zankoff's military government in Sofia.

In this plan Raditch met two insuperable obstacles. In the first place, however bitter his well-to-do supporters in Zagreb may be against their commercial and political rivals at Belgrade,

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they are not inclined to support a movement savoring of social revolution. In the second place, the Croatian peasants, though eagerly lapping up Raditch's talk of a peasant republic free from taxes and military service, want nothing to do with the abrogation of personal property rights. Alexandroff, for his part, probably never entertained illusions as to the possibility of following any such course in Macedonia. If he did, he soon found that his peasantry were as little favorable to communism as the peasantry of Croatia. This was the end of the great dream of a rising of the peasants north and south of Serbia to crush the alleged tyrants at Belgrade. Some of Alexandroff's followers, however, had come wholly under the influence of Moscow, and these, when they saw the failure of the Raditch plan, assassinated their former leader. Others say the assassination was planned by the Bulgarian Government in retribution for Alexandroff's dickering with their agrarian and communistic enemies. But the former theory seems far more likely.

RUMANIA

Though menaced from time to time along her Russian border, Rumania has maintained peace abroad since her troops relinquished Budapest in 1919 after their overthrow of Bela Kun's communist régime. Internally, though there has been discontent, especially in the former Russian province of Bessarabia and the former Hungarian province of Transylvania, there has been no serious bloodshed.

The Bessarabian problem has already been discussed in FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Vol. II, No. 4, p. 662). It has grown rather less menacing to the peace of Europe during the past few months. The Soviet Government is still intent on forming a "Moldavian Republic" out of the Russian provinces adjoining Bessarabia,—in several of which provinces, by the way, there are only a handful of Moldavians,—the obvious intention being to provoke envy among the Moldavian (Rumanian) inhabitants of Bessarabia, where a vigorous communist propaganda directed

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from Moscow has been aided by a none too gentle Rumanian administration and by unsettled economic conditions. But the "Moldavian Republic," like other units in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, would be a paper state; nor are conditions in the regions that would constitute it such as to attract the inhabitants of Bessarabia, even those of them who are opposed to the present régime because of the "state of siege" or unsatisfactory economic conditions. As a matter of fact, Soviet propagandists seem to be devoting less attention to Rumania just now than they did a few months ago, perhaps because (as recently reported from Moscow) they consider Bulgaria and Poland to offer more fruitful fields.

Rumania, though momentarily perturbed by Jugoslavia's willingness to resume diplomatic relations with Russia, has stayed on excellent terms with her two partners in the Little Entente. It will be remembered that just after the armistice there was heated argument between Bucharest and Belgrade regarding the division of the Banat, and "frontier incidents" were of frequent occurrence. The Allied commission handled this problem skilfully, however, and both sides ended by accepting a fair settlement. In December, 1923, a convention was signed between the two countries, according to the terms of which three Rumanian communes with a majority of Jugoslavs were exchanged for a town of some importance inhabited mainly by Rumanians. This regulated the last remnants of the dispute. There now seems every likelihood of continued friendship between the two peoples, whose history has never been marred by armed conflict. The marriage of King Alexander to the daughter of the Rumanian sovereigns was designed to strengthen these good relations and has doubtless served its purpose, though Queen Marie of Jugoslavia has not shown herself as active in identifying herself with the life of her adopted country as her English mother did when she became the wife of Ferdinand of Rumania.

The Rumanian Government is dominated by conservative elements in which a certain military faction is prominent. The granting of fuller rights to the Jews, as to the minority racial groups included within the new frontiers, was not undertaken very willingly, nor have the rights always been fully safeguarded. This has augmented the bad feeling between Rumania and Hungary, as there are many Magyars in Transylvania. But

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Rumania's title to that region cannot be attacked on the principle of nationality; the compact body of half a million Magyars (the so-called Szeklers) about whom Hungarian publicists talk a good deal inhabit the southeast corner of Transylvania and could not have been left to Hungary unless the far greater number of inhabitants in all the intervening country, who are preponderantly Rumanian, were retained under the Hungarian yoke. In view of her sound ethnic claims, Rumania would have done well to pay a bit more attention to keeping her record scrupulously clear as regards fair treatment of the Magyar groups inevitably coming under her sovereignty, thus making certain that Budapest should have no shadow of legitimate complaint regarding the execution of the peace settlement. In general, the lot of the Rumanian peasantry has been improved since the war, and when (as seems inevitable) the Transylvanians secure fuller participation in the government at Bucharest no doubt what discontent has been evident in that province will tend to disappear. A fuller execution of the law dividing up the large estates will also benefit the peasants throughout the country.

In the Dobrudja Rumania has a dispute with Bulgaria about which little has been heard so far but which may easily become ugly. The Dobrudja is the bare and monotonous region stretching south from the mouths of the Danube and presenting to the Black Sea a marshy and inhospitable coast. The southern part of the Dobrudja, with a population about equally divided between Rumanians, Bulgars and Turks, was alotted Rumania in 1913 following Bulgaria's defeat in the Second Balkan War. A difference has now arisen over the property of its inhabitants who are of Bulgarian blood. Bulgaria asserts that the new Rumanian authorities are intent on seizing the property of the Bulgarian peasants and that they are using as an excuse the fact that the latter are unable to produce freehold papers dating from the time when Bulgaria (including this part of the Dobrudja) obtained freedom from the Turks, nearly half a century ago. Apparently the Bulgarian Government used to admit the fact of undisputed possession at the time of independence as proof of land ownership, and no title deeds were ever issued. Bulgaria thinks it unfair that peasants unable to produce title deeds which were never considered necessary should now be dispossessed in favor of Rumanian settlers coming

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from north of the Danube; and failing a direct settlement the government intends bringing the dispute before the League of Nations as a violation of minority rights guaranteed in the treaties of peace.

The American Government has also had its difficulties with Rumania, resulting in the recent recall of the American Minister from Bucharest to report to the State Department on a Rumanian mining law which in some of its provisions seemed to indicate a hostile feeling toward foreign enterprise. In the effort to retrieve Rumania's vast petroleum resources from the foreign *concessionaire*, this law required that more than sixty percent of the stock and more than two-thirds of the personnel of foreign companies desiring to continue doing business in Rumania must be Rumanian. Our Government contended that many legitimate foreign mining and oil companies would in consequence be forced out of business. There were other American grievances, such as the passage by the Rumanian Government of legislative acts which made it almost impossible for foreign creditors of Rumanian citizens to collect their debts, even though they might have a legal judgment and their debtors were solvent. Latest reports are that the Rumanian Government is showing a more conciliatory attitude than it did last spring, and that the American Minister at Bucharest will shortly renew his efforts to prove to the Liberal Government now in undisputed control that Rumanian prosperity and economic independence will best be served not by driving out foreign capital and foreign enterprise but by utilizing them under restrictions universally recognized as just and proper.

The name "Liberals" as applied to the political followers of the Bratianu brothers is rather misleading, as their policy is frankly reactionary in comparison with the programs of the more important opposition groups. The latter are unable to come together for concerted action, even on the grave financial difficulties which in ordinary circumstances might be expected to make it impossible for the present government to remain in office. Last spring the Peasant Party and the Transylvanians came to an understanding which for a time seemed to threaten the supremacy of the Bratianus, but disagreements arose and it now is likely that the Liberal Party will remain in power at least until the end of the present session of parliament.

A word about the present status of the Little Entente. Under

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the skilful guidance of Dr. Benes, the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, this alliance between Rumania, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia has been a factor in affairs of general European moment. Its *raison d'être*, however, is a comparatively limited one. At the end of the war the three Danubian states which had profited by the break-up of Austria-Hungary found themselves in a most precarious relation towards their ex-enemies. They realized that they must stand together, or fall prey to combinations made against each of them in turn. The Little Entente's object was the preservation of the peace treaties intact, and in particular the prevention of attempts to restore the Hapsburgs to power either at Budapest or Vienna.

By the terms of the Little Entente each member state is left free to determine its own attitude toward Russia. When the Democrat cabinet came to power in Jugoslavia last summer the new Minister of Foreign Affairs took pains to renew his acquaintance with his Czechoslovak and Rumanian colleagues, and following a series of conferences with them during the last week in August announced his intention to keep intact and strengthen the Little Entente. The Little Entente must, indeed, have the support of any present Jugoslav cabinet, of whatever party. But towards Russia the new Jugoslav Government showed a more conciliatory attitude than had previously been adopted by M. Pashitch. The agreement which it was proposed to sign with Moscow was purely economic, however; and as the pre-war economic relations of Russia and Serbia were nil, the treaty, even if put into effect at a later date, need not be expected to produce any great alteration in the status of the Little Entente. Rumania, who is on tenter-hooks over Russian propaganda in Bessarabia, has vigorously urged Jugoslavia against any sort of dealings with Moscow. But she cannot go further than argument, and when M. Davidovitch announced his intention of opening negotiations with the Soviet Government the Bucharest papers hastened to point out that the actions of Jugoslavia were after all of no concern to Rumania, who was proclaimed as being quite content as long as Russian troops refrained from crossing the Dniester.

The theory that the Little Entente is at the beck and call of France has been rather over-played. A year ago the British and German press were full of angry denunciations of what was pictured as a barefaced attempt by France to utilize the Little

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Entente nations in her supposed schemes for the military domination of Europe. The treaty negotiated between Czechoslovakia and France in the closing days of 1923 was seen as the first of a series of similar agreements which would end by France becoming dominant at Bucharest and Belgrade as well as at Prague. Italy was particularly irritated at the prospect. That it induced moderation in Mussolini is shown by the fact that the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three member states, held in Belgrade on January 10, 1924, witnessed the collapse of the French project for a close formal alliance with the Little Entente, and that soon thereafter the Italian treaty with Jugoslavia was consummated. The truth is that the interests of the Little Entente states in regard to France, just as in regard to Russia, are by no means identical. In so far as France will assist them to keep Vienna and Budapest in order they will work with her and support her in her somewhat similar difficulties with Berlin. But economically their interests are not those of France, and even if Jugoslavia and Rumania now proceed (as seems likely) to make individual economic or political alliances with France, it will not be correct to say that the Little Entente, as such, is a French catspaw.

BULGARIA

Several of the more important problems facing Bulgaria on her different frontiers have already been discussed. Some idea has also been given of the complexity of the situation in Macedonia, where the activities of bands of Bulgarian sympathizers have several times brought the Jugoslav Government to the verge of launching a military demonstration which, once started, might easily have sucked in Bulgaria, loath as its government would be to risk new conflicts in its present undermined and dispirited condition.

Just before the Bulgarian military overthrew Premier Stambuliski in 1923 signs of a Serbo-Bulgar rapproachement gave promise of a better era in the Balkans. Stambuliski's murder, precipitated as it was by his advocacy of a Pan-Jugoslav federation, reawakened misgivings in the minds of Bulgaria's neighbors, and in Macedonia itself the bands which the peasant premier had held more or less in hand began new aggressions which tried the patience of Belgrade and which the new Zankoff Government at Sofia was powerless to control. The relations of Zankoff and

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his colleagues with the revolutionary Macedonians were peculiar. While secretly blessing Alexandroff's effort to maintain Bulgarian nationalistic feeling in Macedonia at fever heat, they wished to be free to meet complaints from Belgrade by saying that trouble in Serbian Macedonia was a domestic matter for Jugoslavia to adjust as best she would, and that while they in Sofia were of course distressed to hear of it they categorically disclaimed any part in fomenting it. Alexandroff has now been assassinated by communist sympathizers who were angered by his refusal to put the Macedonian revolutionary organization at the disposal of Moscow for a country-wide communist rising. The Zankoff Government, with one eye cocked at Belgrade, is under the necessity of speaking publicly of the murder of Alexandroff as a good riddance, whereas actually they consider him a patriot and a martyr. His service to them has indeed been greater than he knew, for his assassination has angered the peasants against the communists and made impossible, for the moment at any rate, the rising against the present régime which seemed inevitable three months ago.

It has been claimed that the communist peril in Bulgaria was drummed up by Zankoff in the hope of securing a remission of certain disarmament and reparation provisions of the peace settlement. That was not the impression I received in Sofia. The government naturally seized on the communist propaganda to buttress up their argument that Bulgaria needs to be allowed a larger army to maintain domestic order. But they did not create that propaganda; nor could they control it, until the murder of Alexandroff threw Moscow and all its works into disfavor.

Thanks to skilful representation at Angora, Bulgaria has been able to arrange better relations with her late allies the Turks than have most of the other states of southeast Europe. When she deals with Greece, however, she has always before her the hope that ere long the Powers who shut her off from the Aegean

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may relent and restore to her a port, or at least fulfil their undertaking to secure her proper railway egress to the Aegean. Any transfer of territory would of course be done at the expense of Greece, who now holds Western Thrace. No love is therefore wasted between Sofia and Athens, and negotiations which on several occasions have been begun for Bulgaria to enjoy commercial rights in some Aegean port (for example Kavalla or Dedeagach) similar to those enjoyed by Jugoslavia at Saloniki, have proved abortive.

Bulgaria's rôle now must be one of peace. Her neighbors have not forgotten the events that began that night in 1913 when the Bulgarian troops turned suddenly on their Serbian allies in the hope of annexing by force of arms the territorial prizes accruing from the Balkan War which had proved difficult to secure by negotiation; nor have they forgotten the heart-breaking negotiations of 1915 and 1916 between Sofia and London and Paris, and their own frantic efforts to make the gullible British and French agents realize that Tsar Ferdinand, for all his polite declarations, had already determined to cast in Bulgaria's lot with the Turks and the Central Empires. If Bulgaria's neighbors are wrong in thinking of the Zankoff Government as merely a stalking horse for a revived and aggressive Bulgarian nationalism they can only be shown their error by an exhibition on Bulgaria's part of unceasing sincerity and peacefulness. That is Bulgaria's retribution for having guessed wrong in the days when the lines were drawn in Europe and two great groups of powers were bidding against each other for her favor.

ALBANIA

Whatever sense of national unity pervades the inhabitants of the rocky mountains, low-lying coastal marshes and baked river beds of Albania is sprung from the necessity of their struggling continually to keep out invaders who would annex this or that district, rather than from strong racial, religious or cultural bonds. In Albania such bonds are indeed far from strong (apart from that of language, which is however spoken in a variety of dialects), as is shown by the wars between tribes and sects which are usually in progress whenever some external danger does not compel them momentarily to close their ranks. The history of the Albanian tribes since they ceased to be under Turkish rule does indeed seem to authorize them to look on every neighbor

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as a potential enemy and on the promises of the chancelleries of the Great Powers as worthless even before uttered. Nevertheless, it is this feeling of insecurity which in part at least is responsible for their remaining a nation in even the rather limited sense which is true at present.

At the instance of Austria, Albania was given independent statehood at the London Conference of 1913, after the First Balkan War. There followed the phantom reign of William of Wied, who fled the country in September, 1914, when the Powers who had placed him on his uneasy throne found more important things to occupy them than the disputes of the Albanian clans. After the war the Albanian delegates who appeared at Paris secured promises for the continued territorial integrity of their country. This was no mean feat. In the north the Jugoslavs claimed Scutari, which would furnish a convenient Adriatic terminus for a railway from Old Serbia; in the south Greece claimed Northern Epirus, and gave the claim a showing of plausibility by putting down as Greeks the inhabitants of that district who belong to the Greek Orthodox Church; and Italy had landed troops at Valona and pressed her occupation inland over a wide radius. In 1920 the Italian troops were forced to withdraw from all except Valona proper, after several unfortunate engagements with the Albanian tribesmen. But although since that time Albania's territorial integrity has been maintained, there have been rumors of various hostile designs in which Italy has usually been credited with playing the leading rôle. There is ground for believing, for example, that about a year ago Mussolini reopened with Jugoslavia the proposal to divide Albania along the lines discussed at Paris (a proposal then rejected by Jugoslavia), except that under the new plan Greece (who has awakened Italian dislike as a probable trade competitor in the Levant) was not to profit from the division. Simultaneously Mussolini was to give his blessing to



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the seizure of Saloniki by Jugoslavia, a proceeding which would leave Greece in quite a minor position. This summer M. Nintchitch, the Jugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave me explicit assurances that no such projects were being entertained by his government, and that the present arrangement in Saloniki is satisfactory. All reasonable Jugoslav statesmen, in fact, were utterly opposed to the Mussolini scheme, which almost surely would have resulted in a general outburst of fighting throughout the Danubian and Balkan countries. In this stand they doubtless had the heartfelt support of their Czechoslovak colleagues. The League of Nations, of which Albania is a member, may also be credited with having acted as a deterrent factor. The tale of the proposal is recorded here more as a reminder of the temptations which would be offered by a continuation of Albania's present uncertain and disturbed condition than as the basis of an attack on the policy of either Italy or Jugoslavia.

As a matter of fact, a case for the partition of Albania has been made out by a number of observers, not all of whom are propagandists for one or other of the possible beneficiary states. In 1917 Dr. Rizoff, then Bulgarian Minister at Berlin, published an argument for assigning southern Albania to Greece, northeastern Albania to Serbia, and constituting central Albania, which is chiefly Mohammedan, into a neutral autonomous region. Others have favored a continuation of Albanian independence in the form of a tribal confederation. Advocates of this plan foresee a continued reluctance on the part of the various Albanian tribes to submit to the authority of a central government at Tirana, and draw a parallel, which is hardly justified by the facts, between the success of the Swiss Confederation and the success which they hope would attend the introduction of a similar arrangement in Albania. The revolution of last summer indicated how unstable things are at present in Albania. This condition does not suit the wishes of England and France, who would dislike intensely to lose the influence which they at present exercise in Balkan politics on account of their indirect control over Albania's future, any more than it pleases Jugoslavia and Greece, who profess to see in Albanian disorders a constant threat to their own security and the integrity of their frontiers. A way to avoid partition (which would perpetuate the old disputes and probably eventually bring war) might be found in the incorporation of Albania in the federation between Jugoslavia

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and Bulgaria which some day, it is to be hoped, will solve the chief problem of the Balkans.

GREECE

The Greek people have had a difficult time deciding under what form of government they wish to live. They have now chosen that Greece is to be a republic, and there is no indication that they will again change their minds.

The dispute between royalists and republicans has marred the domestic peace of Greece and wrecked her international policy ever since the 1915 Venizelist coup d'état which drove King Constantine into exile, established Venizelos at Athens, and in due time led to his appearance at the Paris Peace Conference as Greece's accredited representative. In Paris Venizelos became the most popular of any of the delegates from the smaller states, and proved the most successfully acquisitive of them all. Not even an outline can be given here of the intrigues which led Constantine (following the political defeat of Venizelos late in 1920) to undertake a new war with Turkey in the effort to enforce the execution of the Treaty of Sèvres. The plebiscite which restored Constantine to the throne, though it undoubtedly registered the will of the Greek people at that time, was never accepted by Britain and France, nor by the United States. A military catastrophe followed the desertion of Greece by the same European statesmen who had urged her into the adventure in Asia Minor. Constantine was again expelled, this time for good, and died in Palermo, January 11, 1923. George, who became King on his father's abdication, was tolerated for a time, but on December 19 quit Athens "on leave of absence" at the demand of the Officers' Union. The wisdom of his action was confirmed at the national plebiscite on April 13, 1924, as a result of which Greece definitely became a republic. Venizelos, for his part, seems to have lost less of his

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hold on the affections of Greece than seemed likely immediately after his signature of the Treaty of Lausanne, which swept away much of the grandiose Greater Hellas which he had constructed at Paris, and though he found he had not the physical strength to retain the personal direction of the government his friends are still in the saddle at Athens, with every prospect of remaining there.

As might be expected, these political convulsions, most of them accompanied by fighting and assassinations, and one of them by a wholesale "execution" of former royalist cabinet officers, have left their mark in Greece today. There are signs, however, that the blood feuds of the past few years are gradually being forgotten and that the country is getting forward towards some degree of political stability and strength. No little credit for this is to be given certain of the more moderate adherents of the former Glücksburg dynasty, who are working quietly to secure the whole-hearted acceptance of the present régime by all the former monarchists. They know that only through seas of blood could they bring back King George (for whom, in any case, they have little personal enthusiasm), and that even if they succeeded Greece would meanwhile have vanished.

Paradoxically enough, progress is being more helped than hindered by the all but overwhelming influx of refugees from Asia Minor. For the moment, it is true, food is expensive, housing in the cities is very short, social conditions are upset, and the number of those needing state aid (food, medicine, seed, implements, etc.) lays a terrific burden on the resources of the government; but to compensate for this many sparsely populated districts are being settled with hard-working agricultural colonists, and industries which the Greeks of Asia Minor used to carry on at great profit in their old homes have been transferred to Greece proper. Commercial activity is meanwhile increasing. The Greeks have always been great traders. Before the war the Greek merchant marine totaled about a million tons. War losses cut the tonnage to less than a third of that figure, but today it again reaches nearly a million tons and the Piraeus has become the third mercantile port of the Mediterranean, ranking only after Marseilles and Genoa. The plans for enlarging the port at the Piraeus were shown me last summer. When I heard that a million passengers had been disembarked there during the preceding twelve months, and when I compared its animation with the all but deserted aspect of Constantinople and

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Smyrna, I realized its great future and that if the Turks hope ever to restore their ports so that they can again compete for the Levantine trade they will have to change very radically their present system of red tape, discrimination and interminable delay.

The refugees have brought with them, in addition both to their agricultural and manufacturing arts and their demands for physical relief, a social problem which last summer assumed threatening proportions. Among them there is a considerable radical element, chiefly Armenian and Circassian, which naturally is looked upon with little favor by the already distracted Greek authorities. The refugees have settled mainly in and about Saloniki, the crowded cities and arid hills of Old Greece promising less of a reward for their toil than the war-worn but fertile plains of Western Thrace and Macedonia. Those were precisely the regions where the Greek Government least wanted radicals to show themselves, and after the discovery of several intrigues between refugees and communist Macedonian leaders they began shipping all suspects down to the Peloponnesus where they could not cause trouble. It seemed ruthless to uproot several thousand Armenians and others who had just commenced cultivating their new Macedonian holdings, and transplant them to still a new scene, but in view of the magnitude of the whole refugee problem and the difficulties of the Greek position in all the lands north of the Aegean the Greek Government cannot be blamed for acting more arbitrarily and heartlessly than might be considered proper in normal times. At any rate, America, despite her magnificent private charity, is not in a position to throw the first stone.

The friction developed between Greece and Turkey over the exchange of populations provided for in the Treaty of Lausanne has been less than anticipated. The Mixed Commission has been defied on several occasions by Mustapha Kemal; in particular, their decision that Greeks living in Constantinople before October 30, 1918, were not subject to the exchange arrangement and could not be expelled has not been accepted by the Turks, who in October proceeded to the promiscuous arrest of all Greeks found in Constantinople and stated that they intended to deport them to Greece forthwith. In view of the protests of the Mixed Commission, however, and following the appeal of the Greek Government to the League of Nations,

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numbers of the arrested Greeks were released and the dispute now seems in way of being settled without violence and without a break in Graeco-Turkish relations. A hopeful note has recently been introduced into these relations by the commencement of informal discussions between the two governments regarding the possibility of arranging a "naval holiday." A wholesome desire to cultivate better relations with Turkey is noticeable in Athens, and if the exchange of populations can be carried through without too much bad feeling there might really be a chance for the naval proposal, in which the influence of M. Politis is discernible.

CONCLUSION

The Balkan equilibrium, being altogether physical, is very sensitive. It is not based on moral factors; live and let live has never been a Balkan rule. To attain the happy condition where each recognizes his neighbor's rights the passage of time is necessary,—time, bringing not only new generations who have not suffered outrageously in the violence of recent years, but also better economic conditions, more general prosperity, more general education. It is far from a forlornly hopeless outlook. The Balkans are not hopeless. Following five centuries of subjugation the Balkan peoples have had only half a century of freedom for experiment in nationhood,—a half-century, too, which has been distracted by the plots and counter-plots of foreign statesmen who professed altruistic friendship but who saw in the lesser European states merely useful pawns in a larger game. If the last fifty years of almost unbroken Balkan war could now be crowned with even ten years of real peace a new picture would not be slow to appear on the old botched and disreputable canvas. It is encouraging that today there seems less likelihood of new armed conflict than at any time since the armistice.

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BRITAIN'S RECOGNITION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

By George A. B. Dewar

DURING the last three years I have been approached by various people who have first professed complete agreement with what I have written in *The Nineteenth Century* (of which I became Editor in 1919) on the subject of the recognition of the Soviet Government by Great Britain,—and who have then asked me to print articles by themselves favoring traffic with and recognition of the Soviet Government! For this grotesque line, namely, hatred of Bolshevism combined with an eager desire to enter into friendly relations at once with Bolshevism, they have offered various arguments which are worth mentioning because, judging by public speeches in this country and by articles in many popular newspapers, they are by no means peculiar to a few propagandists; on the contrary, they are common-form among many thousands of people today in Great Britain. One of their explanations is in effect: "We must have World Peace or civilization will perish. If we do not adopt a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Government and go in with it there will soon be another World War, and then we shall all be destroyed." This is the popular nonsense known as pessimism. There is of course not the least likelihood of another World War on the scale of 1914–18 for at least some decades to come. Any great leader of armies, indeed any sane civilian who has thought at all about the matter, will, I think agree with this. As to civilization or the human race perishing, there was far more likelihood of this a hundred, five hundred, a thousand years ago, when the world's population was small, when there was frequent and furious internecine warfare, and when civilization—its material side at least—was minute compared with what it is today.

But suppose another war on a huge scale is threatened, how can it be averted by recognizing and patching up treaties with a Power which makes not the least secret—and the frankness of the actual Soviet leaders we must admit—of its desire and intention to smash our whole system of civilization, including Christianity, which it despises as hypocrisy and rubbish? Can

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any thoughtful man honestly believe that by eagerly trading with or assisting in any manner an evil Power such as this we shall end war and assist Christianity? "Turn the left cheek to the smiter"—though I confess with shame I have never myself been able to do it, I perceive in that one of the noblest directions ever given to mankind. But Christ did not mean thereby, as too many of our public performers appear to think: "Defend and assist a Power which proclaims fiercely and frankly its intention to sweep away the whole doctrine of Christianity as a monstrous imposture." To assist and fraternize with the Bolshevists, and to recognize their Government, for the sake of peace and in the name of Christianity, is to sink very near the Bolshevist level in morality; whilst it is obviously to sink below the Bolshevist level in courage.

Another quite different argument for recognizing the Soviet Government is that it should be done for the sake of the security of the British Empire. They are plotting in the East and elsewhere to break up our Empire, and unless we are diplomatically in touch with their Government we shall have very great difficulty in discovering and defeating their evil designs. I wonder whether those who urge this would have been in favor of remaining diplomatically in touch with Germany during the war, in order to discover as far as possible and defeat her designs, could such an ingenious arrangement have been made.

A third argument for going in with the Bolshevists is very common and popular in Great Britain today, and is advanced unblushingly by various members of our political parties. I feel that it is, whether financially sound or not, by far the most debasing of all: namely, that we must go in with the Bolshevists, traffic freely and speedily with them, no matter what their crimes and plots may be, because, if we do not, we shall lose money, and other nations who do go in with them will make money at our expense. I may be asked at this point: "Then what do you think of the argument of large numbers of more or less anti-Bolshevists who oppose treaties and traffic with the Soviet Government simply on the ground that it will not help us economically, and that we should not gain but lose money thereby?" I do not think that, from a moral standpoint, there is much, if anything, to choose between these two schools. I dare say the second one is much better informed economically than the first, much shrewder financially. But this is a matter

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which ought not to be dealt with and decided on from the £.s.d. standpoint. Suppose in August, 1914, this country, which was pledged to stand by Belgium in case she was invaded, had at the last moment come to the conclusion that it would be wiser economically and financially to stand aside and see what happened. I dare say there are people who incline to the belief that if we had not intervened we might today be a more prosperous nation, with far less unemployment, and very likely driving a fine trade with Germany, if not with Austria. And it may be quite arguable that therein they are correct. But by adopting such a policy we should have acted in a disgraceful manner, if the German and Austrian propagandists who have lately been showering their leaflets and articles on the editors of English newspapers and reviews will pardon me for saying so. We should not in the least degree have helped by such a policy to "end war on earth." We should have completely sacrificed our national honor. We should have retarded, not forwarded, civilization; which is exactly what we are doing today by recognizing the Bolshevists and making or trying to make lucrative financial arrangements with them.

I am not, of course, preaching against or deriding commercialism and finance. That would be foolish and thoughtless; and, moreover, hypocritical, as are many of the sermons and sneers in which the "recognizers" and allies of the Soviet Government indulge. I only wish to point out that there are a few great national questions which must be decided on other grounds than those of commerce and finance, that is, if we adhere to such things as national honor. If the question of recognizing and befriending Bolshevism is not one of these, then to profess a belief in national honor is purely hypocritical.

Contrast now the attitude and policy of Great Britain towards the Bolshevists with the attitude and policy of the United States.

Very little is uttered aloud or printed on this subject today in my country. Comparisons naturally are odious, both to the out-and-out supporters of the recognition of the Soviet Government and to the half-and-half supporters. I shall take the opportunity to touch on this matter, however, because the policy of the United States strikes me as by far the most intellectual, the most progressive, and the noblest that has been taken by any nation. It strikes me as the most upright, the most logical, and, as far as concerns Christianity and the true cause of

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civilization, the soundest decision in regard to any grave problem which a great nation has taken since 1918.

Why has America taken this line? There are so-called critics of America in this country who, in reply to this question, will say with a sneer: "Why, of course, because she does not see her way to make any money to speak of out of Russia just now. America, as we all know, is out for money." Now for many years I confess I believed the story that America was nothing if not intent on making money, that it was her supreme aim and object in life. I accepted this common-form statement. The word "dollar" helped somehow to dupe me. But during the war I began to have my doubts; and since then, quite apart from this Russian question, I have used my own intelligence instead of accepting jabber as fact, and I have come to the conclusion that the whole of this talk about America being more devoted to money than Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Germany, or any other nation is nonsense.

I have no doubt that America does perceive that, apart altogether from the questions of right and wrong, to recognize and traffic with the present Soviet tyranny would be commercially useless. But it was not that which induced President Wilson to take in 1919 the firm and straight line he did towards the Bolshevists; the line which has been taken by his successors, and by the nation as a whole. In his famous note in 1919 he said: "In the view of this Government there cannot be any common ground upon which it can stand with a Power whose conceptions of international relations are so entirely alien to its own, so utterly repugnant to its moral sense. There can be no mutual confidence or trust, no respect even, if pledges are to be given and agreements made with a cynical repudiation of their obligations already in the mind of one of the parties. We cannot recognize, hold relations with, or give friendly receptions to the agents of a Government which is determined and bound to conspire against our institutions, whose diplomats will be the agitators of dangerous revolt, whose spokesmen say that they sign agreements with no intention of keeping them."

America's service to civilization in the war was immense. The war could not have been won, I doubt whether it could have even been drawn, without her aid. We gladly availed ourselves of it. But when that peril to human progress had passed, and the scarcely less formidable one of the Soviet tyranny

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and its schemes of revolution throughout the world took its place, we paid no attention to America's policy. Hence our disgraceful recognition of the Soviet, and the plight we find ourselves in today.

The Ponsonby Treaty, directly it was announced, was attacked and jeered at as a "fake" by the larger section of the Liberal Party, and half defended half attacked by the other and smaller section. Virtually the whole of the Conservative Party attacked it, including those Conservatives who had protested a little against the recognition, but had not seen their way even to divide the House of Commons over it, and those who had approved of the recognition as a wise step economically. I do not perceive much to choose between any of those four sections. I may be told that the reason why the Conservatives did not, after their mild little protest in the House of Commons, challenge a division over the recognition proposal early in the year was because they knew they would be defeated by a large majority, the Labor Party and the Liberal Party being absolutely agreed in the matter. That is so. They would have been defeated and the recognition would have been arranged just the same. But it is a feeble excuse. Conservative, Liberal and Labor members constantly challenge a division over all manner of political questions, knowing perfectly well beforehand that they will be defeated. They regard such divisions as of great importance; and if honor counts in party politics, obviously many a division over a great question of right and wrong is essential. Honor was overlooked in regard to the recognition proposal.

What attitude in this matter would a great Liberal statesman like Gladstone have taken, or a bold Conservative like Randolph Churchill? My impression is that both would have challenged a division over the recognition, instead of waiting some months to expostulate loudly over the natural result of the recognition—the so-called "fake" treaty. I noticed that Randolph Churchill's son, in a speech at the end of September, declared that Gladstone would have entirely condemned the Soviet Government, and have declined to have any relations with it. I feel sure in any case Gladstone would not have loudly applauded the recognition, and then a little later have scathingly condemned its natural result, the Treaty. In a letter to me dated November 13, 1896, W. H. Gladstone remarked: "I entered the House of Commons in 1832. 1. The moral

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standard of legislation has been raised; 2. that of personal conduct lowered. . . ." I wonder what Gladstone's opinion would have been as to the raising or lowering of the moral standard of legislation in 1924 as compared with 1832.

The truth is that those who blessed the recognition as a wise and humane step and then loudly condemned the Treaty as a wicked "fake" are about as logical as they would have been had they condemned the recognition and soon afterwards blessed the Treaty. I am not partial to the Socialist and Communist Parties—though I have met honest and intelligent Socialists and liked them—but I admit that over this Bolshevist question they have at any rate been bolder and more logical than a great number of their opponents and half-opponents.

What will be the comment of a number of party politicians in Great Britain on what I have stated in this article? It will largely be: "The fellow is queer. He goes in for sentiment. And he is not up-to-date. Moreover he knows absolutely nothing about economics." Virtually the same criticism is passed on all people in this country who oppose having friendly relations and traffic with a Power which proclaims its intention of smashing civilization. Well, I do believe in sentiment in such a matter as this. Sentiment—a fact overlooked by people here who are so fond of misusing and spoiling words—is derived from the Latin word *sentio*, "I feel," and feeling is very closely related with thought in such matters.

As to up-to-date that is another matter. Americans are often good-naturedly accused in this country of using multitudes of slang words and expressions. I doubt, however, whether America or any other country could vie with England at the present time in the use of the expression up-to-date. Used in relation to material necessities and conveniences there appears to be some intelligence or reason in "stunting" the expression up-to-date. By up-to-date boots, hats or tobacco, is implied, and often no doubt correctly, the most serviceable and desirable necessaries of everyday life. So far, then, there is no harm in up-to-date "stunts." They at least help the masses who might not know the best goods without some such means.

But when the up-to-date cry and the "stunt" method are applied to, let us say, literature, morality, religion, education, politics home and foreign, the result in Great Britain is thoroughly bad. The masses are not in the least degree helped. On

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the contrary they are blinded and made fools of. They are induced often to change their views of great and urgent problems of civilization without thinking them out, or trying to think them out: at the most they are helped to chatter and giggle. The stunt-monger, for example, will tell you today that to refer with disapproval to the recognition of the Soviet is not to be up-to-date. That view, he proclaims, is all over and done with —only old Reactionists and Die-hards are today in favor of not getting in with the Soviet Government. But unless he is a frank Communist—and neither the Communists nor the Socialists in Great Britain are such culprits in regard to this debasing up-to-date folly as is the popular "stunter"—he allows you to scream and wring your hands over the proposal to make a loan to the Soviet. You will not be up-to-date by helping the Soviet commercially—but you will be splendidly up-to-date by recognizing and going in with it. Don't mind how many tens of thousands of people the Bolshevists have tortured and killed during the last few years, or are torturing and preparing to kill today. Overlook the fact that they announce their intention of destroying our system of civilization and Christianity. Never mind all that—or you will be a mere Reactionist, Die-hard, or antiquated Tory or Liberal. Instead, be an up-to-date progressive person, and (if you fancy the idea) be a Christian, by forgeting all about that and by concentrating instead on the question of what we can "scoop" out of our new friend the Soviet Government.

In over thirty years' experience of politics in Great Britain I have never known the average smart talker, writer and performer on so low a level of intelligence as he is at present. It is this that no doubt largely accounts for the debasing and foolish plight we find ourselves in today in regard to the Soviet Government.

Suppose in this matter, which for all European Powers is clearly the most urgent problem since the close of the war, America had sunk to our level in courage and intellect, would she today be in her present much better and more promising condition? I doubt if she would. When eventually we recover our sanity and manhood and when the Bolshevist peril ends—and not being what is termed a pessimist I incline to believe both these things will happen after we have received our punishment —we shall perceive and acknowledge the sterling service of America, not to herself alone, but to mankind.

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EGYPT, THE SUDAN AND THE NILE

By Pierre Crabitès

GENERAL GORDON, whilst on his fateful way to Egypt, on January 22, 1884, sent an official memorandum to Lord Granville in which the following passage occurs: "The Sudan is a useless possession, ever was so, and ever will be so. . . . I think Her Majesty's Government are fully justified in recommending the evacuation." The martyr of Khartum saw the Sudan through the spectacles of his generation. He surveyed its topography in the light of the past. To his mind the immense expanse which he beheld was but a channel through which the Nile carries its life-giving waters to the land of Egypt. He did not foresee that this "useless possession" might some day refuse to be merely an aqueduct. It never dawned upon him that in 1924 it might lay claim to the prerogatives of a riparian proprietor.

Every precedent justified the attitude of General Gordon. Egypt was the daughter of the Nile; the Sudan was her handmaid. The stream was more than the dower of the Pharoah's child; it was her birthright. The Sudan was born in bondage and knew no heritage. Such was the principle tacitly admitted when Tewfik, the Khedive of Egypt, in June, 1882, welcomed the arrival of the British Army of Occupation.

"At that time," writes Lord Cromer, "the nominal authority of the Khedive extended (in the Sudan) over an area stretching from Wadi Halfa on the north to the Equator on the south, a distance of about 1,300 miles, and from Massowah on the east to the western limits of the Darfour province on the west, a distance of about 1,300 miles—that is to say, he ruled, or attempted to rule, over a territory twice as big as Germany and France together. The worst forms of misgovernment existed over this vast tract of country. . . . The rich soil on the banks of the river, which had a few years since been highly cultivated, was abandoned. There was not a dog to howl for a lost master. Industry had vanished; oppression had driven the inhabitants from the soil. . . . The entire country was leased out to piratical slave-hunters, under the name of traders, by the Khartum Government."

EDITORIAL NOTE: This article was written by Judge Crabitès and accepted by FOREIGN AFFAIRS before the assassination of Sir Lee Stack on November 19.

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There is a tradition in Islam that some time there is to appear on earth a Mahdi,[1] upon whose coming the world will be converted to the Muslim faith. In August, 1881, a man named Mohammed Ahmad proclaimed to the Sudanese, who in the north are all Mohammedans, that he was the Mahdi whom they were expecting. He was of their flesh and blood. Born amongst them, he had been apprenticed to his uncle, a boat-builder at Sennar, but early in life he entered a religious school at Khartum. His mission, as explained in his various proclamations, was to gain over the Sudan to his cause, then to march against Egypt, overthrow the heretical Turks, and convert the whole world.

Notwithstanding the credulity and ignorance of the people thus appealed to, it is probable that the Mahdi would have met with no success had not the prevailing discontent predisposed the inhabitants against the Egyptian Government. The Khedivial authorities, however, were so universally abhorred that the masses flocked to the standard of Mohammed Ahmad. It soon became apparent that Cairo had to deal with a formidable rebellion, the suppression of which would tax to the utmost the military and financial resources of Egypt.

The Khedive had no army worthy of the name. His coffers were empty. The situation was so ominous that on November 19, 1883, Lord Cromer, then Sir Evelyn Baring, despatched a cablegram to the British Foreign Office which the Maker of Modern Egypt characterizes as "largely responsible for initiating the policy of withdrawing from the Sudan." Circumstances, however, interfered with the immediate execution of this decision, and on January 16, 1884, a telegram was sent to London to the effect that the "Egyptian Government would feel greatly obliged if Her Majesty's Government would select a well qualified British officer to go to Khartum instead of the War Minister. He would be given full powers, both civil and military, to conduct the retreat." Gordon was chosen. He died at his post of duty when Khartum fell. Thereafter "the policy of withdrawing from the Sudan and adhering to a strictly defensive attitude on the Egyptian frontier was steadily maintained for some years."

Those in authority at London and Cairo, nevertheless, had no idea of definitely abandoning the Sudan. Britons are not

[1] The literal meaning of the word "Mahdi" is one who is "conducted in the right path." The idea conveyed is in effect not widely different from the Jewish conception of a Messiah.

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moulded in such a frame. The popular sentiment among them found expression in the feeling that "Gordon must be avenged." But before any thought of reconquest could be entertained two conditions had to be fulfilled. In the first place, the Egyptian army had to be rendered efficient. In the second place, not only had the solvency of the Egyptian Treasury to be assured, but funds had to be provided for the extraordinary expenditure which the assumption of an offensive would necessarily involve. It took time to accomplish these results, but on September 2, 1898, the battle of Omdurman was fought and the power of the Khalifa, the successor of the Mahdi, crushed.

The Sudan having been reconquered, the question of the future political status of the country naturally forced itself to the fore. The campaign had been carried on in the name of the Khedive. British and Egyptian blood had been shed and British and Egyptian money expended. It was therefore considered but proper that the new administration should be typical of this same spirit of coöperation. But there was still another difficulty to be faced. It sprang from that network of treaties known as the Capitulations and which had hampered the freedom of action of the Khedivial Government.

It was laid down in the preamble of the agreement entered into between London and Cairo that it was desirable "to give effect to the claims which have accrued to Her Britannic Majesty's Government by right of conquest, to share in the present settlement and future working and development" of the legislative and administrative systems of the Sudan. The text of the Treaty provides that:

(a) the British and Egyptian flags should be used throughout the Sudan; (b) the Supreme military and civil command should be vested in one officer, termed "the Governor-General of the Sudan," and to be appointed by a Khedivial decree on the recommendation of the British Government; (c) proclamations of the Governor-General should have the force of law; (d) the jurisdiction of the Egyptian Mixed Tribunals should "not extend to or be recognized for any purposes whatsoever, in any part of the Sudan"; and (e) no foreign Consuls should be allowed to reside in the country without previous consent of the British Government.

This agreement is still in force. It created a partnership between England and Egypt for the administration of the Sudan

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and has made of that country an asset of the partnership. This extension of England's sphere of influence in Africa flowed logically from her Egyptian commitments. This branching out of Egypt was but a natural expansion. The two High Contracting Parties had like interests and the partnership worked out admirably as long as Egypt submitted complacently to the presence in Egypt of the British Army of Occupation.

Today, matters have entered a new phase. The world of 1924 is not the world of 1898, and Egypt now aspires to absolute independence. England, accordingly, on February 28, 1922, abolished, in principle, her Egyptian Protectorate. The Proclamation which announced this unilateral decision set forth, however, that certain questions should form the subject matter of an agreement between England and Egypt. The Anglo-Egyptian partnership in respect of the Sudan is one of the points thus reserved for subsequent adjustment. Accredited representatives of the two governments have not met, as yet, to discuss these matters. (The recent conversations between Ramsay MacDonald and Zaglul Pasha were of a preliminary nature, intended merely to prepare the way for an official meeting of delegates duly appointed by the two governments.) It is believed that the ultimate fate of the Sudan, as such, will not prove an insuperable barrier. The Sudan, on the other hand, as the concrete expression of Nile Waterway rights presents an issue which merits careful analysis.

The statement which has just been made with reference to the final lot of the Sudan, considered as a territory and not as the channel through which the Nile flows before it enters Egypt, is based upon repeated unequivocal public declarations made by responsible British statesmen that England will never abandon the Sudanese. Since the armistice Great Britain has vacillated with regard to her Egyptian policy. Upon one point, however, she has remained adamant and consistent, and that is that she will not abandon the Sudanese. The very contortions of British declarations in respect of all other Egyptian questions serve to emphasize that Britain is determined to remain in the Sudan.

Properly to understand the water problem of the Nile Valley it is well to begin by recalling that, though the political boundaries of Egypt include within them a vast extent of territory, by far the greater part of it is desert, lying generally at a much higher level than the river.

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The small and real Egypt may be literally described as "the river, which is Egypt," meaning the land formed by the deposit of the silt-laden annual flood. The main part of this land is the Delta, or Lower Egypt, which is triangular in shape. Its apex is at Cairo and its base on the sea. Its area is about 4,800,000 feddans, of which 3,000,000 feddans are cultivated.[2] In the reaches from Cairo southwards to the Sudanese frontier the river runs in a broad cleft in the North African plateau, and has deposited there wide berms of alluvial soil covering about 2,500,000 feddans, of which 2,200,000 are now cultivated. Thus the combined area of all of the Nile lands of Egypt totals about 7,300,000 feddans, of which about 5,200,000 are under cultivation. Of the arable lands not yet utilized, 200,000 feddans in the lake zone of Lower Egypt should be reserved for pisciculture. This therefore reduces to 1,900,000 feddans the maximum increase of cultivation in Egypt.

Rain plays no part in the agricultural life of Egypt. It seldom rains. Irrigation from the Nile was thus introduced at an early date. The summer supply of water in that river is insufficient for the adequate irrigation of the cultivated lands at present dependent on it. Egypt is a growing country. The increase in population today is at the rate of 200,000 souls per annum. Egypt is exclusively an agricultural country. There is, therefore, an insistent demand for expansion of cultivation into new areas now lying fallow for want of water.

Further control of the river is accordingly now urgently required both to prevent the heavy loss that occurs practically every year owing to the unavoidable restriction of crops, and also to provide additional water for development.

All authorities are agreed that the construction of the new reservoir thus so urgently required cannot be made upon Egyptian soil. The Aswan dam has already been built near the southern boundary of Egypt. Engineering science must, therefore, seek a site beyond the Egyptian frontiers. The commission of experts appointed in 1920 to inquire into this matter unanimously reported that "it is desirable, if not essential, that the reservoir should be as near Egypt as possible; but it cannot be constructed north of Khartum because it would be necessary to

[2] Egyptian official reports speak of feddans and not of acres. A feddan is practically of the same dimensions as an acre. The figures given here and in the next two paragraphs are taken from "Nile Control," issued by the Ministry of Public Works, Egypt, Government Press, Cairo, 1920, Vol. I, p. 1.

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commence filling the reservoir before the end of the flood season, because Aswan already takes practically all the flood water which is free from silt, and it would rapidly silt up owing to the heavy silt contents of the Blue Nile in flood."[3]

Egypt, therefore, cannot exist without drawing water from a river which rises far beyond her borders. Her sorry plight is made more acute by the fact that no possibility of expansion is available without building reservoirs beyond her frontiers. Manifestly such works may not be carried out unless the neighboring power consent. It follows that, when all is said and done, the future of Egypt depends upon the solution which will be given to the question of the Sudan.

Admitting, however, that the Sudan Government agree to allow Egypt to share in such waters as may be stored in the reservoirs built upon Sudan territory, the problem is not yet solved.

Egypt today needs annually about 34,000 million cubic meters of water for the adequate fertilization of her crops, while the experts appointed by the Egyptian Government to inquire into the Nile Projects agreed in putting her eventual requirements at 58,000 million cubic meters per annum. Now, an examination of the tables published by the Ministry of Public Works shows that in the year 1913–14 the aggregate discharge at Aswan, downstream of the Dam, was 41,000.[4] This supply, while considerably short of the ultimate requirements of Egypt, furnished a nominal excess of 7,000 over the present consumption of 34,000. The conditions created by this relative scarcity of water, however, were such that Sir Murdoch Macdonald, the Adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works, writes that in 1913–14 "it is said some reduction took place in the normal quantity of cotton produced. . . . There was, however, practically complete suppression of the average 200,000 feddans of rice as this crop was reduced to 25,000." When it is borne in mind that rice plays an important part in the food supply of the Egyptian, the practically total suppression of the Egyptian rice crop of 1913–14 means that a margin of 7,000 million of cubic meters is drawing things too closely for safety.

It may be argued, however, that the 1913–14 discharge was

[3] Report of the Nile Projects Commission. Printed with the authority of the Egyptian Government, Cairo, 1920, page 53.

[4] The water discharge figures herein set forth are all in millions of cubic meters.

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the lowest during the last fifty years. The table before cited refers to 1902–03 and 1888–89 as "ordinary low years." The figures given are 67,000 and 68,000 respectively, and therefore afforded but a surplus of 9,000 and 10,000 over the eventual requirements of Egypt. If in 1913–14, when there was an apparent margin of safety of 20 percent, there was "practically complete suppression of the average 200,000 feddans of rice," it is clear that when Egypt shall have had all of her 7,100,000 feddans under cultivation, "ordinary low years" will leave but a margin of safety of 15 percent and therefore disastrously affect the food supply of the Egyptians. The contention may be advanced that over-year storage may be provided to meet the deficiency of a given low year and that it is not one year but the sequence of years which presents the governing conditions. If this principle be applied to the years 1913–14, 1914–15, and 1915–16, it is found that the aggregate flow from these three years (without eliminating any loss through evaporation) amounts to 190,000. The supply distributed over three years fixes, in theory, an average of 63,000 per annum. In other words, it creates a nominal surplus of less than 9 percent over Egypt's ultimate requirements.

These figures forget all about the Sudanese, that the Nile traverses their territory, that they have vast areas which require irrigation and that the Egyptians cannot get another drop of Nile water without making use of reservoirs erected in the Sudan.

Modern Sudan knew nothing of irrigation until 1903. It was then proposed to undertake experiments to test the feasibility of producing by irrigation exportable crops such as wheat, cotton, sugar, etc. It was foreseen that to obtain a favorable result it might be necessary to use summer water.

The Anglo-Egyptian partnership which then and now operates the Sudan did not act as an ordinary riparian proprietor would have done. It did not proceed without first considering the interests of Egypt. "As the available supply was strictly limited," writes Sir Murdoch Macdonald, the Adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works, "an agreement was reached between the Sudan and Egyptian Governments provisionally fixing the Sudan areas which could draw summer water at 10,000 feddans." When the Aswan dam was heightened, the Sudan summer area was increased to 20,000. In a footnote to a table giving the approximate present and future requirements of cultivation, Sir Murdoch Macdonald is, therefore, able to say

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that the present-day necessities of the Sudan are negligible.

It is accordingly clear that the Nile has always been looked upon both by Egypt and the Sudan as Egypt's river. As long as a community of interests obtained, as long as England occupied Egypt and was but a joint partner in the administration of the Sudan, this attitude may readily be understood. It was not that Britain loved the Sudan less; it was that she loved Egypt more.

Now that the British Protectorate over Egypt has been withdrawn and that England proposes to retire from that country but to remain in the Sudan, the matter of the allocation of the waters of the Nile enters a new phase. A partnership is a moral person having a legal existence which is separate and distinct from that of the partners. If and when England leaves Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian partners will begin to have conflicting interests in the Sudan. When gentlemen fall out others profit. Here, when partners disagree the Sudanese will profit.

It has already been pointed out that the Sudan covers more territory than Germany and France together. A part of this area enjoys a satisfactory rainfall. But there are large stretches of excellent arable lands which cannot be cultivated without irrigation. This acreage, at all events, approaches in extent the 7,100,000 feddans which constitute the Egypt of the fellah. Certain British syndicates have already learned of the productive quality of the soil of the Sudan, and plans are now under way whereby 300,000 feddans will be developed within the next few years, of which about one-third will require water in the spring of each year. Once the Anglo-Egyptian partnership shall have ceased to administer the Sudan with more than due regard for the vital interests of Egypt, it may be assumed that British capital will flow into the Sudan and that these 300,000 feddans will extend into the millions. And there is a reason for this. Lancashire today is dependent upon foreign countries for her raw material. The Sudan produces an admirable grade of cotton. Everything tends to show that Manchester will see to it that Britain inquires into the riparian rights of the Sudan and that they are enforced.

The law affecting riparian rights admits of a rule known as "first in time, first in right." This principle compensates foresight and rewards enterprise. It is equitable. It finds its proper application as long as the potential water supply answers all

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existing needs. It recognizes vested rights. It does not, however, give a "first appropriator" a right of preëmption upon the "unappropriated" water supply. It does not exclude the hypothesis that all the arable lands unwatered but irrigable belonging to different proprietors, including the "original appropriator," enjoy an equitable right to an adequate share of the unappropriated water of a stream.

If these principles be as well founded in law as they appear to be sound in equity, it follows that should England retire from Egypt, remain in the Sudan, and give no undertaking as to the "unappropriated water" of the Nile, Egypt will be in immediate peril not only of seeing her future expansion definitely arrested but of having the value of her cotton crop cut to pieces by the increased supply south of her frontiers.

Egypt's present requirements call for 34,000 millions of cubic meters of water. In 1913–14 the supply was insufficient to fill this need. It has already been shown that the quantity available in an "ordinary low year," such as 1902–3 or 1888–89, will not fulfil Egypt's ultimate demands. The maximum known flow of 138,000 will be inadequate for the eventual necessities of both Egypt and the Sudan, whatever reservoirs may be erected in the Sudan to husband the waters of the Nile. It will take decades before the Sudan can be developed to such an extent, particularly as it suffers from a scarcity of population. Governments, however, must think not only of the present, but of the rights of future generations.

It, therefore, is not imperialism but a question of life and death which causes independent Egypt to claim the Sudan. It accordingly is not imperialism but a reluctance to recede from an existing partnership which impels England to refuse to abandon the Sudan. Without a practical monopoly of the "unappropriated waters" of the Nile and the right to erect reservoirs in the Sudan, Egypt cannot expand and will be unable to provide for her increasing population. Without a right at least to an adequate share of this "unappropriated water" stored in reservoirs built on her own soil, the Sudan cannot realize the magnificent future which awaits her. When the Sudan ceases to be an aqueduct she will become a priceless possession; but Egypt will have been dealt a staggering blow. Courageous statesmanship should be able to solve the problem which the abolition of the British protectorate has brought to the fore.

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THE SUDAN DISPUTE

The question of the future political status of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan has entered an acute phase. Even before the British ultimatum following the assassination of Sir Lee Stack on November 19 there had been a rupture of negotiations and both the British and Egyptian Governments had adopted an intransigent attitude which did not promise well for the future.



In ancient times the rulers of Egypt long held extensive territories on the upper Nile. In the nineteenth century, we find that the famous Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, after practically emancipating himself from the control of his master, the Turkish Sultan, and creating an army on European principles, determined to build up an empire to the southward. Gradually Egyptian dominion was extended, until by 1880 the Egyptian Sudan came to include an

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area of about a million square miles with a sparse population of mixed Arabs and negroes. Such a territory was difficult to control, and under a weak and corrupt officialdom there was a great increase of slave raiding at the expense of the black populations beyond. This was finally checked after some hard fighting, chiefly by the efforts of a few European officials of whom the best known are Sir Samuel Baker, the explorer, and "Chinese" Gordon.

In 1882 the revolt of the Egyptian army under Arabi Pasha led to the intervention of the British, who as soon as they had taken the government into their hands were called upon to deal with the political and religious insurrection in the Sudan of the so-called Mahdi. This had spread rapidly; and in 1885 Khartum (which was defended by General Gordon who had been recalled to save the situation) fell after a long siege, just as a British army was arriving to its relief. Gladstone and his ministry thereupon decided to abandon the region to the Mahdists. The latter held it till its reconquest by an Anglo-Egyptian army under Sir Herbert Kitchener in 1898. The Sudan, however, was not restored to its former status. Instead, by a convention signed on January 19, 1899, between the governments of Great Britain and Egypt (which was itself under British rule), the territory south of the 22nd parallel was to be administered by a Governor-General appointed by Egypt with the assent of Great Britain. The British and Egyptian flags were to be used together. The governors of the provinces have been British officers.

Until recently this system has worked well. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, which has made extraordinary progress in the last fifteen years, seems to have been admirably governed and developed. England has good cause to be proud of the result. But now that Egypt has been recognized as an independent state and is no longer under British tutelage, the question as to the actual ownership has become critical. The Egyptians declare that the territory belongs to them and has never ceased to since they first acquired it, that Britain reconquered it solely and explicitly as the guardian and trustee of Egypt,—indeed, that she pointed this out to the French when she required them to withdraw from Fashoda, especially emphasizing that Egypt, whose existence depends on the Nile, must control the upper waters of the river. Since then, the troops stationed there have been paid for chiefly by Egypt, Egyptian officials have been employed in the administration, and deficits in the Sudanese budget have been made up from the Egyptian treasury. As long as Egypt itself was ruled by foreigners, it mattered little that the Sudan was not administered from Cairo, but now that Egypt's right to govern herself is recognized, she is equally entitled to get back all of her territories.

To this the English reply that the case is not parallel, that the Sudan was a foreign colony lost to Egypt through her misrule, that she would never have recovered it by herself, and that she did not get back sole possession of it, as the title "Anglo-Egyptian" recognizes; furthermore, that she is incapable of giving it good government and that the Sudanese, and particularly the Arab tribes, are totally opposed to being handed over to the politicians in Cairo. (This the Egyptians of course deny.) The British admit that Egypt has some rights in the matter, including a guarantee that the Nile water necessary to her shall not be tampered with higher up the stream, but they declare that to restore the Sudan to unadulterated Egyptian authority would mean the undoing of much of the work of the last fifteen years.

The settlement of this difficult controversy was reserved in the 1922 declaration by which England gave her consent to the independence of Egypt. It will not be easy to achieve a permanent arrangement through action by only one of the parties concerned.

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THE FRANCO-SWISS FREE ZONES

By Louis Schulthess

The controversy which has arisen between France and Switzerland regarding the free zones of Haute Savoie and the Gex district may appear secondary in comparison with others which are attracting the world's attention. And yet for Switzerland, and especially for the city of Geneva, it has a very great importance.

Connected with Switzerland by a narrow strip of land which is hardly four kilometers wide, the Swiss city of Geneva, with 140,000 inhabitants, finds



itself shut in by the French regions of Haute Savoie and the district of Gex, of which it is the natural center and the commercial metropolis. In order to live and prosper, Geneva must be in a position to entertain free and easy economic relations with those essentially agricultural regions. It needs them for its food supply, and it is in those regions that the trade of Geneva finds its nearest market.

From immemorial times a special régime facilitated the economic relations of the little Republic of Geneva and its neighbors. In 1603 the Treaty of St.

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Julien established the principle of free trade between Geneva and Savoy, the Genevans being exempt from tolls and custom duties, while in 1602 the same right of exemption had been recognized by France with respect to the district of Gex. This régime was of economic advantage to both parties. Then came the French Revolution. And in 1798 Geneva, after having been an independent republic for several centuries, was annexed to France. In 1813 it recovered its independence, and having expressed its determination to become Swiss was received as a member of the Swiss confederation (1815).

Taking into account the exceptional position of Geneva, the European Powers who in 1814 and 1815 were entrusted with the task of remaking the map of Europe sanctioned under a new form a situation which had existed since the beginning of the seventeenth century. The economic relations between Geneva and the bordering regions, the so-called "free zones," remained exempt from all customs barriers. The Treaty of Paris (November 20, 1815) reëstablished the free zone of Gex, the whole region being placed outside of the French customs; the Treaty of Turin (March 16, 1816) created a similar free zone on the left bank of the Rhone, the small "Zone Sarde."

In 1860 Savoy was united to France. In a plebescite held April 22, 1860, the population of Haute Savoie declared in favor of the annexation, provided the region they inhabited was constituted a free zone. Thus a new free zone came into being, variously known as the "Grande Zone de Savoie" or the "Zone of Annexation." Between those zones, be it noticed, there is the important difference that while Switzerland has definite and mutually covenanted rights in the Gex district and the "Zone Sarde," she has no such rights with respect to the "Grande Zone de Savoie." In the latter the customs immunities which the Swiss enjoyed had been granted only through the free will of the French Government. These immunities were withdrawn by France at the termination of a thirty-year agreement entered into in 1881.

On the other hand, the governments which have succeeded one another in France since 1815 have always recognized that the régime of the smaller zones, being established by international treaties, could not be modified by the action of only one of the parties concerned.

In the spring of 1919 the French Government, whose intention it was to obtain through the Treaty of Versailles the abolition of the whole system of free zones, entered into negotiations with Switzerland. The negotiations were conducted rapidly and resulted in a text which was to become Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles. This Article declares that "the free zones of Upper Savoy and the Gex district are no longer consistent with present conditions, and that it is for France and Switzerland to come to an agreement together with a view to settling between themselves ("de régler entre elles d'un commun accord") the status of these territories under such conditions as shall be considered suitable by both countries."

Adhering to this disposition, the Swiss Government in its note of May 5, 1919, indicated clearly that it would not agree to the unconditional suppression of the system of free zones, and "that in its opinion the question was not the modification of the customs system of the zones as set up by the treaties, but only the regulation, in a manner more appropriate to the economic conditions of the present day, of the terms of the exchange of goods between the regions in question."

The negotiations with a view to establishing a new régime were prolonged and complicated. It would be idle to describe them here. France refused to consider further any solution which would not allow the French customs line to be advanced up to the political frontier—that is, to the very outskirts of

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Geneva. Switzerland, being anxious to assure the maintenance of the ancient and close relations of trade and friendship which have existed between the population of the zones and the adjacent Swiss territories, finally, consented to enter into conversations looking toward a convention which foresaw the transference of the French customs barrier to the political boundary of the two countries. At the same time she emphasized that the reservations made regarding this change in the customs line would be maintained as long as no definite agreement had been reached. The conversations resulted in the convention of August 7, 1921, which contained various provisions designed to facilitate an adjustment to new conditions and which thus appeared to compensate the Swiss for the transference of the French customs line up to the political boundary. The régime of friendly intercourse established by this convention extended not only to the "petites zones" (Zone Sarde and Zone Gex) which are based on international treaties, but also to the "Grande Zone de Savoie" to which Switzerland has no title.

Evidently, the convention could not come into effect before it had been approved by the two states, each according to its own constitutional processes. In Switzerland international treaties which are to last more than fifteen years have to be submitted to popular ratification if 30,000 citizens demand it. Such a referendum having been demanded in this case, the Swiss people on February 18, 1923, rejected by a large majority the proposed customs agreement, thus manifesting its will not to accept a settlement of the question of the zones which would advance the customs line to the political frontier.

Legally and internationally the vote of the Swiss people reëstablished the status quo, inasmuch as the régime established by the international treaties could only be modified through mutual agreement between the two countries. The Swiss Government was in a position to resume the negotiations only on a basis of propositions which did not aim to move the customs line up to the political boundary. It could not fall in with new French suggestions which were little else than an adaptation of the convention already rejected by the Swiss people.

While Switzerland was endeavoring to find a basis on which the negotiations might usefully be resumed, the French Government announced in its note of October 10, 1923, that it was about to put into force a bill which had been passed on February 16, 1923, and which directed that the customs statutes of the free zones be reformed and that the customs line be moved up to the political frontier. Switzerland protested against this decision, affirming that if it were enforced it would violate her covenanted rights and the principles of international law. She added that if no agreement were possible regarding the legal question raised by the interpretation of Art. 435, Par. 2 of the Versailles Treaty (Switzerland holding that according to the wording of the article the free zones are to continue and that only a revision of the statutes is to take place, while France holds that the article abolished the free zones and provided only for an agreement to be concluded between the parties regarding the new régime), the question would have to be decided by a judicial or arbitral organ.

But the French Government held to its course, and though it declared that if agreement were impossible it would not refuse to refer the solution of the question of the zones to arbitration, it nevertheless proceeded on November 10, 1923, without reaching any previous accord with Switzerland, to transfer the French customs posts to the political boundary. From this moment it was impossible for the Swiss Federal Council to pursue the negotiations further, France having set about solving the question in her own

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way and by her own authority. In renewing its protest the Swiss Government declared that the only amicable solution of the conflict was to have recourse to a judicial or arbitral procedure.

Two jurisconsults, one Swiss and the other French, have now prepared a procedure of arbitration which is acceptable to both parties. It was signed in Paris October 30, 1924. According to this agreement the controversy is referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague. Three phases are laid down in the procedure. In the first place, the Court shall consider the question whether Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles has directly abolished the stipulations of the Treaties of Paris and of Turin and of the other supplementary acts concerning the free zones, or whether its object was to have those conventional statutes abolished by a new régime to be agreed upon by the two States concerned. This constitutes the first phase of the proceedings. Having concluded its deliberations about this legal question, and before pronouncing a sentence, the Court shall then set a period within which the two parties may endeavor to settle between themselves the status of the territories in question. During this second phase the Court shall give a semi-official intimation of its opinion, so that the negotiators may act in full knowledge of the situation. If an agreement can be reached within the given time the whole matter is settled and the Court does not need to occupy itself with it further. But if an agreement cannot be reached and ratified, the Court shall—this is the third phase—pronounce its decision regarding the legal question outlined above, and at the same time regulate for a period (the duration of which it is itself competent to fix) the whole complex of questions involved in the execution of Article 435.

The question naturally arises whether this arbitration agreement would have to be submitted to a popular referendum, in accordance with the provisions of the Swiss constitution. Undoubtedly it would. In the same way, a settlement between the parties as provided for in the second phase of the proceedings would be subject to popular ratification. On the other hand, the regulation of the free zones by the International Court, in case a settlement between the parties cannot be reached, would have the character of a sentence and as such, of course, could not be submitted to a referendum.

There are some other provisions which we cannot discuss here in detail but which show even more clearly that the arbitration agreement as it now stands is a compromise, and that both parties have had to make concessions. These concessions were made on both sides in an earnest endeavor to find an amicable way out of a dispute which for five years had beclouded Franco-Swiss relations. The reference of the controversy to the Hague (for which the Swiss Government strove from the beginning) was made possible chiefly owing to the new spirit which has taken hold of public and official opinion in France since last spring, and of which M. Edouard Herriot is the principal exponent. It is also in this spirit that the two Governments have now come to an agreement for the conclusion of a treaty of obligatory arbitration which, from a general point of view, is of even more importance than the settlement of the particular dispute about the free zones. This action accords with the principles so eloquently professed by M. Herriot in his speech at the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 5, 1924, when he said that henceforth the principle of arbitration must more and more be made the cornerstone of international law.

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LES TROIS ANS DE DIPLOMATIE SECRÈTE QUI NOUS MENÈRENT À LA GUERRE DE 1914. By Colonel Converset. Paris: Levallois-Perret, 1924.

A bitter critique of European diplomacy from 1911 to 1914.

DER BEGINN DES KRIEGES 1914. Edited by A. von Wegerer. Berlin: Deutsche Vergesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1924, 66 pp.

A German translation of important Russian telegrams following July 16, 1914.

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Probably the most ambitious historical work ever undertaken. The project embraces some two hundred volumes, covering all the European countries involved in the war and Japan.

HISTOIRE ILLUSTRÉE DE LA GUERRE DE 1914. By G. Hanotaux. Paris: Gounouilhou, 1924– . Sixteen volumes.

Volumes 15 and 16 of Hanotaux's monumental work, covering the period from the Battle of the Somme in 1916 to the Battle of Chemin des Dames in 1918.

PRELIMINARY HISTORY OF THE ARMISTICE. Edited by J. B. Scott. New York: Oxford University Press, 1924, 163 pp.

Contains a translation of German documents of the pre-armistice and armistice periods.

LES PREUVES. LE CRIME DE DROIT COMMUN. LE CRIME DIPLOMATIQUE. By M. Morhardt. Paris: Librairie du Travail, 1924, 380 pp.

A bitter attack on Poincaré designed to show that he was chiefly responsible for the outbreak of the World War.

LA VICTOIRE. By A. Fabre-Luce. Paris: La Nouvelle Revue Française, 1924.

A constructive critique of the policy of force as applied by the Entente in its relations with Germany since 1918.

L' AVENIR DE L'ENTENTE FRANCO-ANGLAISE. By R. Pinon. Paris: Plon, 1924.

A plea for mutual understanding, based on the assumption that a close alliance is rendered impractical by the divergent interests and methods of the two countries.

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LES MINORITÉS NATIONALES D'EUROPE ET LA GUERRE MONDIALE. By T. Ruyssen. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1924, 422 pp.

An excellent study of the relation of nationalism to the causes of the war, and of the effects of war on nationalism.

PAN EUROPA. By R. N. Cudenhove-Kalergi. Vienna: Pan Europa Verlag, 1924.

A defense of the plan for a United States of Europe as the only feasible method of preserving the ascendency of Europe.

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An enthusiastic nationalistic interpretation.

THE CATHOLIC REACTION IN FRANCE. By D. Gwynn. New York: Macmillan, 1924, 186 pp.

A well-written sympathetic interpretation of the revival of Catholicism in France.

MY DUEL WITH THE VATICAN. By A. Loisy. New York: Dutton, 1924, 357 pp.

A contribution to the history of the struggle of French modernism and ultramontanism.

ANNUAIRE GÉNÉRAL DE LA FRANCE ET DE L'ÉTRANGER. Paris: Larousse, 1924, 1107 pp.

The latest edition of the great French annual.

L'AVENIR DU FRANC. By G. Wernlé. Paris: Dunod, 1924.

A competent study of the French financial situation, with suggestions as to stabilization and readjustment.

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An economic, political and cultural survey.

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A history of the Italian liberal party since 1919.

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A translation of the notes exchanged between the Allied and German governments during the Paris Peace Conference.

L'ALLEMAGNE ET LA GUERRE DE L'AIR. By General von Hoeppner. Paris: Payot, 1924.

A competent and reasonably impartial history of the German air campaign in the World War by the commander of the German air forces.

DREI VERDERBER DEUTSCHLANDS. By C. Geyer. Berlin: Dietz, 1924.

A severe attack upon the financial policies of Havenstein, Helfferich and Stinnes, which the author regards as responsible for the present state of German finances.

THE REPARATION PLAN. By H. G. Moulton. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1924, 325 pp.

A favorable analysis of the Dawes Plan, with a long documentary appendix.

THE PRESENT STATE OF GERMANY. By J. H. Morgan. Boston: Small Maynard, 1924, 107 pp.

An interesting brief survey.

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L'ALLEMAGNE ET LES RÉPARATIONS. By P. Noël. Paris: Payot, 1924.
The reparations problem, historical and economic, as viewed by a French commissioner.

RECUEIL DE DOCUMENTS SUR L'HISTOIRE DE LA QUESTION DES RÉPARATIONS. By G. Calmette. Paris: Costes, 648 pp.
Valuable source material.

LA QUESTION DES RÉPARATIONS, 1919–1921. By G. Calmette. Paris: Costes, 1924, 539 pp.
An authoritative history from the French point of view.

THE COLLAPSE OF CENTRAL EUROPE. By K. F. Nowak. New York: Dutton, 1924, 365 pp.
A well-written and interesting survey of events in the Dual Monarchy after Brest-Litovsk.

DIE OSTERREICHISCHE REVOLUTION. By O. Bauer. Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1924.
A history of Austrian transformations since 1917.

DER KÖNIG UND SEIN REICHSVERWESER. By A. von Boroviczeny. Munich: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1924.
An inside history of the last attempt of Emperor Charles to regain his throne in Hungary. The author aims to prove that the plan was backed by the French Government and was frustrated solely by Horthy's reluctance to surrender his power.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By J. Gruber. New York: Macmillan, 1924, 256 pp.
A competent analysis of social and economic conditions in the Czechoslovak state.

THE NEW SLOVAKIA. By R. W. Seton-Watson. Prague: Borovy, 1924, 131 pp.
A competent description by one of the leading authorities on Eastern Europe.

LA LOI POLONAISE DE 1920 SUR LA NATIONALITÉ ET LES TRAITES DE VERSAILLES. By A. de Lapradelle. Paris: Comité des Délégations Juives, 1924.
A criticism of contemporary Polish policy toward minority peoples in Poland.

RUSSLAND'S EINTRITT IN DEN WELTKRIEG. By G. Frantz. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1924, 306 pp.
While giving evidence of a German bias, this work is thorough and important.

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An excellent study of the relation of Russia's foreign debts to her economic recovery.

ALS WIRTSCHAFTSPIONIER IN RUSSISCH-ASIEN. By R. Asmis. Berlin: Stilke, 1924, 234 pp.
Reliable and up-to-date observations on the industrial situation in Siberia and Turkestan.

LA RENAISSANCE DU CAPITALISME DANS LA REPUBLIQUE DES SOVIETS. Paris: Giard, 1924, 448 pp.
An exposition of the more conservative economic trends noticeable recently in Russia.

THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF SOVIET RUSSIA. By S. N. Prokopovich. London: King, 1924, 230 pp.
A valuable statistical analysis.

PROBLEMS OF LIFE. By L. Trotsky. London: Methuen, 1924.
A discussion of Bolshevik efforts to reconstruct the daily life of the Russians.

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THE ROMANCE OF NEW RUSSIA. By M. Marx. New York: Seltzer, 1924, 225 pp.

A brilliant favorable interpretation of the present régime.

The British Empire

THE GREATEST EXPERIMENT IN HISTORY. By Sir Edward Grigg. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924, 216 pp.

An able apology for British imperialism and imperial administration.

THE OUTLINE OF BRITISH TRADE. By D. W. Caddick. London: Harrap, 1924, 160 pp.

A succinct survey.

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A survey of England's constitutional development since the Act of 1911.

THE LABOUR PARTY'S AIM. By Seven Members of the Labour Party. New York: Macmillan, 1924, 96 pp.

An authoritative statement of policy.

THE EVOLUTION OF FRENCH CANADA. By J. C. Bracq. New York: Macmillan, 1924, 476 pp.

A well written work, in a sympathetic and appreciative vein.

EGYPT AND THE ARMY. By P. E. Elgood. New York: Oxford University Press, 1924, 382 pp.

The development of the Egyptian independence movement during the World War period.

LABOUR IN INDIAN INDUSTRIES. By G. M. Broughton. New York: Oxford University Press, 1924.

A doctor's thesis constituting the most thorough study of the subject yet published.

INDIAN PROBLEMS IN RELIGION, EDUCATION AND POLITICS. By Bishop Whitehead. London: Constable, 1924.

A valuable work by the distinguished Bishop of Madras, resident in India for forty years.

INDIAN EMIGRATION. By "Emigrant." London: Milford, 1924.

An authoritative account of Indian emigration during the last century.

THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH. By G. Tregarthen and P. E. G. Bayley. London: Fisher Unwin, 1924, 456 pp.

A new edition of a standard work brought down to 1924.

A HISTORY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA. By J. S. Battye. New York: Oxford University Press, 1924, 480 pp.

A substantial and reliable work.

The Near East

POLITICKA ISTORIJA SRBIJI U DRUGOJ POLOVINI DEVETNAESTOG VEKA. By Z. Zivanovic. Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1924, two volumes, 394, 413 pp.

The first two volumes of a four-volume work on the political history of Serbia.

GREECE AND THE GREAT POWERS. Edited by B. Dewing. Washington: American Friends of Greece, 1924, 96 pp.

A pro-Greek anthology.

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A discussion of the capitulations as an anachronism in international law.

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THE CALIPHATE. By T. W. Arnold. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, 223 pp.
One of the most competent works yet written on the history of the Caliphate.

PETITE HISTOIRE DE SYRIE ET DU LIBAN. By R. P. Lammens. Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1924, 150 pp.
A well-organized summary of the history of Syria and the Lebanon.

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A survey of political conditions in the Near East by a French nationalist.

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LA POLITIQUE DES MANDATS DANS LE LEVANT. By J. Luquet. Paris: Editions de la Vie Universitaire, 1924, 284 pp.
The Near East mandates and the clash of Anglo-French interests.

ANATOLICA. By H. C. Luke. London: Macmillan, 1924.
A descriptive book of high merit on Cyprus, Asia Minor and the Caucasus area.

Africa

AFRICA. By E. Lewin. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, 224 pp.
A clear popular survey of contemporary Africa.

RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT. By W. Hayter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1924, 49 pp.
A constitutional history of the attainment of Egyptian independence.

EGYPT. By H. H. Powers. New York: Macmillan, 1924, 327 pp.
An excellent descriptive work.

GREATER FRANCE IN AFRICA. By W. M. Sloane. New York: Scribners, 1924, 293 pp.
Observations after a trip through Morocco and Algeria.

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A thoroughgoing imperialistic apology for French expansion in northern Africa.

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A lucid survey of the French colonial possessions, with a plea for a more constructive colonial policy.

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A critical account of recent events in Morocco.

The Far East

GLIMPSES OF JAPAN AND FORMOSA. By H. A. Franck. New York: Century, 1924, 235 pp.
A fascinating descriptive volume.

WILLIARD STRAIGHT. By H. Croly. New York: Macmillan, 1924, 569 pp.
A biography, valuable for its light on American relations with the Far East.

LE JAPON D'AUJOURD'HUI. By A. Maybon. Paris: Flammarion, 1924.
A work on the chief currents in Japanese thought and culture since 1867.

ORIENT ET OCCIDENT. By R. Guénon. Paris: Payot, 1924.
A study of methods of establishing better relations between eastern and western peoples. The author upholds the superiority of Oriental culture.

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RED BEAR OR YELLOW DRAGON. By M. E. Harrison. New York: Doran, 1924, 296 pp.

A racy journalistic story of the struggle between Russia and Japan for raw materials and investments in China and Central Asia.

Latin America

THE MONROE DOCTRINE: ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LIFE OF THE STATES OF THE NEW WORLD. By A. Alvarez. New York Oxford University Press, 1924.

A well-documented analysis by a leading South American publicist.

HACIA LA SOLIDARIDAD AMERICANA. By S. G. Inman. Madrid and New York: Committee on Coöperation in Latin America, 1924.

A brief work on Pan-Americanism, containing material on the Santiago Conference of 1923.

A BRIEF BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BOOKS IN ENGLISH, SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE, RELATING TO THE REPUBLICS COMMONLY CALLED LATIN AMERICAN. By P. H. Goldsmith. New York: Macmillan, 1924, 107 pp.

A serviceable guide.

THE PEACE OF AMERICA. By B. Brum. Montevideo: Imprenta Nacional, 1924.

A brief but lucid Uruguayan plea for a league of American states based on principles of equality.

THE MEXICAN YEAR BOOK. Edited by R. G. Cleland. Los Angeles: Times-Mirror Press, 1924, 582 pp.

A reliable compendium for the years 1922-1924.

Miscellaneous

A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES: RECENT TIMES. Edited by C. E. Merriam and H. E. Barnes. New York: Macmillan, 1924, 597 pp.

A voluminous study of developments in political thought since 1880, containing valuable chapters on international law, jurisprudence and racial theories.

POPULATION PROBLEMS. By E. B. Reuter. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1924, 338 pp.

This manual includes sections on immigration and race mixture.

SURVIVAL OR EXTINCTION. By E. M. Friedman. New York: Seltzer, 1924, 297 pp.

An unusually thorough and judicious study of the Jewish problem in the modern world.

THE CHARACTER OF RACES. By E. Huntington. New York: Scribners, 1924, 393 pp.

An original interpretation of the modern racial problem in its relation to the geographical environment.

RACIAL REALITIES IN EUROPE. By L. Stoddard. New York: Scribners, 1924, 252 pp.

An interesting popular work, compounded of anthropological realities and fanciful and obsolete dogmas.

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Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

AERIAL NAVIGATION

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION for Air Navigation. Official Bulletin No. 1– . August, 1922– . [Paris, ed. Blondel La Rougery, 1922– . 30½ cm.

Contents: Official acts relating to the air convention of the 13th October, 1919; Documents relating to the Commission; Additional Items, including revisionary documents.

AGRICULTURE

INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL d'Agriculture. Actes de la septième Assemblée générale, 2–8 mai 1924. Rome, Imprimerie de l'Institut, 1924. xiv, 870 p. 24 cm.

ANGLO-FRENCH NEGOTIATIONS

PAPERS respecting Negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact. London, 1924. 175 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., France No. 1 (1924). Cmd. 2169.) 5s.

ARBITRATION AND ARMAMENT

ARBITRATION, SECURITY AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. General Report submitted to the Fifth Assembly on behalf of the First and Third Committees by M. Politis and M. Bénes. 20 p. 32 cm. (League of Nations. A. 135. 1924.) $.20.

The protocol for the pacific settlement of international disputes is A. 135. II.

REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. Limitation of National Expenditure on Armaments. Replies from Governments. 7, 3 p. 33 cm. (A. 40. 1924. IX.)

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Compare also: Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the League of Nations respecting the Proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance. London, 1924. 14 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., Misc. No. 13 (1924). Cmd. 2200.) 6d.

STATISTICAL Information on the Trade in Arms, Ammunition and Material of War. 89 p. 33 cm. (A. 30. 1924. IX.)

CLAIMS

MIXED CLAIMS COMMISSION. United States and Germany. Opinions and decision in Life-Insurance Claims. (April 17 and September 18, 1924.) Washington, 1924. 103–141 p. 23½ cm.

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COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT

EXTRACTS from International Agreements affecting the Jurisdiction of the Court. Second edition (June 1, 1924). 197 double pages. 24 cm. (Series D, No. 4.) $3.60.

Contents: Jurisdiction of the Court as derived from the instruments establishing it and from decisions of the organs of the League of Nations; II, Jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with (other) treaties and international agreements; Tables.

THE MAVROMMATIS Palestine Concessions. 93 double pages 24½ cm. (Collection of Judgments. Series A. No. 2. August 30, 1924.) $1.60.

QUESTION of the Monastery of Saint-Naoum (Albanian frontier). 27 double pages, map. 24½ cm. (Collection of Advisory Opinions. Series B. No. 9. September 4, 1924.) $.50.

TREATY of Neuilly, Article 179, Annex, paragraph 4 (interpretation). 10 double pages, 1 p. 24½ cm. (Collection of Judgments, Series A. No. 3. September 12, 1924.) $.20.

CUBA

CORRESPONDENCE between His Majesty's Government and the Cuban Government respecting the Ill-Treatment of British West Indian Labourers in Cuba. London, 1924. 21 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., Cuba No. 1 (1924). Cmd. 2158.) 6d.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE between His Majesty's Government and the Cuban Government respecting the Ill-Treatment of British West Indian Labourers in Cuba. London, 1924. 47 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., Cuba No. 2 (1924). Cmd. 2245.) 9d.

DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION

CORRESPONDENCE between His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States of America respecting the Appointment of an Irish Free State Minister Plenipotentiary at Washington. London, 1924. 3 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., United States, No. 2 (1924). Cmd. 2202.) 2d.

ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

MEMORANDUM on Central Banks. 1913 and 1918–1923. Geneva, 1924. 385 p. 25 cm. (League of Nations.) $2.50.

A résumé and analysis of the balance sheets of the central banks in 37 countries, with general introduction concerning their legal status and postwar development and detailed notes explaining the balance sheets.

MEMORANDUM on Currency. 1913–1923. Geneva, 1924. 306 p. 31½ cm. (League of Nations.) $2.50.

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I. Balance of Payments and Trade Tables; II. Trade Statistics of Forty-two Countries.

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BULLETIN of the International University Information Office. 1st year, Nos. 1 and 2– . January–April, 1924– . Quarterly. 24½ cm. (League of Nations, Committee on Intellectual Coöperation.)

EGYPT AND SUDAN

DESPATCH to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan respecting the position of His Majesty's Government in regard to Egypt and the Sudan. London, 1924. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., Egypt No. 1 (1924). Cmd. 2269.) 2d.

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NOTES exchanged between the United Kingdom and Italy approving an agreement for the rectification of a section of the Eritrea-Sudan frontier. London, 1924. 9 p., map. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 29 (1924). Cmd. 2222.) 2s.

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TREATY between the United Kingdom and Italy regulating certain questions concerning the Boundaries of their respective Territories in East Africa. Signed at London, July 15, 1924. London, 1924. 10 p., map. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., Italy No. 1 (1924). Cmd. 2194.) 2s.

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GENERAL TREATY between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Signed at London, August 8, 1924. London, 1924. 14 p. 24½ cm. (Parl. Pap., Russia No. 4 (1924). Cmd. 2260.) 6d.

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FIRST Report by the Commissioner-General of the League of Nations for Hungary. May 1 to 31, 1924. 9 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 250. 1924. II.)

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INTERALLIED RHINELAND HIGH COMMISSION

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ORDINANCES of the High Commission concerning Customs in the Occupied Territories; and regulations and decisions of principle of the Customs Managing Board. July 1, 1921. Mayence, Imprimerie Walter, 1921. vii, 259 p. 24½ cm. (At head of title: Confidential.)

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Contains minutes of plenary and committee meetings and official communications.

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LIQUOR

CONVENTION between the United States and Germany. Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors. Signed at Washington, May 19, 1924. Washington, 1924. 7 p. 23½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 694.)

CONVENTION between the United Kingdom and the United States of America respecting the Regulation of the Liquor Traffic. Washington, January 23, 1924. London, 1924. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 22 (1924). Cmd. 2199.) 2d.

MANDATES

ANNUAL Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of the South Seas Islands under Japanese Mandate for the Year 1923. Prepared by the Japanese Government. 49 p. 26 cm.

CONVENTION between the United States and France. Rights in Syria and the Lebanon. Signed at Paris, April 4, 1924. Washington, 1924. 12 p. 23½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 695.)

GERMANS in the Mandated Territory of Southwest Africa. London, October 23, 1923. London, 1924. 7 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 27 (1924). Cmd. 2220.) 3d.

PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION. Minutes of the Fourth Session, held at Geneva from June 24 to July 8, 1924. 184 p. 33½ cm. (League of Nations, A. 13. 1924. VI.)

REPORT by His Britannic Majesty's Government on the British Mandated Sphere of the Cameroons for the year 1923. London, 1924. 80 p. 24½ cm. (Colonial No. 6.)

REPORT of the Administrator of South Africa for the Year 1923. Union of South Africa. Cape Town, 1924. 64 p. 33 cm. (U. G., 21–1924.)

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MEMEL

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OPIUM

ADVISORY Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs. Report to the Council on the Work of the Sixth Session. August 4 to 14, 1924. 23 p. 33½ cm. (League of Nations. A. 32. 1924. XI.)

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FIRST Opium Conference. Part I, Summary of the Information received from Governments with Regard to Prepared Opium in the European Possessions and Countries of the Far East, 9 p. 33 cm, (League of Nations, C.O.P. I.)

SECOND Opium Conference. Part I. Summary of the Information received from the Governments with Regard to the Production and Manufacture of Raw Opium and Coca Leaves, Opium Derivatives and Cocaine, with Statistical Tables (Years 1920, 1921, 1922 and 1923). 60 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, O.D.C. I.)

REPARATION

AGREEMENTS concluded between (1) The Allied Governments and the German Government concerning the Agreement of August 9, 1924, between the German Government and the Reparation Commission; (2) The Allied Governments and the German Government to carry out the Experts' Plan of April 9, 1924; (3) The Inter-Allied Agreement to carry out the Experts' Plan of April 9, 1924; and (4) The Agreement between the Governments represented on the Reparation Commission to modify Annex II of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles. Signed at London, August 30, 1924. London, 1924. 39 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 36 (1924). Cmd. 2259.) 9d.

PROTOCOL concerning the contributions to be made from the German Budget and the institution of control over the revenues from customs and the taxes on spirits, tobacco, beer and sugar. a. Letter from Mr. Owen D. Young. b. Text of the Protocol. [Paris, 1924.] 12 double pages. 31½ cm. (Reparation Commission. Annex No. 2134 a, b.)

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